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ABSTRACT

Biology, Culture, and Environment: The Struggle
For Hegemony in Arizona
by
Sondra Kae Cosgrove
Dr. Willard Rollings, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor o f History
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This is an examination o f the various cultural groups who have attempted to extend
hegemonic control over what is now the state o f Arizona. Each chapter focuses on the
ways different societies adapted to the region’s challenging environment; paying particular
attention to those that sought to integrate their neighbors into their own socioeconomic
systems, whether by force or through negotiation. The rise and fall of the indigenous
Hohokam civilization marks the first phase in this struggle for hegemony, while conflicts
between Spaniards and Indians characterize the second. The third, and so far, final cycle
concludes with Euro-Americans seizing the region from Arizona’s Hispanic and Native
Americans residents.
A brief preface introduces this work’s underlying, interdisciplinary methodology, while
the body o f the text proceeds chronologically from prehistory to 1886. The first chapter
examines the various prehistoric people who took up residence in Arizona. It describes
how the Hohokam Indians were able to adopt a sedentary lifestyle and then translate their

111
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subsistence success into political power. The chapter concludes with the collapse of
Arizona’s prehistoric political economy due to climatic change. Chapter two then
provides an overview o f the conflicts, beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing
into the early nineteenth century, between Athapascan Indians and Spanish colonists.
Throughout this period, both groups endeavored to exert control over the Southwest’s
trade economy, yet each blocked the other’s efforts.
Chapter three analyzes the American ideology of Manifest Destiny and its role in
westward migration; while the arrival o f Americans in the Southwest and their successful
quest to capture Arizona’s resources is the focus of the remaining chapters. A brief
summation then concludes this work.
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PREFACE

Human occupation o f what is today the state o f Arizona stretches back for thousands
of years. For most o f this time, however, the region’s inhabitants were nonliterate and
therefore left no written records detailing their thoughts, beliefs, or important life events.
While this lack o f documentation does pose a formidable challenge to writing even a
partial state history, it fortunately does not create an impenetrable barrier. Instead, it
merely necessitates utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, conversant in alternative forms
o f evidence, to integrate this community into the larger, historical fabric. As such, this
examination o f Arizona, from prehistory to 1886, will rely heavily on a range of nonhistorical sources. These include the archaeological record as well as theoretical models
from disciplines such as paleoanthropology, psychology, and cultural anthropology.'
The field o f paleoanthropology, in particular, offers tremendous investigative

' This synthetic approach is particularly popular in the field o f psychology where proponents seek not
only universal cognitive processes but also the means for determining how fixed biological traits interact
with known ecological domains to produce varied, yet reliable behavior. Research psychologist Mike
Knight writes, "An egregious error w e have made in doing science in psychology is to think o f prediction
as synonymous with predicting the future. It is possible to formulate hypothesis that make specific
testable predictions about the p a s t. . . In the speculative approach, one first discovers a psychological
m echanism , and then one speculates about what adaptive problem it evolved to solve. The approach
advocated here is the reverse: first, one uses existing and validated theories from evolutionary biology to
define an adaptive problem that the human mind must be able to solve, and then deduce what properties a
psychological mechanism capable o f solving the problem must have. It is a constrained and predictive
approach, rather than a com pilation o f post hoc explanations tor known phenom ena.” See Mike Knight,
"Functional Darwinism: A C ognitive Science Paradigm," P sychological R eco rd 44, no. 2 (Spring 1994):
44. See also Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Genes, People, an d Language (N ew York: North Points Press,
2000), 32, who concurs, “M ultidisciplinary research provides, in a way, a sort o f replication o f an event,
which is generally possible only in experimental science.”

VI
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assistance in interpreting the prehistoric and protohistoric periods. Because paleo
anthropology is an integrated discipline, it brings together under one conceptual umbrella
theories from physical anthropology, archaeology, paleontology, and geology. Paleoanthropological models o f human behavior, therefore, consist of a range of independently
verifiable variables, which makes them more reliable than nonintegrated hypothesis. Such
variables include primary biological traits that are common to all Homo sapien sapiens,
secondary learned behaviors that are known to exist in both past and present human
cultures, and ecological data gathered through scientifically rigorous, environmental
surveys.^
Among the primary biological traits found in paleoanthropological models are
bipedalism, non-specific, omnivorous digestion, opposable thumbs and dexterous fingers,
and the capacity to think symbolically. Such attributes have predictive value as they
produced the behaviors that set humans apart from other species and linked individuals
into symbiotic groups. These capabilities allowed humans to travel long distances while
carrying objects and infants; they produced the ability to process and consume many types
o f food from a wide range o f ecosystems; and they imparted the acumen humans needed
to create tools with which to compensate for absent appendages and diminished physical

^ David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellengrini explain, “Biologically primary abilities are those
that have undergone selection pressure and evolved to deal with problems faced by our ancestors.
Language and sim ple quantitative ability . . . would be exam ples. In contrast, biologically secondary
abilities do not have an evolutionary history but are abilities that are instilled in children by their cultures
to deal with new ‘ecological’ problems unknown to forebears . . . Their novelty reflects a new application
o f biologically primary abilities for purposes other than the original evolutionary-based function." See
David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellengrini, The O rigins o f Human Nature: E volutionary
D evelopm en tal P sychology (W ashington D. C.: American Psychology Association, 2002), 125. See also
Milford FI. W olpoff, P aleoanthropology, 2d ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1999), 146, 159, 163.

V ll
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attributes—such as claws, fangs, and great strength/
More advanced biological features include complex cognition, which allowed for
behavioral plasticity, and vocal communication, which facilitated prolonged childrearing as
well as integrated social living among adults. When combined, these two traits made it
possible for humans to reason about the past and future, to pass accumulated knowledge
on to ofifepring, to mediate conflicts, and to migrate beyond their natal African environ
ment without having to wait for natural selection to alter their collective physiology."*
In examining these more advanced human features, the field of psychology provides
great insight as it offers analytical tools for deconstructing human thought processes and
clues as to how different social and physical environments have shaped human intellectual
development. Because o f this, psychological models are useful for generating plausible
ranges o f behavior within known settings. For instance, psychological theories reveal
likely human reactions to events such as habitat degradation and territorial encroachment
by aggressive outsiders. In addition to this, the field also provides the means for
understanding behavior that may appear to be irrational, yet in fact it makes rational,
evolutionary sense.^

^ The evolution o f an organism is constrained by the amount o f energy it can reasonably extract from
its environment. Every organ and appendage requires a certain amount o f calories to function; the larger
and more com plex, the more calories required. Thus, if an organism selects for a large brain or heart,
there must be reduction in other areas to offset the greater amount o f energy consumed by the specialized
feature. Human evolution selected for a large brain and in the process gave up defensive appendages such
as claws and strength from overly large m uscles. In the end, the larger brain was the better choice as it
created technological appendages to compensate for what was not selected. See John C. Cartwright,
E volutionary E xplanations o f Human B ehavior (N ew York: Routledge Press, 2001).
Leda Cosm ides and John Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer," 1997,
< http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html.(17 September 2003), Online book. See also
Bjorklund and Pellengrini, 80, 96, 100.
’ Bjorklund and Pellengrini, like m any others, argue that whatever, in a broad sense, increases
reproductive success is rational behavior for a species. See Bjorklund and Pellengrini, 262.

V lll
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Psychological studies show that human behavior is rational when it ensures the short
term survival o f the individual. Examples of this would include the theft o f a relative’s
food to avoid starvation or the killing of an ally who momentarily threatens a person’s
wellbeing. As both actions address immediate problems, each would be rational,
regardless o f the fact that they could ultimately lead to lethal retaliation by an offended
party.^
Psychologists also identify behavior as rational if in the long-term it achieves some sort
o f reproductive benefit. An example o f this would be a hunter who divides his kill
amongst his kinsmen with full knowledge that his behavior will reduce the amount of meat
immediately available for his own family. In the present his dependents will have less
sustenance, but in the fiiture, he assumes, they will have more as those who received meat
will feel obligated to reciprocate equally when the roles are reversed. This outcome may
not always occur, yet a sufficiently high success rate will ensure that the behavior
continues.’
Human behavior can even be rational when it leads to immediate, individual death. In
these instances, humans sacrifice themselves for first-order kin, such as siblings and
offspring, by denying their own biological drive to survive. This trait, known as altruism,
baflfied Charles Darwin as it ftew in the face o f his theory of species reproduction. Why,

" Ibid, 193.
’ Kristen Hawkins, "Is The Meat the Hunter's Property?: Big Game, Ownership, and Explanations o f
Hunting and Sharing," in Human D iet: Its O rigins a n d Evolution, ed. Peter S. Ungar and Mark F. Teaford
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29-35; Cartwright, 5.

IX

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

he pondered, would a fit individual sacrifice him or herself for a companion? The answer,
Darwin found, lay in the fact that humans will seek not only to perpetuate their own
genetic code, but will also seek to save others who share their biological inheritance. Over
time, humans have even come to view the perpetuation of cultural inheritance as a
sufficient reason for sacrificing one’s own life for that of a compatriot.*
Beyond the organic components o f human behavior lay secondary traits that, when
understood, also aid in reconstructing human history. The field o f anthropology lends
assistance in interpreting these behaviors; the sum of which anthropologists call culture.
In general, cultural behaviors include all those that humans create to live in specific
physical and social environments, such as religious rituals, courtship practices, and a wide
variety o f actions that fall under the heading of manners. While not as predictive as other
paradigms, cultural theories are still useful as they clarify behavior not readily elucidated
by biological or cognitive models.^
Tlirough their study o f cultural behavior, anthropologists have also discovered the
most enduring forms o f human social organization, with the first and foremost being the
familial band. This grouping o f thirty to fifty relatives appears to have developed
naturally, early in human social evolution and remained the preferred combination for
thousands o f years. It was not until the agricultural revolution began in approximately
10,000 B.C.E. that population density increased sufficiently to necessitate new social

Ralph L. Holloway, "Toward a Synthetic Theory o f Human Brain Evolution," in O rigins o f the
Human Brain, ed. Jean-Pierre Changeux and Jean Chavaillon (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995), 42-5;
Robert Hinde, Why G ods Persist: A Scientific A pproach to R eligion (New York: Routledge Press, 1999),
180-1; W olpoff, 95.
’ Jonathan Haas, "Cultural Evolution and Political Centralization," in From L eaders to Rulers, ed.
Jonathan Haas (N ew York: Kluwer Academ ic/Plenum Publishers, 2001), 13.

X
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configurations. Once this happened, anthropologists argue, new sociopolitical entities
such as tribes, chiefdoms, and eventually states began to appear with a concomitant
redistribution o f decision-making power and access to resources. While these scholars
disagree over the finer details o f how each familial band negotiated the transition from one
social grouping to the next, in their broad interpretations, there is enough agreement to
generally predict how particular human societies managed social change."*
As with any historical undertaking, even one that draws assistance from a variety of
disciplines, a certain amount o f speculation invariably plays a role in developing
conclusions. This is true for this study, yet even here, conjecture will be grounded in three
sound, interconnected premises; a brief review of which will reveal their veracity. The
first is that regardless o f time or place all humans will devote a portion o f their time and
energy to acquiring nutrition, shelter, and reproductive security. Therefore, any
examination o f human life will uncover evidence o f these biologically derived activities.
This evidence, which can range from artifacts such as flint scrappers to various types of
food debris, will then offer insight into a society’s daily activities."
The next assertion is that not only do we know that all humans will seek to meet their

Morton Fried, The E volution o f P o litica l S ociety: An E ssay in P o litica l A nthropology (N ew York:
McGrav/ H ill, 1967), 61-4; Robert M cC. N etting, “Population, Permanent Agriculture, and Politics:
Unpacking the Evolutionary Portmantueau,” in The Evolution o f P o litica l System s: S o cio p o litics in
Sm all-Scale S ocieties, ed. Steadman Upman (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 22-3, 23742; Steadman Upman, “D ecoupling the Process o f Political Evolution,” in The Evolution o f P o litica l
System s: S ociopolitics in Sm all-Scale Societies, ed. Steadman Upman (New York: Cambridge University
Press, I9 90),I2; Fried, 153, 177, 186, 229; Cavalli-Sforza, 96-9.
" Robert Hinde, 17-8, states, “W e all have sim ilar sets o f goals such as food, security, sex, [and] a
need t& make sense o f the world . . . These and other basic human propensities can reasonably be
assumed to be present, to varying degrees, in all individuals . . .” Jonathan Haas also states, 13-5,
“People o f different culture respond to their unique environments in similar ways with a relatively tightly
defined range o f variability.” See also Bjorklund and Pellegrini, 262-3.

XI

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

basic biological needs, but we also know how physiology restricts the ways humans fulfill
those need. For instance, while humans can eat many types o f food and adapt to many
different environmental settings, there are limits to what they can digest and ecosystems in
which they can survive, (e.g., humans cannot extract nutrients fi'om many forms o f nonorganic matter, and they cannot endure without sufficient supplies o f water). These
restrictions are all the more rigid for groups that possess only simple forms of technology,
as they have more difficulty manipulating their surroundings. Thus, if ecological setting
and level o f technology are known variables—which they can be with a fair degree of
certainty through dendrochronology and the archaeological record—it is possible to
generate plausible narratives that describe how particular humans fed, sheltered, and
reproduced themselves.'^
And lastly, due to the evolutionary selection in Homo sapien sapiens for a large brain
over other traits that facilitate solitary living—such as appendages that serve as defensive
weapons—humans must live in groups to ensure proper juvenile maturation and to
decrease the likelihood o f premature death among all members. Consequently, any
historical study o f normal humans will find evidence o f some form of bonded living. While
humans may express this trait in a variety o f ways, in every society there will be a basic
distribution o f power and resources as well as mechanisms for suppressing

" Arthur S. Keene, "Nutrition and Economy," in The A n alysis o f Prehistoric D iets, ed. Robert E.
Gilbert and James H. M ielke (Orlando: Academ ic Press, 1985), 156-9, 175, 180; Patricia A. Gilman,
W andering Villagers: P it Structures, M obility a n d A griculture in Southeastern Arizona, Anthropological
Research Paper, no. 49 (Phoenix: Arizona State University, 1997), 8-9.

XU
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egocentric tendencies in favor of community cohesion."
In summation, to integrate all of Arizona’s inhabitants into a larger historical
framework, this study will employ an interdisciplinary approach suited for uncovering and
interpreting a wide spectrum o f human behavior. To this end, it will purposefully
emphasize Arizona’s prehistoric and protohistoric periods, and will seek to integrate
within the storyline the perspectives o f later-arriving immigrants who also lacked written
communication skills. It will utilize a wide variety o f methodologies, theories, and models
to create a three dimensional narrative that does not categorize subjects as “advanced”,
“simplistic,” or “barbaric.” Nor will it pander in suppositions that imply that biology or
culture predestined some groups to triumph over others. Instead, it will proceed under the
assumption that each historical figure is equal to all others and that history is a composite
o f thousands o f minute, highly contingent variables, which could have produced hundreds
o f alternative endings.
As I finish, I would like to thank all those people who assisted me in this process. My
family deserves much o f my gratitude. They never wavered in their support, even when I

Studies from a variety o f fields substantiate this assertion; the most current com es from the field o f
developmental psychology. This research demonstrates that human phenotype and cognitive capabilities
derive from a combination o f specialized biological features and generalized m echanism s created through
childhood interaction with social and physical environments. It shows that to accommodate our specie’s
large brain and cranium, evolution selected for human infants who arrived premature and helpless and
then spent an extended and intensive childhood learning from adults which biological behaviors to
express and in what form that expression should take. Evolutionary biologists and geneticists also show
the even after childhood, humans require group living to survive. Through statistical analysis CavalliSforza, 30, documents that individuals in a society require access to approximately 500 other individuals
to avoid interbreeding. See also Bjorklund, 21, 100; and Richard B. Lee, “Primitive Communism and the
Origin o f Social Inequality,” in The E volution o f P o litica l System s: Sociopolitics in Sm all Scale S ocieties
(N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 245. Lee states, “D espite our seem ing adaptation to life
in hierarchical societies, there are signs that humankind retains a deep rooted desire for a sense o f
community. A ll theories o f justice revolve around these principles, and our sense o f outrage at the
violation o f these norms indicates the depth o f its gut-level appeal.”

X lll
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was certain that I would never complete this project. While writing is often a lonely
endeavor, this study is as much the product o f the careful editing o f my colleagues, as it is
my own. To my fellow graduate students, I say thank you. Lastly, I would like to thank
my committee members for standing by me and seeing me through to the end o f my
journey. My life certainly would have been much more trying without the guidance of
these fine scholars.
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CHAPTER 1

INDIGENOUS ARIZONA AND THE FIRST
COMPLEX CIVILIZATION
At some point between 40,000 and 20,000 B.C.E.' the earth entered into a new glacial
cycle causing a worldwide drop in ocean levels. As a result, a land bridge appeared
connecting Eurasia with the Americas. This event allowed humans to migrate from what
is now Siberia into what is currently Alaska. Once in North America these migrants
encountered the massive Laurentide glacier covering all o f present-day Canada and the
Cordillian ice sheet spread across the landscape west of the Rocky Mountains.’
After squeezing between these two giant mountains o f ice, some families eventually
arrived in the region that is today the Great Plains of the United States. There they

' 1 w ill use the date markers B.C.E. and C.E. to the historic periods; I w ill then only state the date.
2

Conclusive data links Amerindians with Siberians in Cavalli-Sforza, 82-3, 140. A new theory,
backed by osteological evidence, has begun to challenge the exclusivity o f the land-bridge interpretation
and posits that humans from southern A sia or possibly Australia arrived in the Americas earlier than the
Siberian migrants. A s human morphological features are the product o f both genetics and environment, it
w ill take more than variations in bone structure to displace the accepted hypothesis. Studies o f D N A
sequencing show little connection between south A sia and the Americas. According to Cavalli-Sforza,
“G enetic tests put the first m igration into th e A m ericas at about 32,000 years ago. E xternal
characteristics are unreliable as they are influenced by both genes and by the environmental conditions o f
the individual’s development; they change rapidly in response to factors such as nutrition and external
temperature.” See also Stuart J. Fiedel, P reh istory o f the A m ericas (Cambridge; Cambridge University
Press, 1992), 44-51; Steve Connor, "Does Skull Prove That First Americans Came From Europe,"
Independent on the Web, 3 December 2002,
< http://news.independent.co.uk/world/science_m edical/story.jsp?story=358001>(20 September 2003);
"Human Skulls Are 'oldest Americans," B ritish B roadcast N etw ork on the Web, 3 December 2002,
< http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/sci/tech/2538323.stm.>(20 September 2003).
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discovered a lush biome with abundant vegetation and herds o f large herbivores. After
months o f trekking over bleak snow-covered terrain, they were probably much relieved to
find such an oasis. In the process o f adapting to their new home, these first Americans
created an innovative cultural complex that paleoanthropologists identity as the Clovis
tradition. In general, Clovis society consisted o f small familial bands, governed by rules of
reciprocal exchange, which foraged widely and hunted large animals when the opportunity
arose.’
For years researchers explained the Clovis aptitude for big-game predation by
emphasizing cultural traits that supposedly imparted extraordinary skill to their hunters.
Recent studies, however, have abandoned this approach and now explain Clovis prowess
in light o f evidence that humans will shun energy-expensive behavior unless assured of
achieving some sort o f benefit."* Thus, with only simple forms of technology, current
investigators argue, pointing to subsistence practices alone as being key to Clovis hunting
skill is mistaken, as the Clovis clearly lacked the tools needed to substantially improve
their predation success. As such, it is necessary to also examine the American

^ Waldo R. W edel, C entral P lains Prehistory: H olocene Environm ents an d C ultural Change
(Lincoln; U niversity o f Nebraska, 1986), 39-42; D aniel G. Landis, Life On The Line: Archaic, Cohonina,
a n d Sinagua Settlem en ts in W estern A rizo n a , Soil System s in A rchaeology, no. 19 (Tucson: Soil System s
Publications, 1993), 34-5.
'* Adrienne Zihlman, "The Paleolithic Glass Ceiling: Women in Human Evolution," in Women in
Human Evolution, Qd. Lori D. Hager (N ew York: Routledge Press, 1997), 99; Victor A. Carbone and
Benne C. Kul, "Preservation o f Plant and A nim al Remains," in The Analysis o f P rehistoric D iets, ed.
Robert I. Gilbert and James H. M ielke (Orlando: Academ ic Press, 1985), 3, 12-33; Alison W yle, "Good
Science, Bad Science, or Science as Usual?: Fem inist Critique o f Science," in Women in Human
E volution, ed. Lori D. Hager (N ew York: Routledge Press, 1997), 29-55; Keene, 72-4, 159.
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environment to accurately determine what enhanced the Clovis’ ability to kill large game/
Aceording to the most plausible environmental hypothesis, the Clovis excelled at
hunting due to American herbivores evolving for thousands of years apart from humans.
Because o f this, they were slow to recognize hunters as predators and for at least a few
generations did not react to humans by fleeing. Any time and energy hunters expended in
pursuit o f these large animals, then, would have likely resulted in a successful kill. Hence,
each felled animal would have reinforced the notion that hunting was a reasonably efficient
means for acquiring nutrition as well as other animal by-produets.^
With secured access to a high quality food souree, the Clovis thrived and spread
beyond the Plains. The conditions sustaining their economic bonanza could not last
forever, though, and finally came to an end when the Pleistocene gave way to the
Holocene epoch at approximately 10,000 B.C.E. This climatie transition shifted global
weather patterns and brought inereasing aridity to many parts o f the Amerieas. The result

’ Until recently, m any paleoanthropologists argued that hunting was the basis o f human social and
physical evolution. Their bias resulted from an over reliance on the fossil record, which tends to only
preserve durable artifacts such as bones and flint. A s it is much harder to find preserved remains
indicative o f gathering activities, current paleoanthropologists now also take into consideration
ethnographies that demonstrate that up to 70 percent o f a band’s food comes from vegetation and sm all
prey. For more on this, see Donald C. Johanson and Maitland A. Edey, "Why did Lucy Walk Erect?," in
The B iological B asis o f Human Behavior: A C ritica l R eader, 2d ed.. Advances in Human Evolution
Series, ed. Robert W. Sussman (N ew Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), 86-101.
* In low technology societies every activity expends physical energy that must be replenished.
Humans in such groups must think ahead to ensure that they do not spend more energy than there is food
available to erase their caloric deficit. The riskiest type o f nutrient acquisition for humans is big gam e
hunting as it expends large numbers o f calories without a guarantee o f recouping calories. Therefore, only
when the risks are lower and the benefits more assured, w ill humans focus more intently on this form o f
procurement. See Wayne D. Carroll et al.. B ackground Paper: H istorical O verview O f The Southern
F orest Landscape A n d A sso cia ted R esources,< http://wwwlsrs.fs.fed.us/sustain/report/histrynf.htm>(13
November 2003), Clemson University Forest Resource Department; Martha Tappen, "Deconstructing the
Serengeti," in M eat Eating & Human Evolution, ed. Craig B. Stanford and Henry T. Bunn (N ew York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 15-26; Blaire Van Valkenbugh, "The Dog Eat D og World O f Cam ivory:
A Review o f Past and Present Carnivore Community Dynamics," in M eat Eating & Human Evolution, ed.
Craig B. Stanford and Henry T. Bunn (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 101-121.
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was leaner habitats. No species felt the consequences of this change more than the large
herbivores. By selecting for large bodies, evolution had enabled them to withstand attacks
by deadly Pleistocene carnivores, yet this also made them vulnerable to extinction should
the calories available from the environment drastically shrink. When this happened at the
onset o f the Holocene, the large, hulking bodies that had served them well for thousands
o f years became a fatal liability.’
As their domain contracted, many large animals began to starve to death. With
gestation among these species often lasting for more than twelve months and adolescent
sexual maturation taking ten to fifteen years, remaining members were physically unable to
replace their departed companions before they too succumbed. Ultimately, numerous
giant species went extinct worldwide, with an almost complete disappearance in the
Americas. In response to losing this prime food source, the Clovis created a new lifeway
known as the Folsom Culture, which placed a greater emphasis on plant foraging,
scavenging, and the hunting o f small animals.*
Similar to the rest o f North America, the transition to the Holocene substantially
altered the climate o f what is today the Southwest o f the United States. During the
Pleistocene the local climate had been mild, with little fluctuation between summer and
winter. Such conditions encouraged a proliferation o f both food and nonfood resources.
Resident Clovis bands took advantage o f this richness by traversing the area in large.

^ Scott A. Elias, The Ice-A ge H istory o f Southwestern Park, 1997,
< http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/People/paleoindians.html> (10 September 2003).
* Robert S. Thompson and Katherine H. Anderson, C lovis Point: Past C lim ate A n d Vegetation
Changes In The Southwestern U nited States,
< http://geochange.er.usgs.gov/sw/im pacts/biology/pastclim > (10 September 2003); Linda Cordell,
A rch aeology o f the Southwest, 2d ed. (San D iego; Academ ic Press, 1997), 90.
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mobile bands that foraged for an array o f plants and hunted a variety of large and small
animals. When the giant herbivores began to die out in the early years o f the Holoeene,
these families adopted the new Folsom tradition. Folsom cultural strategies then
predominated in the Southwest until approximately 5000 B.C.E. when the increasingly
arid climate once again forced the emergence of new desert cultures that focused even
more on extensive foraging and small animal predation. These traditions included the
archaic Amargosa, San Dieguito, Chiricahua, and Cochise.^
Throughout the Southwest, summers became hotter, winters cooler, and rainfall more
varied. Archaic families survived by maximizing returns from their topographically diverse
homeland, which included arid flatlands, riverine basins, jagged plateaus, and chains of
alpine mountains. Now, instead o f ranging widely over the horizontal landscape, they
traveled over shorter, more vertical distances in a seasonal round that coordinated
staggered lowland to upland harvests. As families moved from one ecological zone to the
next, they foraged for drought-tolerant grasses, seeds, and fruits, while hunting both
desert and mountain adapted animals."*
In addition to reorganizing their economic behavior. Southwestern peoples also altered

’ Laurance D. Linford, A rch aeological Investigation in W est-Central A rizona, Archaeological Series,
no. 136, ed. John F. Robertson (Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1979), 32; Landis, 33; Elias,
"Paleoindian And Archaic Peoples.”
Terah L. Sm iley, "Paleo-Ecological Evidence," in The Cochise C ultural Sequence in Southeastern
Arizona, ed. E.B. Sayles et al.. Anthropological Papers o f University o f Arizona, no. 42 (Tucson:
University o f Arizona Press, 1983), 20-5; Bruce B. Huckell et al.. O f M arshes an d M aize: P receram ic
A gricultural Settlem ents in the C ienega Valley, Southeastern A rizona (Tucson: University o f Arizona
Press, 1995), 24-5; W illiam W. W asley, "Environmental Setting," in The Cochise Cultural Sequence in
Southeastern Arizona, ed. E.B. Sayles et al.. Anthropological Papers o f University o f Arizona, no. 42
(Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1983), 6-16; Mark R. Hackbarth, A rchaic a n d Hohokam
O ccupation o f the M ayo B ou levard P ro ject A rea in N ortheastern Phoenix, A rizona (Phoenix: City o f
Phoenix Parks, Recreation, and Library Department, 1998), 9.
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their social structures to fit the new environmental constraints. With food more dispersed,
they replaced aggregating in extended, femilial groups that exploited big game with
smaller, nuclear bands that judiciously partook o f resources from more limited territories.
To hedge against drought-induced femine, they still maintained widespread trading
contacts, yet now they only rendezvoused with distant family members when abundant
food sources would allow. Ultimately, the result of this increasing social atomization was
a higher degree o f isolation that promoted cultural differentiation."
Between 9000 and 2000 B.C.E., these small archaic bands drifted away from one
another with some traveling into what is today Arizona. These first inhabitants scattered
across the region until almost every human-fiiendly niche had a resident population.
Those who made their way into the eastern Mogollon Mountains lived mainly in the
upland environs, which, unlike the valleys, had numerous small springs and streams. Over
time, they conformed to the limits o f their habitat by relying more heavily on mountain
resources during the summer and maintaining extensive trading contacts with groups
outside their climatic zone during the winter.*’
Farther north, above the Mogollon Rim on the Colorado Plateau, streams and rivers
were even more unreliable as they could disappear one year and then overflow the next

“ M. Steven Shackley, "Range and M obility in the Early Hunter-Gatherer Southwest," in E arly
Form ative A daptation s in the Southern Southwest, ed. Barbra J. Roth, Monographs in World History, no.
25 (Madison: Prehistory Press, 1996), 7; Huckell, 1.
National Park Service, D ouble A dobe Site,
<http://tps.cr.nps.gov/nhl/detail.cfh?ResourceId=86&ResourcedT(3 September 2003); Richard CiolekTorrello, "Sites o f the Early Formative Period," in E arly Farm ers o f the Sonoran D esert: A rch aeological
Investigations a t the Houghton R o a d Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson:
Statistical Research, 1998), 229; Eric J. Kaldahl, "Climate, Vegetation, and Dendrochronology," in Living
on the Edge on the E dge o f the Rim: E xcavations an d A nalysis o f the S ilver C reek A rch aeological
R esearch Project, I9 9 3 -I9 9 8 , ed. Barbara J. M ills et al., Arizona State Museum Archaeological Series
192, vol. 1 (Tucson: A rizona State M useum, 1999), 11-5; Huckell, 14.
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with devastating floods. Likewise, rain often neglected the region for months on end and
then would suddenly reappear in the form o f thunderbursts that selectively drenched small
areas while leaving vast spaces bone dry. Such conditions made life tenuous and
unpredictable yet did not deter settlement. Once migrating bands discovered the region’s
sandstone aquifers, which drained watersheds fi’om farther to the north, they began
congregating near relatively stable and productive alluvial fans.*’
Residents o f the south-central basins were very fortunate as their lowlands valleys
offered generous supplies of water from the Santa Cruz and San Pedro Rivers as well as
an above average ten to twelve inches o f rainfall per year. This moisture supported plant
species ranging from the desert agave to the mountain piflon pine, which supplied
residents with ample amounts o f carbohydrates, while scores o f rabbits, deer, and various
small rodents provided fat and protein. The territory’s topography also contributed to a
secure way o f life, as the basins were narrow enough to allow for the gathering o f a
variety o f upland foods within a day’s walk o f lowland water sources.'"*
In the central valleys, along the perennial Salt and Gila Rivers, it was not a lack o f
water that restricted human habitation, but instead the relatively wide expanses that
separated lowland water supplies from more plentiful upland foods. This distance made it
more time consuming, and thus costly, to move between riverine and alpine resources.
Resident families therefore either had to travel extensively or establish stable villages

" Jeffery S. Dean, C hronological A nalysis o fT s e g i Phase S ites In N ortheastern A rizona, Papers o f
the Laboratory o f Tree-Ring Research, no. 3 (Tucson; University o f Arizona Press, 1969), 15, 87.
Paul R. Fish, "The Hohokam: 1,000 Years o f Prehistory in the Sonoran Desert," in D ynam ics o f
Southwestern Prehistory, ed. Linda S. Cordell and George Gumerman (W ashington D. C.: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1989), 22; Huckell, 2.
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close to the rivers and then periodically dispatch band members to live and gather food in
the adjacent mountains. Over time, riverine bands also entered into trade alliances with
families living in the east who were looking to exchange upland commodities for lowland
products."
Inhabitants in the far west faced the greatest challenge as they lived in one of the
Southwest’s harshest ecological zones. Their territory encompassed the lowest, and
therefore, hottest part o f the Sonoran desert, where fresh water, apart from rivers such as
the Colorado and Gila, was so scarce that in many places it was nonexistent. To
overcome this obstacle, archaic bands had to carefully establish residences in a variety of
locations to ensure maximum access to seasonal resources, while concurrently shielding
themselves from extreme high and low temperatures as well as recurrent floods. In the
northwest, bands also had to contend with numerous steep-walled canyons, which made

Connie L. Stone and Todd W. Bostwick, "Environmental Contexts and Archaeological Correlates;
The Transition to Farming in Three Regions o f the Arizona Desert," in E arly Form ative A daptation s in
the Southern Southwest, ed. Barbara J. Roth (Madison: Prehistory Press, 1996), 19; Rein Vanderpot, Eric
E. Klucas, and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, eds.. From the D esert to the M ountains: A rch aeology o f the
Transition Zone The State Route 87-Sycam ore C reek P roject (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999), 95-6;
Eric Eugene Klucas, "Round Valley," in From the D esert to the Mountain: A rch aeological Transition
Zone The State Route 87-Sycam ore C reek P roject, ed. Rein Vanderpot, Eric Eugene Klucas, and Richard
Ciolek-Torrello, Technical Series, no. 73, vol. 1: Prehistoric Sites (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999),
85.
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travel and therefore the search for food and water that much more difficult."
Despite these and other challenges, archaic groups throughout Arizona persevered and
eventually began to thrive. They were so successful that by approximately 3500 B.C.E.
their varying subsistence strategies had raised population levels to the limits of the region’s
carrying capacity. When this happened, the largest groups began to routinely find it
impossible to escape localized drought or poor harvests without encroaching on their
neighbors. This dilemma led some southern families to search for and eventually discover
a low-cost means for increasing their food supply without having to expand their territory:
plant cultivation."
Living as they were on the peripheiy o f the Mesoamerican periphery, these southern
bands maintained trading contacts with people in modern-day Chihuahua and Sonora, who
had acquired and adapted com and squash to make them amenable to desert, floodwater

" W illiam Price wrote, “These Indians seem very destitute, and it is miraculous how they are enabled
to secure an existence in this barren waste o f a country. They say they rely on grass seeds and mescal; we
did not see even a rabbit in several hundred m iles o f the country they occupied.” See W illiam R. Price, "A
Scout A m ong the Havasupai and Hualapais Indians," in E yew itness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed.
Peter C ozzens (M echanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 227. W hile stationed in northern Arizona,
American Charles K ing also wrote o f the plateau region, “From northwest to southeast run great parallel
ranges o f sterile mountains, like waves o f the stormiest sea— only that the farther you get into the
northeast and northern sections o f the territory the more abrupt, jagged, and precipitous they become; the
more tumultuous is the upheaval, and from broad valleys lying deep and sheltered between, you com e
upon narrow, tortuous canyons, so deep, so narrow that w hile it seem s possible to hurl your hat across the
widest o f the lot, you look down into depths unfathomable, and by winding ‘goat trails’ and hours o f
dizzying clim bing and sliding, som etim es on all fours, you m anage to cross.” See "On Campaigning in
Arizona," in Eyew itness to the Indian Wars, I8 6 5 -I8 9 0 , ed. Peter Cozzens (M echanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2001), 162; Joan S. S chneider, “Project B ackground," in O f Stone a n d Spirits: Pursuing
the P ast o f A ntelope H ill, Technical Series, ed. Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altusch, no. 76 (Tucson:
Statistical Research Publishers, 2000), 14; Landis, 40.
" Chester A. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, "Research Design," in E arly Farm ers o f the
Sonoran D esert: A rch aeological Investigations a t the Houghton R o a d Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard
Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1998), 42; Ofer Bar-Yesef, "From Sedentary Foragers to
V illage Hierarchies: The Em ergence o f Social Institutions," in The O rigins o f Human S o cia l Institutions,
Proceedings o f the British Academ y (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 50; Huckell, 2-3, 16.
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farming.'* With reliable rivers, adequate rainfall, and nearby mountains that allowed
groups to tend gardens without abandoning upland foraging, these southern families had
the conditions necessary to adopt domesticated crops without having to drastically alter
their subsistence methods. If adopting such plants had required more than modest
changes, it is very likely that they would have seen this option as too risky and rejected it,
but this was not the case.’^
After being adopted in the south, domesticated com and squash spread through
kinship trading networks to other areas possessing conditions amenable to cultivation. In
the mountainous regions just to the north of the San Pedro River, families living in suitable
basins imitated their southern kin by augmenting their available lowland resources with
small gardens. Due to their greater likelihood o f experiencing drought, however, they
continued to rely mostly on wild, upland foods. Similarly, bands residing in higher
elevations had to contend with a short frost-free growing season. Thus, like their lowland
kin, they adopted horticulture, but protected themselves from crop failure by continuing to
devote a lion’s share o f their energy to foraging and trading with lowland partners.
Paleoanthropologists identify this new mixture o f subsistence strategies characteristic of

Carla R. Van West and W illiam L. Deaver, “Introduction, in E l M acayo: A P rehistoric Settlem ent
in the U pper Santa Cruz R iver Valley, ed. W illiam L Deaver and Carla R. Van West, Statistical Research
Technical Series, ed. Jeffery H. Altschul, no. 74 (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 5; Steven D. Shelly,
“O steological Description on the Macaw Skeletal Rem ains,” in E l M acayo: A P rehistoric Settlem ent in
the U pper Santa Cruz R iver Valley, ed. W illiam L. Deaver and Carla R. Van W est, Statistical Research
Technical Series, ed. Jeffery A ltschul, no. 74 (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 128.
” Stephen Plog, "Agriculture, Sedentism, and the Environment in the Evolution o f Political
Systems," in The Evolution o f P o litica l System s: S ocio p o litics in Sm all-Scale S eden tary Societies, ed.
Steadman Upman (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 182-3.
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eastern Arizona as the MogoUon tradition/"
Over time some o f these MogoUon farmers migrated northward onto the Colorado
Plateau, carrying with them their domesticated plants and horticultural know-how. The
Plateau’s arid and unpredictable environment, however, necessitated modifications. The
end result was the emergence of dry farming techniques that maximized the region’s high
water table and hedged against locaUzed crop failure through multi-zone plantings. At the
time it seemed that this new, sparse society would be ephemeral and destined to fade
away; yet, in looking back, it is plain to see that this was not a trivial settlement. On the
contrary, these hardy migrants’ descendents would one day become the Western Branch
o f the fabled Anasazi culture.^'
Unlike the southern and eastern vaUeys, which were suited to floodwater farming, the
central basins offered an ideal setting for irrigation horticulture as they hosted two large,
perennial rivers fiUed with ample supplies o f water and soil-replenishing silt. Bands Uving
along the GUa River were the first to adopt this more intensive and thus dependent form of

Huckell writes that catastrophic freezes occur at the higher elevations on average every thirteen
years. See Huckell, 135-7. In 1875, Army surgeon L.Y. Loring wrote o f this region, “The soil is
cultivated to a slight extent, and their [Coyotero Apaches] method o f cultivation is o f the simplest
description . . .It is observed that they now cultivate more land than formerly, when they were not under
government subjection.” See L.Y. Loring, “Report on [the] Coyotero Apaches,” in E yew itness to the
Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (M eehanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 193. See also
Stone and Bostwick, 18; Kaldahl, 21-24; Stephen Plog, 182-3; Huckell, 12-3; Richard Ciolek-Torrello,
"Sites o f the Early Formative Period," in E arly Farm ing in the Sonoran D esert: A rch aeological
Investigations at the H oughton R oad Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson:
S tatistical R esearch, 1998), 230.
R.G. Matson, "The Spread o f M aize to the Colorado River Plateau," A rch aeology Southwest, no. 13
(1999),http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/Research/spread_of_m aize.htm (!0 September 2003); Laurie
W einstein, "Introduction," in N ative P eo p les o f the Southwest: N egotiatin g Land, Water, a n d E thnicity,
ed. Laurie W einstein (Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 4-5; Richard Ciolek-Torrello, "Summary
and Conclusions," in E arly Farm ers o f the Sonoran D esert: A rch aeological Investigations a t the
Houghton R o a d Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1998),
276.
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cultivation by minimizing risks associated with crop failure. They did this by reinforcing
upland trade contacts and by actively nurturing wild plants in the surrounding deserts.
Due to this ingenuity, these riverine bands were the first to produce a consistent surplus of
food, which eventually allowed them to settle in permanent villages. Once established,
these sedentary farmers then started down the path to become Arizona’s first complex
civilization: the Hohokam.^^
As would be expected, bands living in the far west had the most difficulty adopting
crops as low rainfall, ephemeral streams, and long distances separating fertile lowlands
fi'om upland resources fimstrated their efforts. Even along the Colorado River farming
was precarious due to its regular and often violent floods. Groups who managed to
cultivate domesticated plants protected themselves by maintaining extensive trading
contacts and by continuing to rely on desert-adapted gathering and hunting techniques.
Families who decided to forsake crops persisted in a mobile existence and reaped
peripheral benefits by trading with riverine settlements along the Colorado River and in the
Hohokam basins. Paleoanthropologists identify this last cultural tradition as the Patayan.^^

Susan K. Fish and Paul Fish, "Prehistoric Environment and Agriculture A m ong the Hohokam o f
Southern Arizona," in N ative P eoples o f the Southwest: N egotiatin g Land, Water, a n d E thnicity, ed.
Laurie W einstein (Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 29-32; Ciolek-Torrello, “Summary,” 275;
McC. N etting, 59-60; Donald E. Weaver, Investigations Concerning The Hohokam C lassic P erio d in the
Lower S alt R iver Valley (Phoenix: A rizona Archaeological Society, 1977), 11.
Later accounts o f life on the river illustrate the difficulties the Indians faced. According to the
commander o f Fort Mojave, established in 1859, “The surrounding country is a desert except in the river
bottoms and sloughs [,] chiefly below the post where the Indians are able to raise som e Corn, Beans, [sic]
m elons, and pumpkins after the overflow in May and June. The C hief [sic] reliance o f the Indians
however is the m esquite bean. The mountains on either side o f the river are barren and destitute o f
timber, springs o f water are seldom found, and the sterility o f the country is apparent in every direction as
far are the eye can reach. See Irene J. Brenan, ed.. F ort M ojave, 1859-1890: L etters o f the Com m anding
O fficers (Manhattan, KS: M A /AH Publishing, 1980), 95; Landis, 39-40; Joan S. Schneidfer, "Project
Setting and History," in O f Stone a n d Spirits: Pursuing The P ast o f A ntelope H ill, ed. Joan S. Schneider
and Jeffery H. Altschul (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2000), 14.
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Regardless o f the level at which different groups practiced horticulture, unprocessed
com was not sufficiently nutritious to allow even part-time formers to rely on it as a
dietary staple. Those who tried would have experienced the ravages of malnutrition due
to a lack o f protein and essential amino acids such as lysine and tryptophan, as well as
deficiencies in niacin, calcium, and iron. Consequently, Arizona’s prehistoric inhabitants
did not reduce their reliance on wüd plants until they acquired domesticated legumes and
advanced food processing techniques. This occurred around 1 C.E. when Mesoamerican
beans and ceramic boiling pots traveled up the same southern trade routes that com and
squash had arrived along years earlier.^'*
Legumes provided protein and the amino acids tryptophan and lysine, while ceramic
cooking vessels allowed for boiling, which released com’s nutritious inner core and
leached minerals into the resulting gmel. Once these additions to domesticated food
production took hold, southem fomilies living where water supplies minimized the risk of
crop failure and nearby mountains allowed for quick trips to upland zones, slowly began
expanding their gardens. Then, as before, once these peoples adopted this more
dependent form o f subsistence, related bands living in adjacent territories slowly copied
their innovations.^^
As domesticated foods became prominent in the Southwestem diet, farming families
discovered that they would need to save an adequate supply o f seeds fi-om one year to the
next to allow for future crops. t^Tiile storage pits and basketry were already established as

Stephanie M. W hittlesey, "Ceramics," in E arly Farm ers o f the Sonoran D esert: A rch aeological
Investigations o f the Houghton R o a d Site, Tucson, Arizona, ed. Richard Cioleck-Terroiio (Tucson:
Statistical Research, 1998), 163-4; Huckell, 112; Gilman, 8-9, 12-3, 112.
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means for caching foods, neither method proved reliable for the type o f moisture-free and
vermin resistant storage that seed-corn required. ' Some innovators eventually realized that
the same ceramic pots that were capable of withstanding boiling water could be altered to
make them almost airtight. Onee this happened, these bands then began storing not only
seeds but also surplus food.^"
From approximately 200 to 600 C.E., bean cultivation, pottery technology, and other
accoutrements o f sedentary living spread throughout Arizona. As each group adopted
these innovations, new cultural forms began to appear that ranged from minor
modifications o f older traditions to dramatic new lifeways. In the Eastern Mountains, on
the Colorado Plateau, and in the western deserts, where rain was unpredictable and either
frost or scorching heat plagued the growing season, change was minimal as families added
beans and ceramics, but continued to rely mainly on foraging and hunting for meeting dayto-day needs.^’
In the southem basins alterations were more pronounced as floodwater gardens
expanded, yet even here families did not become overly dependent on crops, as they still
feared drought-induced shortages. As a result, they buffered against possible crop failure
by continuing to devote some of their time and energy to older foraging and trading
practices. The most dramatic and sweeping transformation appeared along the Gila and
Salt Rivers where bands expanded and elaborated their irrigation networks and in the

Huckell, 14-5; W hittlesey, 138, 161, 163; Gilman, 8-9.
Chester W. Shaw and Ciolek-Torrello, 42; Eric Eugene Klucas and M. Kyle Woodson, "The Camp
Creek Area," in From The D esert to the M ountains, ed. Rein Vanderpot, Eric Eugene Klucas, and
Richard Ciolek-Torrello (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999), 85.
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process reorganized their sociopolitical system to form Arizona’s first complex society/*
These myriad variations in regional subsistence practices derived mainly fi’om
environmental constraints, yet they also emanated fi'om choices groups made as they
evaluated the feasibility o f adopting a more sedentary lifestyle. In the short-term these
decisions were perfectly rational, however, as with most human actions, no matter how
well planned, such choices can result in long-term, unforeseen consequences. This was
certainly the case with the storage o f surplus food.
While full-time farming assured families access to sufficient amounts o f essential
nutrients when growing conditions were optimal, the erratic climate could easily force a
hasty return to foraging when drought or floods decimated crops. Storing surplus food in
flush years became a way to lessen the likelihood o f this occurring. Although, the practice
o f dividing harvests into discrete units created new difficulties as it redirected food
allocation away fi'om communal sharing and toward private household ownership and use.
This then resulted in new and unsettling confrontations as communities attempted to
adjust to this redefinition o f property and potential unequal distribution o f resoiuces.^’
Evidence o f bands devising new rituals to manage these conflicts first appears in the
archaeological record in approximately 700 C.E. with construction o f “great houses” in
the south. These were larger than normal pithouses that lacked residential hearths and
storage features. Later, large kivas, which were dug deeper into the ground, appeared in

Mark R. Hackbarth, A rch aeological an d A rch ival Investigation o f the Las Canopas: The E steban
P ark P roject, Pueblo Grande Museum Anthropological Papers, Forward by Todd W. Bostwick, no. 6
(Phoenix: City o f Phoenix Parks, Recreation, and Library Department, 1997), 7-9; Chester W. Shaw and
Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 18; Klucas, 135.
Plog, 184-5; Gilman, 6-9, Chester W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 423; Richard CiolekTorrello, “Summary,” 271.
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the east, while platform mounds and ballcourts reminiscent of Mesoamerica sprang up in
the central basins. In each instance these new, more public venues, signified that groups
now found it necessary to perform community rituals to formalize obligations of
reciprocity.^"
O f all the emerging sedentary groups, the Hohokam displayed the most elaboration in
developing these new ceremonial structures. The probable reason for this is that by the
700s C.E. the number o f families living along the Gila and Salt Rivers was beginning to
reach the river’s carrying capacity, which created three significant, interrelated problems.
First, canal residents had to find ways to equitably distribute finite supphes of land and
water amongst themselves. Second, families had to develop a system for deflecting
challenges fi’om outsiders seeking access to irrigation sites. And third, these now
dependent farmers had to strengthen trading ties with people living in areas unaffected by
local weather fluctuations as insurance against starvation in years with low-river flows.^'
To effectively respond to all three dilemmas, the Hohokam chose to subdivide their
ritual system so as to address matters related to trade, conflict resolution, and alliance
building in distinct settings. Most likely they built platform mounds for mediating conflicts
among canal families, and Mesoamerican-hke ballcourts for soothing tensions with
outsiders and greasing the wheels o f trade. From a pragmatic perspective, this duality
gave the Hohokam more flexibility in managing their increasingly complex reality without

Plog, 186-7, 192-3; Fried, 144-5; Upman, “D ecoupling,” 12; Gilman, 70-1.
Katherine A. Spielman, "Interaction A m ong Nonhierarchical Societies," in Farmers, Hunters, an d
Colonists: Interaction Between the Southwest a n d the Southern Plains, ed. Katherine A. Spielman
(Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1991), 4-5; Glen E. Rice, "Warfare and M assing in the Salt and
Gila Basins in Central Arizona," in D ea d ly Landscapes: Case Studies in P rehistoric Southwestern
Warfare, ed. Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LaBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University o f Utah Press, 2001),
302-4; Fried, 61, 208-9; Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.
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having to create a centralized, hierarchical political system to dictate resolutions/^
In general, platform mounds were located in residential areas, and served as arenas for
conducting rituals to ensure adequate rainfall, to communicate with supernatural forces for
other purposes, and to stress the necessity o f abiding by the rules of reciprocity.
Ballcourts, on the other hand, were located toward the edge of settlements and appear to
have hosted games that involved both spectators and players. BaUgames would have
allowed people lacking kinship ties to come together in a controlled setting to bond and
dissipate the potential for violence through rigorous physical activity.^^
New ceremonial structures such as kivas and ballcourts would have also facilitated the
advent o f new administrative positions. This is not to say that communities would have
abandoned older forms o f leadership, circumscribed as they were by context and
consensus, but instead that these public venues would have broadened their conception of
authority. To clarify, there is a distinction between authority and power. Positions o f
authority are most prevalent in societies just beginning to develop beyond egalitarian,
familial bands. In this context, authority is the ability to influence behavior without the
clout to mete out punishment for refiisal to cooperate. Power, on the other hand, usually
appears in later stages o f socioeconomic development and includes the unchallenged right
to reward or punish other community members. As Hohokam society was comprised of

James E. Odenkirk, An Interpretation O f The Hohokam B allcourts In A rizona, 1984,
< http://wwwlaafla.org/SportsLibrary/NASSH Proceedings/N P I984/N P 1984g.pdf> ( l5 September 2003);
John P. Andrews and Todd Bostwick, D esert Farm ers A t The R iver's Edge: The Hohokam A n d P ueblo
Grande, 2000< ,http://www.ci.phoenix.az.us/PLFEBLO/dfritual.html>(12 September 2003); Plog, 192-3.
” Richard Eflfland and Barbara MacNider, Egalitarian H ierarchies?,
< http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/dept/dlO/asb/lost tribes/Ieadership.html> (2 September 2003); Odenkirk,
Internet; Plog, 192-4.
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leaders with authority, but not power, anyone seeking a higher ceremonial status would
have had to still rely mainly on persuasion to gain and keep pubhc support/"
Traditionally, a person could attract followers by excelling in areas such as warfare,
craft production, hunting, or medicine. To address additional complications that came
with sedentary living, Arizona’s central communities most likely expanded this list to
include the ability to fairly redistribute resources and the knack for circumventing crop
failure by appeasing supernatural forces. Thus, ambitious individuals could now achieve a
differentiation in status if they could keep family members and trading partners sufficiently
supplied with resources. Or, a person could attain a position of prominence if they
exhibited a penchant for combining the cycles o f the sun and the moon with patterns of
floods and droughts into a predictive system that reliably produced healthy harvests.
Obviously, anyone who exhibited skill in both areas stood the best chance of winning and
maintaining community fidelity.^^
O f these two forms o f leadership, the more difficult, and thus tenuous, was that of
weather prognosticator. To untangle the mysteries of nature, they would have had to
engage in analytical processes to allow them to explain the unknown in terms of the
known. Those who succeeded probably did so by working inductively, that is, reasoning
that if events with clear cause and effect relationships occurred due to the actions of
physical beings, then events lacking clear causes must be the result o f supernatural
intervention. Likewise, if humans could understand and influence the behavior o f visible

David P. Bruan, "Selection and Evolution in Nonhierarchical Organization," in The Evolution o f
P olitica l System s: S ociopolitics in Sm all-Scale Societies, ed. Steadman Upman, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 66-7; Lee, 237-9.
Effland and M acNider, E galitarian H ierarchies, Internet.

18

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

organism, then there ought to be mechanisms for doing the same with entities beyond
human sight/"
Just explaining these relationships would not have been enough, however, as they also
would have had to demonstrate a personal affinity for communicating with and placating
these mystical forces. Unfortunately, the naturally unpredictable Southwestem climate
probably turned many o f their well-crafted predictions into lies, making it difficult for such
men and women to maintain community allegiance. In the best case scenario, a
discredited forecaster would have merely lost status, while in the worst case such a person
could have been accused o f witchcraft and ostracized from the group. Ultimately, this
linking o f Hohokam social authority to the Southwest’s mercurial climate, most likely
introduced an element o f instability into their political structures that eventually
undermined their ability to maintain cohesion during times of crisis.^’
Evidence o f leadership positions associated with socioeconomic authority also appears
in Arizona’s archaeological record in the 700s C.E. The first signs emerged at a Hohokam
village archaeologists call Snaketown. Located at the confluence of the Gila and Santa
Cruz Rivers, the site’s founding families apparently began at this time to leverage their
prime location into increased wealth and political authority.
Two complimentary advantages afforded them this opportunity. First, living between

Winifred Creamer, "The Origins o f Centralization; Changing Features o f Local and Regional
Control During the Rio Grande Classic Period, A D 1325-1540," in From L eaders to Rulers, ed. Jonathan
Haas (New York: Kluwer Academic/Penuim Publisher, 2001), 56; Stephen Plog, Ancient P eople o f the
Am erican Southwest (N ew York: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 54-5; Hinde, 53-5, 72.
Plog, A ncient P eoples, 178-9.
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perennial rivers, they had access to sufficient supplies of irrigation water to produce not
only enough food for subsistence, but also handsome surpluses for trade. And second,
due to the fact that all draft animals capable of hauling large loads had gone extinct in the
Americas, people fi'om across the Southwest used the rivers as highways for moving bulky
items. Thus, the junction o f the Gila and Santa Cruz Rivers had the potential to become a
trading hub for goods from as far away as the Pacific Ocean, the Great Plains, and
Mesoamerica. Once they realized this, Snaketown’s elite apparently seized the chance to
expand their influence. They did so by building two platform mounds for consolidating
their lineage’s ability to produce surpluses, and two ballcourts for translating those
surpluses into control over trade in foodstuffs and luxury items-such as macaw feathers,
copper bells, and sea shells.^*
From approximately 800 to 1000 C.E. the roots of complex civilization slowly dug
deeper in the central basins, while peoples in the surrounding areas lived in a manner that
was less complicated, yet still reasonably comfortable. During this time the Medieval
Warming Anomaly brought warmer and wetter weather to the Southwest, with increased
rainfall in the lowlands and a longer frost-free growing season in the mountains. Such
salubrious conditions apparently encouraged many families still subsisting by gathering and
hunting to settle down. Evidence shows that some planted gardens near high altitude
water sources, while others sowed crops on floodplains once considered too dry to farm.

' Lynn Thompson, "Hohokam Luxury Trade," in C enter a n d Periphery: C om parative Studies in
A rch aeology, ed. Timothy C. Chapman (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 47-50; Ciolek-Torrello,
“Summary,” 273; Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altshul, 7; Sharon F. Urban, "Shell Artifacts: Beads by
the Hundreds," in E l M acayo: A P rehistoric Settlem ent in the U pper Santa Cruz R iver Valley, ed.
W illiam L. Deaver and Carla R. Van West (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 113; Jefferson Reid and
Stephanie W hittlesey, The A rch aeology o f Ancient A rizona (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1997),
88-9.
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As this trend accelerated, the density of settlements surrounding the Hohokam villages
increased, creating a large pool o f new clients for their central exchange network/" In
response, Snaketown’s leading families extended ballcourts out to these new desert
settlements/"
On the Colorado Plateau Anasazi families were among those who optimistically moved
out onto previously marginal floodplains. A willingness to take such a risk was apparently
widespread as many new villages soon appeared. Their success is evident in the
substantial masonry storehouses that sprang up during this period on the edges o f larger
settlements. A similar chain o f events also unfolded to the south as MogoUon farmers
began growing crops in basins that once had been too arid for cultivation, and at higher
elevations where a longer frost-fi-ee growing season could now accommodate com."'
While neither the MogoUon nor the Anasazi appear to have been directly connected to
the Hohokam trading network, the two peoples did forge closer economic ties through
rituals conducted in newly buUt great kivas. As usual, life changed the least in the far

” During the M edieval Clim atic Anom aly, worldwide clim ates were generally warmer from 850 to
1200. In the Southwest, the clim ate was also wetter. See Emi Ito Hu et al., 'Narm er P eriods In A laska
A rea N ot C onfined To M odern r;m ej,<ttp://www.eurekalert.org.pu release/2001-08/uoiaw pi082001.php>(2 September 2003); Steven A. LeBlanc, "Warfare and Aggression in the El Morro
Valley, N ew Mexico," in D eadly Landscapes: Case Studies in P rehistoric Southwestern Warfare, ed. Glen
E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University o f Utah Press, 2001), 45.
Fried, 69-79, 112-3, 117, sees such ritual structures as venues for creating affinal ties, and therefore
establishing familial rules o f reciprocity as the guide for trade between unrelated groups. See also Charles
W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 46; Landis, 41; Carla R. Van West and W illiam L. Deaver, 21;
Gilman, 76-7; Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.
John D Grahame and Thomas D. Sisk, Canyons, Cultures A n d Environm ental Change: An
Introduction To The Land-U se H istory O f The C olorado P lateau [Online Report, accessed 25 October
2003]; available at http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu; Internet; Richard C. Lange, P reh istoric Land-U se
Settlem ent o f the M iddle Little C olorado R iver Valley: The Survey o f H om olovi Ruins State Park,
Winslow, A rizona (Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1998), 6, 130-3.
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west, yet even there people sowed more crops and some northwestern bands moved into
the Hohokam sphere o f influence to share in the central basins’ good fortune/^
As rivers swelled and watertables bubbled higher, more families settled into a farming
lifestyle across the region. Over time, successive good harvests and less rigorous,
sedentary living combined to enhance female fertility. As this increased the number of
successful pregnancies, the size of the average family grew and the enlarged population
accelerated the trend o f bringing more land into cultivation. With more muscle power
available, extended families now settled in areas that could only be inhabited through
intense physical management, (i.e. building irrigation canals, terracing, constructing
catchbasins). Ultimately, what this also meant was that Arizona’s families were
subsidizing their increased population by destroying the wild buffer zones part-time
farmers had relied on for generations. This was especially true when drought or floods
had destroyed whole harvests."^
The favorable climatic regime not only encouraged bands living along the Santa Crtiz
and San Pedro Rivers to expand crop production, but also may have given them a sense of
economic independence that led these families to withdraw from the larger Hohokam

O f this, military scout, W illiam R. Price, 230, wrote, "Remnants o f c liff dwellings and pottery are
observed fifteen or twenty m iles above the villages, which would indicate that at som e previous date the
water had com e to the surface much higher up the canyon and that much more land was susceptible to
cultivation."
A human fem ale’s reproductive system shuts down in tim es o f nutritional stress; whether due to a
lack o f food in general, or to a lack o f nutrients in particular. When a fem ale has access to a balanced diet
and is not expending more calories than she is ingesting, pregnancy hormones reach levels conducive to
conception. See Am enorrhea: When M enstruation G oes A w ay, A pril 1 9 ,2 0 0 4 ,
< http://www.m ayoclinic.com /invoke.cfin?objectid=55FA C 47F-288C -4F89-83B1701B4B34C A E3>(20
April 2003), M ayo C linic. Improvement in nutrition and less need to travel also reduces pressure to keep
family size small through infanticide. According to Robert McC. N etting, 22-3, once population levels
reach a certain upper threshold, humans must abandon extensive subsistence strategies for more intensive
methods, or face starvation. See also Paul R. Fish, 37; Susan K. Fish and Paul R. Fish, 133-8; Gilman.
70-1, 76-7; Cavalli-Sforza, 98-9.
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ballcourt system. With starvation risks reduced, benefits gained by remaining connected
to the central basins apparently were no longer worth the cost of continued
subordination.""
At about the same time, the Hohokam began altering their ceremonial complex, most
likely in response to these southem villages leaving their trading network, but also due to
nomadic bands crowding closer to their canals. Those responsible for these changes began
to shift community focus away fi'om ballcourts and toward platform mounds and as such,
to the rituals that placated the forces o f nature and bound neighbors into peaceful
alliances. It is possible that individuals connected to weather prediction spearheaded this
sociopolitical transformation, as they saw an opportunity to leverage their supposed
connection to the improved climate into real power. By encouraging the building of fewer
ballcourts and more platform mounds they could drain influence away from the trading
elite and bolster their own clout. Migration away from Snaketown and other Gila River
settlements to Salt River sites may be evidence of this.""
The end of the Medieval Warming Anomaly in the Southwest began in roughly 1040
C.E. when many parts o f Arizona received only 25 percent of the average annual rainfall.
In these places inhabitants now faced a future that would once again include the ever
present specters o f drought, floods, and famine. Having never lived when climatic
variability was the rule instead of the exception, farmers now lacked experience in

Henry D. W allace and W illiam H. D oelle, "Classical Period Warfare in Southern Arizona," in
D eadly Landscapes: C ase Studies in P rehistoric Warfare, ed. Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt
Lake City: The University o f Utah Press, 2001), 252-3.
Reid, 103-4; Rice, "Warfare and Massing," 319; Andrews and Bostwick, D esert Farmers-,
Hackbarth, A rch aeological, 8-9.
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dealing with these once again constant threats. The best response was to either diversify
their subsistence base by cultivating drought-resistant wild plants, or to revert back
completely to a gathering and hunting way o f life. Those who lived where one or the
other o f these options was possible eventually did so; while the rest found themselves
faced with a crisis.""
As circumstances offered this last group little time to contemplate their predicament,
many adopted a variety o f short-term solutions. Some bands migrated toward remaining
lowland rivers. Once arrived, however, they often found established residents on the best
sites who were more than willing to defend their positions. Others migrated vertically,
hoping to take advantage o f smaller, yet numerous mid-elevation springs and streams, yet
they soon discovered that the climatic change had appreciably shortened the frost-fi'ee
growing season. A few even exercised the option o f last resort and began raiding existing
riverine communities."^
Had the Hohokam ballcourt system still been functioning it may have served as a
macroregional institution for ameliorating the growing disparity between the haves and the
have-nots. By this time, however, most ballcourts had fellen into disuse. As over
population and an inability to improve environmental conditions through greater labor
outlays spread through the central basins, Hohokam families began to abandon the most
intensely used ritual sites. With their departure the human bonds needed to maintain what

^ Center For Clim ate A ssessm ent For The Southwest, "Reconstructing Past Clim ate In The
Southwest," 2002,< http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/clim as/research/paleoclim ate/overview.htm l>(25
September 2003); Dean, 13; Lange, 139-143; Kaldahl, 21-4; Rice, 328; Gilman, 79.
David R. W ilcox et al., "Antecedents to Perry Mesa: Early Pueblo III D efense Refuge System in
West-Central Arizona," in D eadly Landscapes: C ase Studies in P rehistoric Southwestern Warfare, ed.
Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University o f Utah Press, 2001), 123-4; Landis,
42; Lange, 134-5, 145, 165.
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was left o f the once elaborate Hohokam ceremonial complex simply faded away/*
As this sequence o f events played out in the central basins, people in the Anasazi and
MogoUon territories responded to the reappearance of environmental uncertainty with a
flurry o f innovative, cooperative measures. Discarding their tradition o f low intensity,
extensive, dry farming, families joined together to augment the region’s carrying capacity
with muscle power. They built stone walls to catch floodwater and abate erosion; they
dug ditches to channel runoff; and they fashioned reservoirs out o f natural sinks. Despite
only achieving short-term success, their willingness to work cooperatively did buy them a
Uttle more time.""
B y 1180 C.E., famiUes throughout Arizona were coming to accept that life would

once again be lived at the mercy o f unpredictable weather cycles. The Hohokam were the
last to rebel against this reality with one final burst o f activity. They extended existing
irrigation networks on the Salt and Gila Rivers and added new channels to remaining
secondary streams. Founding families quickly seized control o f headgates on both old and
new canals, however, leaving lower status bands and newcomers to vie for less desirable
positions. Battles erupted when farmers Uving at the end of each canal discovered that
water flow would often be insufficient to reach their fields. With no viable alternative to
remaining, terminus groups apparently soUcited aUies to help them fight for greater shares
o f water. Most likely, they sought assistance from desert dwelling kin, yet it is also
possible that they simply opened their doors to anyone willing to join the struggle. Over

Andrews and Bostwick, D esert Farmers', Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.
According to Landis, 20, during periods o f drought on the Colorado Plateau, plant life dies out
allow ing flood waters to wash away topsoil, which then begins a cycle o f arroyo cutting. Grahame and
Sisk, Internet; Dean, 15, 138; Ciolek-Torrello, “Sites,” 230; N etting, 26; Lange, 8-9, 164.
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time this strategy proved so successful, that these settlements were able to translate their
numerieal strength into greater political and ritual power. Large platform mounds
appearing at each terminus site is evidence of this phenomenon.""
At the same time that Hohokam families were battling each other for water shares,
desperate desert raiders began threatening their communities from the outside. Exhibiting
an extraordinary gift for compartmentalization, canal residents reacted by suspending
internal animosities whenever group survival was at stake."' This contextual-based,
community cohesion allowed the Hohokam to field fighting forces large enough to drive
hostile bands out o f surrounding buffer zones and into distant, hilltop settlements.
Cooperation also permitted the Hohokam to build defensive fortresses around terminus
platform mounds. These sanctuaries had thick adobe walls that allowed club-wielding
warriors and archers to strike invaders from above as well as provide protection for whole
canal populations below.
Once warfare became an accepted strategy for coping with community problems,
vulnerable Hohokam leaders appear to have expanded its use. Spanish explorers observed

Kaldahl, 20-9; Weaver, 95-6; Plog, Ancient, 140-3; Klucas and Woodson. 85.
A description o f the Yavapai homeland in 1877 offers clues as to the source o f their desperation,
“We found Mr. AI Blackburn keeping a station at Soda Lake. A spring near the house furnished brackish
water, but Mr. Blackburn hauled water in barrels from a much better spring o f fresh, sweet water about
three m iles to the northwest. Around the station lay many dead cattle, each o f them dried-up mummies.
Near the house were three o f them that looked as though they were but lying down to rest; but they had
been dead for three years. So dry is the clim ate that the dead animals, if not eaten by coyotes or foxes,
w ill soon desiccate and remain entire for years.” See Don Maguire, G ila M onsters a n d R ed-E yed
Rattlesnakes: D on M aguire's A rizona Trading Expeditions, J876-1879, ed. Gary Topping (Salt Lake City:
The University o f Utah Press, 1997), 40.
” K.J. Schroeder, A rch aeological Survey o f Phoenix's P apago Park, M aricopa County, Arizona,
Pueblo Grande Museum Technical Report, no. 96 (Phoenix: Parks, Recreation and Library Department,
1996), 17, 33; Cam illio C.C. Carr, "The Days o f E m pire-A rizona, 1886-1869," in E yew itness to the
Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (M echanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Book, 2001), 3-22; In 1877,
merchant Don Maguire, 79, observed a terminus mound and noted that "Judging from the foundation and
for som e feet above the foundation, the w alls were six feet thick."
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the results o f this when they arrived in Arizona in the late seventeenth century and found
the Pima Indians, who are the likely Hohokam deseendents, battling with Yuman groups
on the Colorado River. The Spaniards explained that the Pimans were attacking their
neighbors due to a belief that the Yumans had conjured a drought to torment them. The
main beneficiaries o f such warfare clearly would have been Piman weather prognosticators
who would have been able to deflect blame for the arid conditions away fi'om
themselves.""
This change in war rationale highlights the problems a variety o f sedentary leaders
faced once the favorable weather cycle came to an end. The return o f climatic variability
would have made it ahnost impossible for economic elites to maintain authority as much of
their power derived fi'om their ability to create and distribute food surpluses. The
situation was doubly hard for individuals who gained deference through their apparent
knack for predicting and controlling the elements, as it would now appear that their
powers had dissipated.""
Even in the less developed regions of the territory, this weakening o f centralized
authority would have had profound repercussions. In the short term it would have meant
that life felt more uncertain and chaotic, while in the long term it would have meant that
instead o f a stable core society, corrçlete with all the accouterments of complex
civilization, setting the pace o f regional life, Arizona would revert back to a state of
decentralized, insular villages in wliich people worried more about their next meal than

dabbling in the arts, politics, or science.

” Van W est and Deaver, 23; Carr, 23.
Rice, 319; N etting, 57; Bruan, 66-7.
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As conditions worsened, people living on the Colorado Plateau finally reached the
point where problems related to environmental degradation—such as arroyo cutting and a
dramatic drop in the watertable—forced them to view out migration as the only real
solution. The first families to leave seem to have gone into the MogoUon Mountains to
settle with extended kin, where they appear to have integrated into existing communities
with little or no conflict. Those who departed later apparently gained entrance into non
related MogoUon viUages by establishing themselves as craft speciaUsts. Evidence o f this
comes fi’om areas where Anasazi influences over material culture attained predominance,
leading to the submergence o f MogoUon forms.""
In addition to these short migrations, some Plateau and MogoUon famiUes also
traveled into the southem basins. Their reception there, however, was less than
welcoming as southem population levels were already high. There was, therefore, little
room to accommodate these newcomers. Archaeological evidence indicates that the
MogoUon migrants first joined with upland groups and then possibly began raiding riverine
settlements. Fear, o f these raiders then apparently caused lowland bands to huddle closer
together and fortify their perimeters. Real or threatened retaUation by these aggregate
viUages, they appear to have caused upland residents to move to better-defended, upland
sites.""

Dean, 81; Landis, 50; Lange, 165; N etting, 43, 58; Reid and W hittlesey, 198-9; Van West and
Deaver, 23; Gilman, 77-9; Lange 165; Joanne M. Newcom b, "Silver Creek Settlement Pattern and
Paleodemography," in L iving On The E dge o f The Rim: E xcavations an d A nalysis o f the S ilver C reek
A rch aeological R esearch Project, 1993-1998, ed. Barbara J. M ills, Sarah A. Herr, and Scott Van Keurn
(Tucson: A rizona State Museum, 1999), 21, 23-4, 50-1.
Ibid.
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This pattern o f migration and aggregation repeated itself across Arizona as desperate
families joined to either maintain access to scarce resources or to repel invaders. While
aggregating was a rational short-term solution, as it offered more muscle power for
extensive foraging and defending territory, in the long run it was, to say the least,
counterproductive. Within only a few years, residents stripped the land surrounding their
settlements o f vegetation, and onee the forage was gone, so too went the animals that the
plants sustained. The result was a depletion o f food and fuel that set the stage for a
serious macroregional, economic collapse.""
Considering the state o f region, it should come as no surprise that by the end of the
1100s G.E., warfare or its threat was ubiquitous throughout Arizona. Mutual suspicion,
hoarding, and club-wielding warriors decimated the last ties o f camaraderie. Where there
was access to stable supplies o f water and food, groups fought amongst themselves for
fair shares, while simultaneously banding together to repel outsiders. While on the dry
peripheries, the less fortunate woke every morning wondering where their next meal
would come from and whom they would have to fight to get it."*
With almost no other options remaining, an exodus from aggregate sites began in
approximately 1330 C.E. Families living in the MogoUon Mountains either moved to
Black Mesa to eventuaUy become the Hopi and Zuni cultures, or broke into smaU, familial

” N etting, 26, 57; Dean, 147-8. O f the A nasazi, Dean writes, "Thus, in a span o f about 40 years the
activities o f man produced a profound change in the vegetational pattern o f Kiet Siel Canyon. It is
possible that the denudation o f the bottom lands hastened the destruction o f the farmland by the TsefiNaha arroyo. In this regard the clearing o f the land for agriculture may be compared to the present
overgrazing by Navajo stock. W hile neither may be considered the sole cause o f a cycle o f erosion, both
affect the rate at which the cutting proceeds by destroying the natural plant cover that would inhibit the
destructive capabilities o f runoff.” See also, Landis, 50; Newcom b, 50-1.
Ibid., 57.
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bands and resumed, as best they could, a mobile hunting and gathering lifestyle. In the
Hohokam core, canal residents abandoned large sites, and they or later raiders even
burned some villages, such as Casa Grande. Just to the south in the Santa Cruz and San
Pedro basins, families resumed an older two-village strategy that divided labor and time
among farming, gathering and hunting. Ironically, the people in the far west fared the best
in terms o f alterations to their lives as they had not destroyed their wild food reserves nor
completely given up a mobile existence.""
Eventually, a sense o f equilibrium returned to Arizona and for approximately one hundred
and fifty years residents survived by once again judiciously partaking o f available
resources and maximizing their subsistence options through a variety of strategies. With
each passing year, the lessons o f sedentary living faded, making it likely that if a new wet
cycle returned, Arizona’s people would remember too little to quickly return to settled
life. In the end, no one will know exactly how they would have reacted, as they never got
the opportunity. Before the climate could turn once again in their favor, strangers began
arriving and set the region on a new historical course.

” The Hohokam constructed hom es o f adobe, yet they also used timber for roofs and architectural
support. See Newcom b, 50-2; Lange, 160-1; Landis, 50. Coronado’s men found the M esa Pueblos easily
defended; they had “a wall o f large and small stones at the top, which they could roll down . . . so that no
army could possibly be strong enough to capture the village.” They also noted the Pueblos had “room to
sow and store a large amount o f com and cisterns to collect snow and water.” See Pedro de Casteheda,
“Account o f the Expedition to Cibola which took place in the year 1540, in which all settlements, their
ceremonies an customs are described,” in Spanish E xplorers in the Southern U nited States, 1528-1843,
ed. Frederick W. Hodge (N ew York: Barnes & Nobel, 1959), 321.
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CHAPTER 2

ATHAPASCANS AND IBERIANS
For approximately one hundred and fifty years after climatic instability and resulting
environmental degradation collapsed their sedentary economy, Arizona’s inhabitants
practiced older forms o f mobile subsistence strategies. If another wet cycle had appeared
within two or even three generations, these peoples’ oral traditions would have retained
enough memory o f sedentism to recreate a new interconnected and complex community.
This, however, did not happen and after the fourth and then fifth generations came and
went, coping with aridity by judiciously partaking o f a mix of wild and cultivated
resources once again became the accepted way o f life.'
The next phase in Arizona’s history began almost imperceptibly, and for approximately
two hundred years brought subtle, albeit important, changes to local life. While not as
dramatic as steady increases in rainfall or the emergence o f economic elites, who conduct
network-building rituals in ballcourts, in cumulative form, the incremental alterations of
this period set the stage for future, more dramatic events.
The forces that influenced Arizona from approximately 1400 to 1600 C. E., were not
native to the Southwest, but instead appeared in the form of newcomers who arrived in

‘ Carole L. Crumley, "Communication, Holism and the Evolution o f Sociopolitical Complexity," in
From Leaders To Riders, ed. Jonathan Haas (N ew York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001), 32;
Hackbarth 10, Reid, 201, 220, 247,257.
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the region from distant lands. The first of these groups were Athapascans who emerged
from the north after traveling along the Rocky Mountain corridors that connected what is
today Alaska with the Northern Plains, the Great Basin, and the Colorado Plateau."
Compared to other indigenous groups, the Athapascans arrived in the Americas late, in
fact almost at the end o f the Pleistocene in 10,000 B.C.E. At first they settled along the
arctic coast, but they did not stay long as the Inuits, the last Asian group to journey across
the Bering land bridge, established camps nearby and eventually pushed the Athapascans
inland. With other bands monopolizing alternate sites, the Athapascans continue to move
eastward until they reached the interior mountains. These families soon found, however,
that their new home lacked abundant sources of food. To sustain themselves, they had to
develop new subsistence strategies that placed a greater emphasis on mobility and
opportunism. This meant that for most o f the year they lived in small, loosely organized
bands that could respond quickly whenever an opportunity to exploit a resource arose."
Throughout North America, many other aboriginal groups also stressed economic
flexibility over specialization and social fluidity over strict hierarchical organization, but
the Athapascans stood out due to the degree with which they made these two attributes
the focal points of their culture. For instance, instead of tracing descent matrilineally to

^ John W. Ives, A Theory O f N orthern A thapascan Prehistory (Boulder, CO; W estview Press, 1990),
15-7, 27-9; Richard Perry, Western Apache H eritage (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1991), 59-61.
^ James W. Vanstone, Athapaskan A daptations: Hunters a n d Fishermen o f the Subarctic Forests
(Chicago: Field M useum, 1974), 3-5, 32, 38; J. Loring Haskell, Southern Athapascan M igration, A.D.
200-1750 (T saile, AZ: Navajo Community C ollege Press, 1987), 11-2; Ives, 30-1, 36, 60-1; Perry, 12-5.
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be assured o f familial lineage, the Athapascans appear to have been tracing descent
bilaterally to enlarge ties o f reciprocity and assure multiple venues of assistance in times of
crisis. Athapascan families also invested individual members with a unique sense of
autonomy that encouraged them to follow their instincts; even if such behavior produced
long absences or the permanent fracturing a group. And lastly, the archaeological record
and ethnographies show that the Athapascans freely adopted technological innovations
from allies and strangers alike, regardless o f the transforming effect this had on their
beliefs and practices."
In about 1500 B.C.E., this lifeway encouraged some Athapascan families to move
southward when cold and wet weather returned after a long warming cycle. Under this
climatic regime, the arctic zone expanded to cover over one thousand miles, which
allowed a number o f Athapascan bands to follow the caribou herds into the Arctic Taiga,
on the edge o f the Northern Plains. A few continued on and crossed the ecological
boundary to exploit plains foods such as wild plums and grapes, prickly pears and
sunflowers, pronghorn antelope and elk, and even big wooly bison."
Beginning in 100 C.E., when a new warming trend began, many arctic-adapted species
and Plains animals seeking cool summer habitats began moving to the north. Given a
choice between retreating with their cold weather resources or maintaining their southem
position, a fair number o f Athapascans chose to permanently leave their homeland behind .
By 200 C.E. some had migrated into the Wyoming Basin where they

^ Haskell, 44-49.
’ Vanstone, 15, Ives, 56; Bradford Fagan, The G reat Journey: The P eopling o f Ancient A m erica
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 192-203.
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encountered Caddoans, and possibly, Algonquian speakers. Over time, through
intermarriage and trade aUiances, these peoples coalesced into new cultural entity
paleoanthropologists call the Avonlea Complex."
Despite their socioeconomic success, a combination o f environmental continuity and a
sense o f individual autonomy compelled many Avonlea Athapascans to keep moving
southward. Some o f these bands settled for a time along the front range o f the Rocky
Mountains, where they mingled and merged with Plains Kiowa-Taonans and desertdwelling Uto-Aztecans. This new mixing created the Fremont Culture, which blended the
three subsistence systems into economic strategies that allowed practitioners to move
easily between ecological zones. As such, Fremont families spread into Rocky Mountain
valleys and the Great Basin, while others migrated into the northern reaches o f presentday Arizona and New Mexico."
In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these Fremont families faced the same
drought-induced subsistence crisis that had forced Arizona’s inhabitants to revert back to
simpler economic strategies. In response, they also adopted less intense subsistence
practices and began to abandon depleted sites. Searching for greener pastures, some
traveled onto the high plains o f Wyoming and Colorado, while others migrated onto the
Colorado Plateau. The first group became the founders o f the Jicarilla Apaches, while the

‘’Canadian Museum o f C ivilization, A H istory O f The N ative P eoples O f Canada, 1000 BC To 500
AD, Late P lains Culture, 21 March 2003,< http://www.civilization.cayarcheo.hnpc/npvol27e.html>(21
September 2003); Yuri Berezkin, T raditional High Cultures: L egend M o tif D istribution On A C ontinental
Scale, 2002,< http://www.traditionalhighcultures.com/AthabaskanM igrations.htm> (4 September 2003);
D ale Welde, The A vonlea Period: Timeframe, Environment, A n d Subsistence, 27 September 2001,
<bttp://www.ucalgary.ca/~w alde/avonlea.btm l>(l 1 September 2003).
’ S. C assells, The A rch aeology o f C olorado (Boulder, CO: Johnson Books, 1990), 25-8.
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second eventually splintered to become the Navajo and the Mescalero and Gila Apaches/
On the Colorado Plateau, low precipitation made it very difficult for even small bands
to survive. Wide-ranging animals capable of digesting tough scrub offered access to
protein, but the plant life consisted mostly of vegetation that humans cannot digest. These
Athapascans possessed horticultural skills, yet the Plateau lacked sufficient water for fiilltime farming, and the frost-free season in the wetter uplands was too short for com. It
soon became evident that newly arrived bands would either have to keep moving or devise
strategies to overcome these ecological obstacles. Those who stayed created a system in
which they procured a surplus of reliable animal-based commodities and then forged
trading alliances with neighbors possessing complimentary carbohydrates.^
The closest and most attractive trading partners for these Fremont Athapascans were
the Puebloan farmers in northern New Mexico. Luckily for them, the Puebloans were
willing to exchange their surpluses of carbohydrate-rich crops and sundry manufactured
wares (e.g. blankets and pottery) for the Athapascans’ hunted goods (e.g. protein, fat, and
furs). As the relationship developed, the Athapascans became the more dependent
partner, as they had more difficulty finding alternative sources of carbohydrates than the
Puebloans did finding other sources o f meat. Consequently, it is likely that the
Athapascans engaged in some level of intimidation to ensure that the Puebloans would
continue to trade. In fact, had this process continued without disruption, the Athapascans

* Jarod Jennings, P reh istory o f Utah an d the E astern G reat Basin, University o f Utah
Anthropological Papers, no. 98 (Provo, UT: University o f Utah Press, 1978), 55-62; Ives, 47.
’ Spielman, 13.

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

would have, in their own self-interest, asserted a certain level of control over the larger,
regional system o f trade. Before this could happen, however, a second group o f outsiders
appeared in the form o f a black explorer and a Spanish padre.'”
Once the Spanish established a colonial base in the Caribbean late in the fifteenth
century, eager Spaniards gazed out fi-om the islands, impatient to seize gold and win glory.
These would-be conquistadores were well-versed in the arts o f conquest as they were the
product o f a culture that had just recently emerged fi'om centuries o f repeated conquests.
Moving westward across the Mediterranean, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, and
Moorish Berbers had all in various degrees and at various times laid claim to Iberia and
her people." After some invasions, lengthy occupations had even followed, with each
leaving an indelible mark on the Hispanic psyche. As such, by the time Iberians set out on
their own colonizing adventures, they carried with them a well-tested blueprint for
achieving hegemony in distant lands.

Coronado's chronicler, Castefteda, 333, 363, wrote that the Plains Apaches "do not have any
crockery [ceramic vessels] in this region. They do not make gourds, nor sow corn, nor eat bread, but
instead [eat] raw meat— or only h a lf cooked— or fruit." This is slightly m isleading as these Indians were
not surviving on meat alone. A s Casteheda unknowingly corrects h im self when he writes, "When they
open the belly o f a cow [sic], they squeeze out the chewed grass and drink the juice that remains behind . .
." A s humans cannot digest cellulous grasses due to a lack o f stomach enzym es, the Apaches were taking
advantage o f pre-digested plant material. See also Katherine Spielman, "Coercion or Cooperation?
Plains-Pueblo Interaction in the Protohistoric Period," in Hunters, Farmers, an d Colonists: Interaction
Between the Southwest a n d the Southern Plains, ed. Katherine Spielman (Tucson: University o f Arizona
Press, 1991), 36-7.
" F or an overview o f th e P hoenicians in Spain, see M arilyn R. B ierling, ed.. The P hoenicians in
Spain: An A rch aeological R eview o f the Eighth-Sixth C enturies in B.C.E (W inona Lake, IN; E isenbrouns,
2000). For an overview o f th e G reek, R om an, and V isigothic influences in Spain, see M arg arits D iaA ndrue and Sim on K eay, ed.. The A rch aeology o f Iberia: The D ynam ics o f Change (N ew Y ork:
Routledge Books, 1997). And for M uslim influences in Spain, see Thomas F. Manchester, From M uslim
F ortress to C hristian C astle: S ocia l a n d Cultural Change in Spain (New York: Manchester University
Press, 1995).
For the latest view o f Roman influence on Spanish colonizing practices, see David A. Lupher,
Rom ans in a N ew World: C lassical M odels in Sixteenth-Century Spanish A m erica (Ann Arbor: University
o f M ichigan Press, 2003).
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One o f the main benefits Iberians gained from their long contact with more complex
societies was an accelerated acquisition o f technology. Once innovations bom of
sedentary living emerged in the Fertile Crescent, they spread westward along the
Mediterranean through both conquest and trade. The Iberians, therefore, gained access to
new ideas and tools without having to undergo the slow, organic processes o f innovation.
Instead, revolutionary breakthroughs in areas such as transportation and communication
simply arrived on their shores."
Iberians also benefited fi’om their prolonged contact with people who looked and
behaved differently, in that it taught them to view the world as a place inhabited by people
with differing phenotypes, customs, languages, and religious beliefs. Because o f this,
Iberians could imagine a reality that was far more diverse than anything the Amerindians
could envision, as New World topography tended to isolate social groups. Ultimately, this
made Iberians more resistant to the element o f surprise and therefore to uncertainty during
instances o f first contact with strangers."
Proof that tliis more expansive worldview assisted the Iberians during encounters with
new societies comes fi-om Heman Cortés’ conquest of the Aztecs. After arriving in the
Caribbean, the Spanish spent twenty-seven years gathering information about the New

For literacy as technology and it influence on cultural development, see Walter J. Ong, O rality an d
Literacy: The Technologizing o f the W ord (London: Methuen, 1982); Idem, Rhetoric, Romance, an d
Technology: Studies in the Interaction o f Expression a n d Culture (Ithaca; Cornell, 1971).
Columbus discovered the Caribbean in October o f 1492. For the next twenty years, the Spanish
and later the Portuguese conducted reconnaissance along the eastern coast o f Mesoamerica. Trips inland
were brief and often resulted in the death o f som e explorers, yet enough data was collected, that when
Cortés and his men landed at what is now Vera Cruz, they were not shocked to discover people who
looked and behaved differently. For a soldier’s perspective on the events that led to the fall o f the Aztecs,
see Bernal D iaz, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, trans. J.M. Cohen (N ew York: The Penguin Group, 1963).
For Cortes’ views, see Hern an Cortés, L etters From M exico, trans. ed. Anthony Pegden, (N ew Haven:
Y ale University Press, 1986).
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World. They expected to find unfamiliar societies and understood that reliable information
would assist in maintaining the upper hand at the moment of contact. This meant that
Cortés already had an abundance of reconnaissance data even before he set sail in 1519.
Once on the mainland, he then took another two years to study Mesoamerican society
before finally attacking the Mexican capital of Tenochtitlan in November of 1521.
Already being familiar with other foreign polities, Cortés, therefore, knew that there had
to be head o f state somewhere along with a political apparatus for wielding power. His
challenge was to leam as much about them as need be to plot an appropriate course of
action."
It was Monteczuma who faced the larger dilemma as he had no fi-ame of reference
from within which to evaluate these bearded, light-skinned men fi-om across the sea.
Thus, his response to the Spaniards was fatally inappropriate, as he hesitated, then
assumed the strangers were gods. This assessment was unfortunate, as it gave
Monteczuma few options for saving himself and his people. Thus, Cortés’ challenge was
not the actual takeover o f Tenochtitlan, as he had leeway with which to plot each o f his
moves. Instead, his utmost problem was the illegitimacy of his actions, as he lacked a
royal contract authorizing him to lead the conquest."

Ibid.
The Spanish discovery and occupation o f the N ew World was done under the aegis o f the Kingdom
o f Castile; not Spain as a nation, as that did not exist yet. Neither Isabella nor Ferdinand wanted to
expend their own money to finance wars or exploration, so they relied on the medieval practice o f “hiring”
men to undertake such adventures at their own expense. This made better econom ic sense; successful
conquerors received confirmation o f legitim acy and a share o f the treasure. See Henry Kamen, Empire:
H ow Spain Becam e a W orld Power, 1492-1763 (N ew York, HaperColiins, 2003), 27, 36, 98, 100.
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This is why, once Cortés had Tenochtitlan under his command, he quickly appealed to
the Crown for post hoc authorization. After the King recognized the conqueror’s fa it
acompli, Cortés then began dividing the spoils o f war among his men. Those who
participated garnered what they believed would be permanent shares of the Mexican
empire, while those who arrived on the heels o f conquest were left to watch with envy and
dream o f setting out on their own grand adventures."
In Spain, the young Castilian King Carlos I, also known as Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V, was plotting to increase his control over various European and Mediterranean
principalities when news o f Cortés’ triumph arrived. Imbued with a millennialistic spirit
and suffering fi'om a chronically empty war chest, Charles and his advisors choose to view
the New World and its vast wealth as a holy subsidy for spreading the Catholic faith.'*
While pleased with his new colony, Charles, as were his grandparents, was jealous of
power and understood the threat Cortés posed if not sufficiently hobbled. As a result,
there was no doubt in the King’s mind that Cortés’ wings needed to be clipped, what was
not clear was how to do so without discouraging other warriors fi-om expending their own
wealth and health to expand Spain’s empire. This quandary, more than almost anything
else, explains the many contradictions in Spam’s colonial policies. On the one hand, the
Crown wanted to encourage bold and often brutal action in the name of conquest; while
on the other hand, it wanted to circumscribe individual initiative and discourage
conquistadors from siphoning off tribute and wielding undue pow er over new vassals.'”

K am en, Em pire 105, 117.
'* Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "The Improbable Empire," in Spain: An H istory, ed. Raymond Carr
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69-77; Kamen, Empire, 45.
Kamen, Empire, 79-80.

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first expedition to the north of Tenochtitlan occurred as a result o f one of the
Crown’s plans to weaken Cortes’ power. In 1528, the King sought to undermine Cortés
by making one o f his chief political rivals, Nuno de Guzman, the lead judge of New
Spain’s Audiencia.^” Charles authorized Guzman to use his office to expose any
malfeasance on the conquistador’s part. In the end, however, it was Guzman who soon
found himself in trouble with the Crown. Charged with corruption and abuse of power, in
1529, Guzman made a hasty exit fi-om Mexico City to escape fi-om the authorities. To
divert attention fi-om his misdeeds, Guzman announced a plan to seek new Indian
civilizations, quickly gathered eager recruits, and headed north along Mesoamerica’s
western coast. Employing slash and bum tactics, the Guzman’s expedition found little real
wealth to seize; this, however, did not stop them fi-om confiscating caches of Indian food
and exploiting Indian labor under slave-like conditions.^'
At the same time Guzman was wrecking havoc on the west coast, on the east coast,
the survivors o f Panfilo de Narvaez’s expedition to Florida—Alvar Nunez Cabeza de
Vaca, Alonzo del Castillo Maldonado, André Dorantes de Carrança, and Dorantes’ slave
Estévan—were making their way back inland across the southern plains. The four men
spent almost eight years wandering westward, including a brief pass through southeastern
Arizona, before eventually making their way to Spanish-held territory. Chronicles o f the
journey described native groups suffering fi-om drought and living in a state of nutritional
privation, as weU as the Spaniards’ acts o f slaving, rape, and other forms o f terrorism.

A Spanish court with judicial and legislative powers.
John L. Kessel 1, Spain in the Southwest: A N arrative H istory o f C olonial N ew Mexico, Arizona,
Texas, a n d California (Norman: University o f Oklahoma, 2002), 22-6; Castefleda, 285-7; Kamen, Empire,
118.
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Upon their return, however, it was not vivid stories of Indian life that intrigued captivated
audiences, but instead Vaca’s tale o f seven distant cities filled with thousands of vassals
and buildings constructed o f shimmering gold/^
Upon hearing this tale, impatient men wasted no time lobbying representatives o f the
Crown for the honor o f bringing these cities into the Spanish domain. In the end, it fell to
Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza to decide who would go. As he was under orders to keep
greedy and reckless behavior in check, Mendoza selected Fray Marcos de Niza to
accompany the slave Estévan on a reconnaissance mission to the north. In his directive to
Marcos, the Viceroy instructed him to:
Take much care to observe the people who are there, if they be many or few,
and if they are scattered or live in communities; [note] the quality and fertility [of the
soil], the temperature o f the country, the trees and plants and domestic and feral
animals which may be there, the nature o f the ground whether rough or level; the
rivers, if they are large or small, and the minerals and metals which are there; and of
the things o f which you may be able to send or bring specimens, bring them or send
them, in order that his majesty may be advised o f everything.^^
And then, in almost the last paragraph, the Viceroy remembered his duty to the Pope and
his Christian God, “And if God, Our Lord, is so served that you find some large
settlement, where it appears to you there is a good situation to establish a monastery and
to send fiiars to undertake the conversion, you shall send information by Indians or return
yourself to Culiacan.”^"

^ Alvar N unez Cabeza de Vaca, “The Journey o f the Vaca Party,” in The N ative Am erican an d
Spanish C olonial E xperience in the G reater Southwest, ed. Basil C. Hendric and Carroll L. Riley, vol. 1,
(N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1992), 10-1, 30-1; The Journey o f Coronado, 1540-1542, trans. George
Parker W inship (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishers, 1990), 20-1; Castefteda, 285-7.
C leve Hall en beck. The Journey o f Fray M arcos de N iza (Dallas: Southern M ethodist University
Press, 1987), 10-11; Castefteda, 288.
Hallenbeck, 12.

41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

On his journey. Fray Marcos dutifully made note of land suited for farming and
ranching, native material culture, and any details pertaining to the northern cities. In fact,
his report is filled with so much enthusiasm that it reads more like a fable than a truthful
account. The padre did experience some difficulty along the way, yet it was not with the
Indians. Instead, it was his companion Estévan, who apparently never declined an offer of
female companionship, which raised Marcos’ ire. Eventually, the missionary decided to be
rid o f him and sent Estévan ahead to prepare the Indians o f Cibola for his arrival. In the
end, Estévan’s arrogance was his undoing; for when he arrived at the Zuni Pueblo, his
antics offended the Zuni to such an extent that they killed him.^^ Unaware o f this, Marcos
continued moving slowly northward until he reached the Sobaipuri Indians living along the
San Pedro River in southeastern Arizona.^”
After resting, he traveled for four more days and encountered the Sobaipuri’s trading
partners, the Southeastern Yavapai. As Marcos found no people living in-between, neither
the Chiricahua nor Western bands of the Athapascan Apaches must have yet arrived in the
region that would later become their home.^’ As he traveled toward Zuni Pueblo, Marcos
encountered one o f the Indian guides that had gone ahead with Estévan; the fi-antic man
told him of Estévan’ ftite. Once Marcos heard this, he was too fiightened to make contact
with the Zuni, so, instead, he observed their mesa-top pueblo firom a safe distance and

W inship, 102; Castefteda, 288-9.
These people were m ost likely the descendants o f the Anasazi and M ogollon peoples.
This shows that the Yavapai were far to the southeast o f the northwestern boundary o f the Colorado
Plateau; offering com pelling evidence that it very w ell could have been the Yavapai, and not the Apaches,
w ho latter attacked Euro-American settlers in the central valleys.
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then retreated back to Mexico City/*
For some unknown reason, upon his return. Fray Marcos exaggerated the details of
what he had seen. Not only did he relate his true discoveries of prime sites for future
Spanish settlements and missions, but he also fabricated a story in which he made contact
with residents o f one o f the seven cities of gold. His glowing report set Mexico City
abuzz and Viceroy Mendoza wasted no time selecting his friend Francisco Vazquez de
Coronado to bring Cibola and the other northern cities into the Spanish realm. As was
typical, Coronado agreed to self-finance his expedition and to abide by restrictions to limit
abusive behavior among his men.^”
Before the Coronado expedition departed. Viceroy Mendoza ordered Hernando de
Alarcon to take the baggage Coronado’s men could not carry and to sail as far as possible
up the west coast. He was to then wait to rendezvous with the explorers. Once these
logistical matters were settled, and after much pomp and circumstance, Coronado and his
band o f over one thousand men headed north. The Spaniards, however, were not
adequately prepared to deal with the desert’s dearth of wild food and water. As such, it
was not long before many men became desperate for fresh provisions. Consequently, the
expedition paid little notice to the resource-poor Indian settlements in Arizona and instead
marched directly to the comparatively well-off Pueblo villages. Coronado’s chronicler
even called the barren region between the San Pedro River and the Zuni Pueblo “the

Albert H. Schroeder, Apache Indians, A Garland Series: American Ethnohistory, Indians o f the
Southwest, ed. David A gee Horr, vol. IV and V (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 2-3; W inship, 32-

6.
Castefteda, 291.
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wilderness.’" ”
Following an initial confrontation, the Puebloans willingly offered the newcomers gifts
o f com and blankets as well as access to their wells. When the Spaniards continued to
demand more, however, conflict erupted. From the Spanish point of view, the relationship
fell imder the purview o f conquest, so there was no need to take Indian concerns into
consideration. Thus, when one village finally refused to continue “trading,” it reaped a
whirlwind as outraged Spaniards set it ablaze. Once the Indians learned the consequences
o f resisting, the Spaniards then declared the territory sufficiently “pacified.” At this point.
Captain Juan GaUego left: with Fray Marcos to report their findings to the Viceroy as “he
did not think it was safe for him [Marcos] to stay in Cibola, seeing that his report had
turned out to be entirely false ..
After establishing themselves at the Zuni Pueblo, Coronado ordered his men to
reconnoiter the region. Some marched westward imtil they met the Yuman-speaking
Maricopa Indians at the junction o f the Gila and Colorado Rivers. They were much
impressed by the natives’ size and physical strength. As the Spaniards traveled further
down the Colorado, they found a tree marked “Alarcon reached this place.” Curious, they
dug at the bottom o f the tree and found letters explaining that Alarcon had traveled as far
up the Colorado as possible, waited, ran low on provisions, and turned back. At the same
these men were reading Alarcon’s letter, other explorers, under the command of Don

Castefleda, 294-6, 299.
Juan Jaramillio, “Narrative Given by Captain Juan Jaramillio o f his journey to the N ew Land o f
Spain and to the Discovery o f Cibola under General Francisco Vazquez Coronado,” in The N ative
Am erican an d Spanish C olonial E xperience in the G reater Southwest, ed. David H. Snow, vol. I (New
York: Garland Publishing, 1992), 119; Castefleda, 301-2, 317.
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Garcia Lopez de Cardenas, were staring awestruck over the edge of the Grand Canyon.
They marveled at its sheer beauty and were baffled as to how the Indians navigated down
the canyon’s jagged walls to reach the bottom. What impressed both parties the most,
however, was the Colorado Plateau’s utter lack o f water for miles on end. One Indian
guide told the Spaniards, “there was no water within three or four days, [and] when they
traveled] across this region themselves they [took] with them women loaded with water
in gourds ..
Hoping to rid themselves o f the Spanish parasites, the Puebloans directed Coronado
farther to the north. They assured him that if he and his men would only leave, they would
discover immeasurable wealth just beyond the horizon. Coronado eventually took the
bait, but only left with a small party o f men to search for the rich city the Indians called
Grand Quivara. Along the way, Coronado’s chronicler noted their first meeting with a
group o f Athapascans. He described them as expert buffalo himters who “lived like
Arabs” and utilized every part o f their giant prey.^^ Had Coronado arrived later he would
have discovered these plains hunters moving south to trade meat for com at the Pueblos,
but as this was their prime-hunting season, the Athapascans were miles away. When
Quivara tumed out to be nothing more than a diversion, Coronado garroted his native
guide and retumed to the Pueblos."

Coronado and his men had similar difficulty finding water near the Pueblos in N ew M exico, "they
left the cam ping place and m id-day o f the third day, when they saw some snow-covered mountains,
toward which they went in search o f water, neither the Spanish nor the horses nor the servants [had]
drank anything." A s cited in Castefteda, 303, 309-10, 14.
This demonstrates the Iberians much broader frame o f reference when it cam e to categorizing
unknown ethnic groups.
" Castefteda, 330, 337; Jaramillio, 100; Ives, 47.

45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Disillusioned, Coronado left New Mexico in 1542, marching again across the
“wilderness” o f eastern Arizona. His exposure o f Fray Marco’s ruse dampened further
interest in the far north for about forty years. In New Mexico, however, the chaos
wrought by the Spaniards surely lingered. With some of their villages burned and their
stores o f com and blankets depleted, the Puebloans would have had little to exchange
when the Athapascans arrived. This may have sparked a conflict and created a more
adversarial relationship between the two peoples. If this were the case, it would explain
why the next Spanish explorers foimd the Athapascans attacking the Pueblos to force
them to relinquish their caches fbod.^^
The next Spanish exploring party of consequence for Arizona reached the Southwest
in 1598. Under the direction of Don Juan de Ofiate, this second group o f conquerors also
arrived weary and short o f food. At first Ofiate sought to replenish their supplies by
soliciting Indian hospitality, yet as soon as he met resistance, the Conquistador resorted to
a level o f violence reminiscent of Coronado’s abuse.
Unbeknownst to Ofiate, at the time, the Puebloans were under increasing subsistence
pressure due to an extended period o f aridity, which had begun in the 1560s. Since about
1400 the region had been in a less-then-average precipitation cycle, but the years 1579
to 1585 were extremely dry. This overall drought phase lasted until 1790, which meant
that for approximately one hundred years, there was not enough rain to adequately sustain

Castefleda, 375; Spielman, "Coercion," 36-7.
36 "Yg The Viceroy o f N ew Spain, A sking him to Issue an Order for the Safeguarding o f the Road o f
the Province o f Nueva, Galacia,” in H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico N ueva Vizcaya, and
Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles W ilson Hackett, vol. I (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution
o f W ashington, 1923), 105.

46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

agriculture or livestock." The proximate effect of this climatic regime was repeated failed
harvests and resulting famine, while the remote effect was the desertification of the
Colorado Plateau and the migration o f some of the Athapascans southward into westcentral New Mexico."
The first Athapasean families to arrive, whom the Spanish called the Gila Apaches,
initially congregated in New Mexico’s Distal Mountains. They then slowly moved closer
to the Pueblos and eventually settled in the foothills flanking the Rio Grande River. At the
same time, a second Athapascan group, whom the Spanish called the Navajo, emerged
fi-om the northwest and settled in the upper San Juan River drainage. These two
Athapascan populations shared linguistic and cultural traits, yet they had been separated
for so long that neither now viewed other as a familial ally.^”
The Athapascan newcomers found ample space to settle, as they had migrated into the
territory previous Anasazi and Mogollon residents had abandoned in the 1330s. Ecological
conditions had not demonstrably improved since that time, so there was no resident

Elinore M. Barrett, C onquest an d C atastrophe: Changing Rio Grande Pueblo Settlem ent Patterns
in the Sixteenth C entury (Albuquerque: University o f N ew M exico Press, 2002), 16-7, 166-7; Marquis o f
Cadereyta, "Autos which cam e with letters from the Viceroy, Dated February 28, 1639, concerning
whether the division o f bishoprics on N ew M exico and doctrinas o f Sinaloa would be advisable," in
H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya an d A pproaches Thereto, to 1773, ed.
Charles W ilson Hackett, vol. 1 (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution o f W ashington, 1923), 98-99. In
1639, Don Francisco de Bustamente wrote to his superiors that the Indians in N ew M exico faced a harsh
life: “They com m only suffer from famines, during which entire pueblos are in the habit o f going to the
mountains to look for gam e and roots in order not to perish.” See Don Francisco de Bustamente,
"Opinion o f Don Francisco de Bustamente, M exico, February 18, 1639," in H istorical D ocum ents
R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya, a n d A pproaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles Wilson Hackett
(W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution in W ashington, 1923), 121.
These bands had moved into northwest N ew M exico during the last dry cycle, then remained and
did not migrate onto the Plains. It is m ost likely that they were living on the Colorado Plateau in small
horticultural com m unities when the Spanish arrived. When they began to feel the effects o f the drought,
they migrated toward the Pueblos, attracted by their surplus agricultural, as w ell as by Spanish livestock.
See Ives, 47; Haskell, 82-3.
” Haskell, 82-3; Ives, 48-9.
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population to resist them. The Athapascans’ biggest concern, then, was not trespassing on
claimed territory, but instead how to find enough food and water to survive. Fortunately,
as ingenuity was a hallmark o f their culture, this was not an overwhelming obstacle. Over
time, they adapted through various combinations o f horticulture, extensive exploitation of
wild foods, and maintaining trade connections with the Puebloans through both
negotiation and intimidation.'*”
The one long-term variable that the Athapascans had not encountered before was the
effects Europeans had on the native economy. The Spaniards regularly consumed more
than their share o f food, water, and fiiel, and their fi-ee-roaming cattle and sheep scoured
unfenced Indian fields and decimated desert-adapted plants. Faced with such
overwhelming competition for resources, the Athapascans eventually had to look for new
sources o f subsistence to augment the Puebloans crops and Mother Nature’s bounty.'"
Considering the circumstances, it did not take long for them to shift their focus to
Spanish livestock and advanced trade goods. Initial contacts indicate that the Athapascans
would have willingly entered into peaceful trading relations had the opportunity been
offered. But with Spanish soldiers and administrative officials seeking wealth through
Indian slaving, early close encounters with Spaniards often cost Athapascans their fi-eedom
and sometimes even their lives. Consequently, instead o f a nonviolent, reciprocating
relationship developing, one based instead on kidnapping, raiding, and retaliatory warfare

David H. Snow, "Upland Prehistoric M aize Agriculture in the Eastern Rio Grande and Its
Peripheries," in Farmers, Hunters, Colonists: Interactions Between the Southwest a n d the Southern
Plains, ed. Katherine Spielman (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1991), 76-7, 88; Homer Aschmann,
"Terrain and Ecological Conditions in the Western Apache Range," in Apache Indians V: A Study o f
Western A pache Indians, I8 4 6 -I8 8 6 , (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 4-5, 20-1.
Conrad J. Bahre, A L egacy o f Change: H istoric Human Im pact on Vegetation in the A rizona
B orderlands (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1991), 55-7.
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emerged/^
Disappointed by the prospects o f his quasi-feadal estate, in 1604 Onate decided to
venture out and explore beyond New Mexico’s boundaries. In doing so, he also fulfilled
his pledge to the Crown to seek a passage from New Mexico to California. Such a route
was important to the Spanish government for three reasons. First, little was actually
known about California and the King wanted an efficient and safe route for reconnaissance
teams to travel. Second, the Monarch wanted access to the region’s natural ports to better
establish trade with China. And third, officials still hoped that a clear passage would be
found connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific so as to eliminate the need to explore on
horseback.'*^
To reach California, Onate’s party decided to travel across Arizona’s northern plateau.
On their way, they vigilantly scouted for signs o f mineral deposits. As such, upon meeting
a group o f Indians, most likely Yavapais, in what is now the San Francisco Mountains,
Onate inquired about the colored ores the Indians had painted on their bodies. When an
older man explained how they extracted the ores from a spot in the mountains, Onate
asked to be taken to the place. He later wrote that the mine “had a very large dump,
where there were many and apparently very good ores. .

"Autos which came with letters from the Viceroy, February 28, 1639, and Petition o f Don Francisco
de la Mora, February 4, 1639," in H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico. N ueva Vizcaya, an d
A pproaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles W ilson Hackett (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution
W ashington, 1923), 98-99; Franeisco M artinez de Baez, "Petition o f Francisco Martinez de Baeza;
M exico, February 12, 1639," idem, 119; Schroeder, 40-1.
“Don Juan de Ofiate From N ew M exico, 1599” in Spanish E xploration in the Southwest, 15421706, Original Narratives o f Early American History Series, ed. Herbert Eugene Bolton (N ew York:
Barnes & Noble, 1908), 219-20.
Ibid., 244.
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Similar to Fray Marcos, Onate apparently did not encounter Apache bands living along
the Mogollon Rim. Exactly when the Athapascans, known as the Western Apaches,
arrived in eastern Arizona is uncertain, as scholars are still not sure o f their location prior
to migrating into the Southwest. While there is no doubt that the Athapascans who
moved into Arizona’s southeastern Chiricahua Mountains originated with the Gila
Apaches in New Mexico, researchers disagree over whether the Western Apaches were
also an extension o f the Gila bands, or if they were subgroup of Fremont Athapascans
from somewhere on the Colorado Plateau. The first theory rests mainly on the proximate
location o f the Güa Apaches to the Western bands, while confidence in the second
hypothesis derives from the fact that the Gila and Western Apaches maintained a buffer
zone between them and rarely worked in concerted effort.”^
In 1606, King Philip III received incrirninating reports regarding Onate’s behavior and
by 1609 he decided to recall the errant administrator and disband the colony. The
Franciscans, who had accompanied Onate, made no effort to hide their disdain for him.
They did not, however, want the entire New Mexican settlement dissolved, especially their
missions. To avoid such an event, in reports to the Viceroy the missionaries devoted as
much ink to inflating the number o f Indians they had supposedly baptized as they did to
vüüying Onate. Repeatedly, they stressed the Viceroy’s duty to protect their newly saved
Cliristian souls. Such tactics ultimately paid off when the King changed course and
ordered that New Mexico becom e a royal colony, maintained at the Crown’s expense. He

then removed Onate and appointed a new governor; he also dispatched fifteen friars and

Perry, 148-50. Most information on the Apaches com es from ethnographies complied since the
end o f the nineteenth century and from linguistic analysis. This is the case due to the Apaches being a
m obile group who left behind little material that remained in the archaeological record.
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fifty married soldiers to populate the colony. In 1610, Onate rode out of New Mexico in
disgrace, leaving behind a settlement that would now be a permanent burden to both the
royal treasury and the Southwestern economy.'*”
Between 1623 and 1650 two closely spaced, severe droughts cast a pall across the
Southwest. Apache raiders reacted by looking for ways to improve their subsistence
success; they found that assistance in the skill o f horse riding. This new mode of
transportation made them much more efficient at capturing Puebloan com as well as
Spanish cattle and sheep. In addition, a string o f incompetent governors disrupted New
Mexican life even further through their despicable acts o f slaving; which in many cases
resulted in a firestorm o f Indian retaliatory attacks. With deteriorating climatic conditions,
increasing Apache raids, and abusive government officials, by 1640 the Southwest was in
dire straights. Starving men and women lined the roads begging for food, while Spanish
and Pueblo men indiscriminately killed Apache raiders, who responded by striking back
just as mthlessly.'*’
For about twenty years after 1640 circumstances normalized somewhat, but drought
retumed again in 1666 and once more threw the region into turmoil until 1671. This latest

46
The Viceroy Concerning the Current State o f Affairs in N ew M exico Report o f the Province,”
in H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya, an d A pproaches Thereto, to 1773, ed.
Charles W ilson Hackett (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution W ashington, 1923), 199-201.
In 1661, Captain Andres Hurtado wrote, ". . . very great. Sir, has been the covetousness o f the
governors o f this kingdom, wherein they have, under color o f chastising the neighboring enemy, made
opportunity to send, apparently in the service o f his Majesty, squadrons o f men to capture the heathen
Indian to send them to the camp and m ines in El Parral to sell (as governor Don Bernardo Lopez de
M endizabal is doing at present, he having sent there more than seventy Indian men and women to be
sold).” See "Declaration o f Captain Andres Hurtado, Santa Fe, September, 1661," in H istorical
D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya, an d A pproaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles
W ilson Hackett (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution W ashington, 1923), 186-7; Elinore M. Barrett,
166-68.
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drying cycle was especially devastating as it culminated in a great famine, a deadly
epidemic, and a barrage o f Apache raiding. In 1669 Fray Juan Bernal wrote that:
For three years no crops have been harvested. In the past year, 1668, a great
many Indians perished o f hunger, lying dead along the roads, in the ravines, and in
their huts. There were pueblos (as instance Humanas) where more than four
hundred and fifty died o f hunger. The same calamity still prevails, for, because of
lack o f money, there is not a fanega o f com or of wheat in the whole kingdom, so
that for two years the food of Spaniards, men and women alike, has been the hides
o f cattle, which they had in their houses.'**
In 1679 Fray Francisco de Ayte wrote o f the worsening conditions:
In the year 1670 there was a very great famine in those provinces, which
compelled the Spanish inhabitants and the Indians alike to eat the hides that they had
and the straps o f the carts, preparing them for food by soaking and washing them
and toasting them in the fire with maize, and boiling them with herbs and roots. By
this means almost half the people in the said provinces escaped [starvation]. There
followed the next year o f 1671 a great pestilence, which also carried off many
people and cattle; and shortly thereafter, in the year 1672, the hostile Apaches who
were then at peace rebelled and rose up, and the said province was totally sacked
and robbed by their attacks and outrages, especially all the cattle and sheep, of
which it had previously been very productive. They killed, stole, and carried off aU
except a few small flocks o f sheep which were saved by the vigilance and care of
some o f the inhabitants, who guarded them by day at great risk of losing their lives,
as some did, and locked them up at night in the patios and corrals of their own
houses.'*”
This last quote also highlights the breakdown in understanding that occurred between
the Apaches and the Spanish. In the same breath that Spanish officials bemoaned their
own drought-induced suffering, they also castigated the Apaches for saving themselves
fi’om a similar fate. Apparently, the Spaniards were unable to see beyond their own self-

‘ Autos sent by Fray Juan Bernal, Commissary o f the Holy Office o f N ew M exico, against Bernardo
Gruber, January 19, 1667-September 1, 1670. Folio 373,” Historical Documents Relating to N ew M exico,
N ueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles W ilson Hackett, vol. 1 (W ashington D C.:
Carnegie Institution W ashington, 1923), 271-2.
“Petition o f Father Fray Francisco de Ayeta; M exico, May 10, 1679,” Historical Documents
Relating to N ew M exico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles W ilson Hackett,
vol. 1 (W ashington, D C.: Carnegie Institution W ashington, 1923), 296-303.

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interest to grasp that the Apaches were also resorting to extreme, short-term solutions to
stave off starvation. Unfortimately, this lack of empathy was not a limited phenomenon.
On the contrary, it became the official Spanish response to Apache survival strategies
throughout the colonial era.
By 1680, members o f the Pueblo communities had also reached a breaking point and
lashed out at the Spaniards with a nativist movement that resulted in the 1680 Pueblo
Revolt. Guided by the spiritual leader Pope, the Puebloans drove the Spaniards south into
Chihuahua to cleanse their land o f their corrupting influence. Not all Puebloans
participated, though, as some families rejected the violence and sought refuge among the
Navajo. For their part, the Navajo willingly absorbed these refugees along with their
useful agricultural and technological know-how.””
As they watched the Spaniards fleeing, some Gila Apaches followed to maintain access
to Spanish material goods as well as to seize any opportunity to strike at their enemy.”'
When they arrived in northern Chihuahua, these Apache bands mixed with local UtoAztecan and Coahulican Indians who practiced similar subsistence strategies.”^ Since they

"Hearing o f June 16, 1663, Requested by Mendizabla; Folio 24. Against Don D iego de Penalosa,
Governor o f N ew Mexico," in H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya, a n d
A pproaches Thereto, to 1773^ ed. Charles W ilson Hackett (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution
W ashington, 1923), 271-2; “Don A ntonio de Otermin Letter from the Governor and Captain-General,
From N ew M exico,” Hackett, 327; “Don Francisco Cuervo y Valdez to his Majesty; Santa Fe, October 18,
1706,” in H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya, an d A pproach es Thereto, to
1773, ed. Charles W ilson Hackett (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution W ashington, 1923), 383;
K essell, 117.
” “The Viceroy o f N ew Spain Makes report to your Majesty o f the general uprising o f the Indians o f the
provinces o f N ew M exico, and o f the measures and means which have been adopted for their restoration
with M exico, February 28, 1681,” in H istorical D ocum ents R elating to N ew M exico, N ueva Vizcaya, an d
A pproaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles W ilson Hackett (W ashington D C.: Carnegie Institution
Washington, 1923), 339-41.
It is likely that these were the descendents o f the Casas Grandes society; the larger com plex
civilization from which the Hohokam traded for luxury goods. Apparently the Casas Grandes people met
a fate similar to that o f the Hohokam, as they too burned many o f their buildings.
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shared much in common, it did not take long for a new hybrid, Apachean subgroup to
appear. The Spanish identified this and aU future blended Athapascan entities as Apachean
due to familiar linguistic markers. The reason for this was that the Athapascans were
willing to radically change almost any part o f their culture except their language. By
1686, this mixed tribe had begun raiding not only New Mexico’s exiled settlers, but also
Spanish and Indian communities throughout what is now northern Sonora and
Chihuahua.””
Northern towns lived at the mercy o f Apache raiders for ten years before Spanish
officials established presidios at Janos and Fronteras. Located in northeastern Sonora,
these forts were strategically placed to obstruct Apache travel routes through the Sierra
Madre Occidental. For a time this strategy worked, but it was not long before the raiders
discovered new passages. Effectively blocking the Apaches was not the only difficulty
Spanish soldiers faced. Once found and engaged in battle, the soldiers then had to deal
with the Apache’s guerilla tactics that tumed many o f the Spaniard’s military strengths
into weaknesses.”'* Frustrated by this, in a letter written sometime in the 1720s, leading
citizens o f Sonora petitioned the King to save them fi'om the cunning Apache villains:
The Apache enemies visit us boldly and repeatedly, to our confusion and damage.
All for lack o f a commanding officer [at Fronteras] with determination, interest,
and valor. Every retaliation against them, made by [the current] lieutenant, is
brief and without speed, range, or organization. In all o f this. Sir, we petition
Your Lordship, who is endowed with royal civility and compassion for our

” Haskell, 78-9, 83-4, 104-5.
Donald T. Garate, Juan B autista de Anza (Reno: University o f Nevada Press, 2003), 56-7, 80, 82-3;
Perry, 134-5; Fay Jackson Smith, Captain o f the Phantom Presidio: A H istory o f the P residio o f
Fronteras, Sonora, N ew Spain, 1686-1735, Including the Inspection by B rigadier P edro de Rivera, 1726
(Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1993), 100-107.
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Miseries, to deign provide, with appropriate foresight, that which calamités
require. .55
One way the Indians were able to negate the Spaniard’s military advantages was by
living in mountainous areas almost too rugged for horses to reach. Because of this, the
Spaniards often had to stop their pursuit at the mountains and in doing so lost their
offensive advantage. Even when they caught the Indians in the open, the Apaches
outwitted their Spanish adversaries through the art of strategic retreat. If not assured an
offensive edge or if the Apaches were woeftiUy outnumbered, they would disperse in as
many directions as men running. This strategy was so simple, yet effective, that it
tormented generations o f Spanish and then later American soldiers.””
Almost in admiration. Captain o f the Fronteras Presidio, Juan Bautista de Anza wrote
o f his Apache adversaries, “They live in small, dispersed rancherias, both in their own
lands and when they seek the protection o f the impregnable mountain ranges along the
fi-ontier. Hence, if they are found, only a small number are seized.. . .And even though
they always inhabit regions o f great strategic advantage they attain even greater advantage
by taking positions where they cannot be attacked, in land as vast as the ocean, with their
backs secure.””’
Frontier conditions eventually deteriorated to the point that Brigadier General Pedro
de Rivera in 1720 reported that:

"Undated and Unsigned Letter," in Juan Bautista de Anza, (Reno: University o fN evad a Press,
2003), 91.
See Jack S. W illiam s and Robert L. Hoover, Arm s o f the A pacheria: A Com parison o f A pachean
a n d Spanish Fighting Techniques in the L atter 18th Century, Occasional Publications in Mesoamerican
Anthropology, no. 25 (Greeley: University o f Northern Colorado Press, 1983). See also Garate, 117-18.
” Garate, 117.
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Because o f the carelessness of the army o f this presidio [Fronteras] and because
o f the cleverness o f the enemy of these frontiers, they [the Apaches] have committed
continuous thefts o f horses, cattle, and other things, penetrating right to the presidio
itself. It is ordered that the armies be continually on the move, with one squadron
inspecting and visiting the passes and areas where the enemy comes, for this presidio
was built for that reason.”*
By the time the General completed his assessment of Fronteras, however, many of the
southern Apache bands had already shifted their focus to the north and west. Pushed by
Spanish soldiers and their Opata Indian auxiliaries, and pulled by a herd o f Spanish cattle
that had recently arrived at the outpost of San Xavier del Bac, some Apaches had
reoriented toward southern Arizona. The man responsible for the cattle’s appearance was
a Jesuit priest whose life’s goal was to prove that one could reach the missions of
California through the dangerous territory of the Apaches. His name was Padre Eusebio
Kino.””
When Kino first arrived in Mexico City in 1681, his superiors assigned him as
cosmographer for what was believed to be the island of California. It was his duty to
improve the viability o f the province by seeking a less costly, overland travel route for
delivering supplies to its residents. Sailing cargo ships north against the current from
Mexico proper was time consuming, and thus expensive. Officials, therefore, hoped that
Kino would discover an easily accessible, land route running peu-allel to the east coast of
the supposed island. With single-minded determination, then. Kino made it his life’s work
to bring California into the Christian fold. His zeal alone was insufficient, however, as

”* Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera, Regulation f o r the Fronteras Presidio, quoted in Donald
Garate, Juan B autista de Anza (Reno: University O fN evad a Press, 2003), 114. See also Smith, 122-23.
Ernest J. Burrus, Kino an d M anje: E xplorers o f Sonora an d Arizona, Their Vision o f the Future, A
S tudy o f Their E xpeditions an d P lans with an A ppendix o f Thirty Documents (St. Louis: Jesuit Historical
Institute, 1971), 96.

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

politics in Spain had stagnated at the end o f the seventeenth century. Suffering from a
lack of administrative attention. Kino received little financial support.””
In 1686, noticed arrived advising Kino to abandon his assignment and turn his
attention instead to establishing missions in the Pimeria Alta—central and southern
Arizona. No one had yet attempted this feat and many argued that it was impossible as
the upper Pimans were as belligerent as their Apache allies. Kino paid no heed to these
naysayers as he viewed his new assignment as a vehicle for completing his unfinished route
to California. With this in mind, he first made contact with the Yuman Indians along the
lower Colorado River. He then worked his way up the Gila River and briefly visited the
Maricopas, before traveling to the junction o f the Santa Cruz River, where he met with the
Pimans. In each village, residents welcomed Kino, along with his enticing trade goods.
By leaving more than he took, Kino consistently received parting invitations to soon
return.”'
Not only was the Padre a master o f persuasion among the Indians, he was even more
convincing with his superiors. To revive support for his Arizona-as-route-to-Califomia
plans, he filled his reports with bucolic images of fertile Piman farms that would be the
“support o f the scantier and more sterile lands o f California.””’ With each letter, his
words wooed important men along the chain o f command until they reached the King’s
council. It was there that Kino finally received authorization and financing for a series of
exploratory ventures to California. Sure that a route existed. Kino never doubted his

^ Idem, ed.. Kino R eports to H eadquarters: Correspondence o f Eusebio F. Kino, S.J., From N ew
Spain to Rom e (Rom e, Italy: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1954).
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ability to prove it. Before he could demonstrate this, however, the one variable in life he
could not control put an end to his quest: just after midnight on March 15, 1711, Father
Eusebio Kino passed fi'om this world into the next.””
During Kino’s tenure, fear of Apache raiders had kept Spanish slavers and landhungry haciendados at bay. As a result, Arizona’s Indians had had little direct contact
with these more brutal colonial figures. What they knew o f the Spanish had arrived in the
form o f a kindly Padre on horseback who brought them wonderful new plants and
amazing new trade goods. When Kino died, the Indians of the Pimaria-Alta were openly
solicitous for more Spaniards to come to live among them. When this did not happen, the
Indians worried that they would be forgotten.”‘*
Kino’s death not only halted plans for integrating Arizona into a larger transportation
and communication network, but it also marked a larger transition in Spanish colonial
administration. In 1700, the last heir in the Spanish Hapsburg line, sickly Charles II,
mercifully died and a new French Bourbon monarch, Philip V, assumed the throne. With
Philip V’s coronation came not only a change in royal lineage, but more importantly, a
change in administrative philosophy. The Hapsburgs had created a hetrarchical
administrative structure in which power was shared with the nobility and subdivided into
overlapping governing units.”” The purpose of this had been to bind Spain’s aristocracy to
the Castilian Crown as well as create political friction to discourage collusion between

“ Burrus, Kino an d M anje, 142-3; K essell, 135.
Edward Spicer, C ycles o f Conquest: The Im pact o f Spain, M exico an d the U nited S tates on The
Indians o f the Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1962), 130-2.
Crumely, 26-7.
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administrators in differing parts of the bureaucracy.””
When Philip V arrived in Spain, he found the old Hapsburg system in a state of
disarray. Not from abuses from below, but from corruption at the top. Despite the vast
wealth pouring out o f its New World colonies, Spain had become a debtor nation to
pursue an aggressive imperial strategy. Consequently, by the end of the sixteenth century,
receipts from its empire did not even cover half of the country’s expenditures. Unwilling
to modernize the country’s tax system, Philip II had begun to raise revenue by selling
bureaucratic offices to the highest bidder. Eventually, even American-bom Spaniards
could purchase a government position. Because o f this, by the seventeenth century,
money, not loyalty, had become the requisite for serving in the colonial administration.
Yet, even with this new source o f income, Philip II still could not cover Spain’s expenses.
In fact, before he died, Spain had to declare bankruptcy four times.”’ Philip V, therefore
had much to accomplish if Spain was to continue as a world power.

^ John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808 (Oxford: The Camelot Press, 1989), 2-4.
Henry Kamen, "The Vicissitudes o f World Power," in Spain: A H istory, ed. Raymond Carr
(Oxford: University o f Oxford Press, 2000), 158-9; idem, Empire, 439-43; Linda K. Salvucci, Richard J.
Salvucci, Aslan Cohen, "The Politics o f Protection: Interpreting Commercial Policy in the Late Bourbon
and Early National Mexico," in The P o litica l E conom y o f Spanish A m erica in the A ge o f Revolution,
1750-1850, ed. Kenneth J. Andrien and Lyman L. Johnson (Albuquerque: University o f N ew M exico
Press, 1994), 95-8.
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CHAPTER 3

SPANISH BOURBONS AND THE MEXICAN INTERIM
In 1700, the Spanish government entered an era of transition when the last of the
Hapsburgs, Charles II, died without an heir. Before dying, he selected Philip of Anjou, the
grandson o f the French monarch Louis XIV and o f Bourbon lineage, to succeed him to the
throne. Upon ascension, Philip discovered he had inherited a treasury in arrears and a
bureaucracy plagued by inefificiency and corruption. The new King and his counselors had
little time to address these matters, however, as they quickly faced a war o f succession
with the Austrian branch o f the Hapsburgs. To raise sufficient funds for Spain’s defense,
Philip V initiated a process o f administrative centralization, which included streamlining or
abandoning imperial programs in Europe and the colonies. For Spanish citizens, soldiers,
bureaucrats, and missionaries, the Crown’s new emphasis on fi-ugality often translated into
reassignments, transfers, or rejections o f new settlements, presidios, and missions.'
Due to this more austere state o f affairs, after Padre Kino died in 1711, it was almost
another thirty years before ecclesiastical officials had enough funding to dispatch Padres

‘ Henry Kamen, The War o f Succession in Spain, 1700-15 (Bloom ington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1969), 15-9; idem. Em pire, 464-6; Salvucci et al., 95-8; Richard L. Garner and Spiro E. Stefanou,
Econom ic G rowth an d Change in Bourbon M exico (G ainesville, FL: University Press o f Florida, 1993),
109-110, 141-45, 154-7; John S. Leiby, C olonial B ureaucrats an d the M exican Econom y: Growth o f a
P atrim onial State, 1763-1821 (N ew York: P. Lang, 1986), 167-71.
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Keller, GrashofFer, and Segesser to the Pimaria-Alta. When these missionaries arrived in
1732, they began where Kino had left off in bringing salvation to the Piman and Yuman
Indians/ Compared to Kino, however, these new men o f God were not as successful at
drawing favorable attention to southern Arizona. Parsimonious royal pohcies and a lack
o f diplomatic acumen hindered their efforts. Even local officials, paid little heed to the
padres’ pleas, as they were focused instead on Apache attacks against missions, mines,
and ranches.^
In addition to these “depredations,”^ officials were also concerned over reports o f a
new Apache group, living north o f the Chiricahua Mountains, who were blocking travel
routes between the Sobaipuris on the San Pedro River and Zuni Pueblo in New Mexico.
Officials labeled this new group the Western Apaches, yet administrators usually referred
to them as individual bands with names that matched their geographic location, such as the
White Mountain or Warm Springs Apaches. These Apaches apparently migrated south
into the Mogollon Mountains fi'om near Black Mesa sometime after 1695/
In 1736, Padre Keller was shocked when he visited the Maricopas, who were a branch
o f the Yuman Indians that had migrated up the Gila River toward the Hohokam villages
during the dry years in the fourteenth century. Upon his arrival, he discovered their homes
destroyed and blamed the Western Apaches for the dastardly deed. His conclusion was

^ Garate, 122.
^ K essell, Spain, 229-30.
Spanish officials labeled anything Indians did that they found unpleasant, inconvenient, or criminal
as a depredation. This would include killing feral cattle and sheep, or retaliating for the killing o f a
relative.
’ Schroeder, A pache Indians, 41-3; Max L. Moorehead, The Apache Frontier: J acobo U garte an d
Spanish-Indian R elations in N orthern N ew Spain, 1 769-1791 (Norman : University o f Oklahoma Press,
1968), 170-1.
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incorrect; however, as Western Apache territory never extended that far west. Instead, it
is more likely that the Maricopas’ long-time adversaries the Yavapais, who lived just to
the north on the Gila River, were responsible party. Once done, though, such
misassignment o f guilt to the Western Apaches for conflict in western Arizona became
common and continued throughout the colonial period and into the Mexican and
American eras.^
In 1752, to protect northern mines and settlements from Apache raiders, Spanish
officials established a number of new, strategically located presidios, including one at the
community o f San Xavier Tubac, in south-central Arizona. The plan was to place soldiers
closer to Apache base camps to block raids at their point of origin, as well as more
effectively mete out punishment.^
With Tubac now an important frontier buffer, the post needed a commander o f aboveaverage competence. It would require a leader who understood the larger forces that
influenced human behavior and was honest enough to see the flaws in his own society.
This man was Juan Bautista de Anza, Jr., the son o f the Fronteras Presidio commander of
the same name. As his father, the younger Anza had a reputation as both a ruthless Indian
fighter and as an evenhanded pragmatist.*
Once in command o f San Xavier del Tubac, it did not take Anza long to determine
that Spanish pohcing policies were ineffective at achieving and maintaining peace. He first

* Albert H. Schroeder, Yavapai Indians: A Study o f Yavapai H istory (New York: Garland Publishing,
1974), 1-3.
’ Kieran McCarty, D esert D ocum entary: The Spanish Years, 1767-1821, Historical Monograph, no. 4
(Tucson: A rizona Historical Society, 1976), 68.
* Ibid., 1-8; K essell, Spain, 254-5; John L. K essell, M ission o f Sorrows: Jesuit G uevavi an d the
Pimans, 1691-1767 (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1970), 38-9.
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realized this in February o f 1766, after he had led his men in pursuit of Apache raiders and
captured 40 warriors. Anza divided the Apaches among his men to sell as slaves in
payment for their service; they then set out to return to Tubac. Upon the soldiers’ arrival,
however, they were shocked to discover that in their absence other Apaches had driven off
the cattle from a nearby settlement. Anza’s anger over being duped eventually turned into
reflection and he slowly began to view his role as more than just a soldier. In fact, he
became determined to create a more rational plan for maintaining peace on the frontier.^
During Anza’s tenure, some o f the Jesuit missionaries ministering to Arizona’s Indians
also came to see the Apaches differently. In other parts o f northern Mexico, the Jesuits
were despised for protecting the Indians from abuse by a sundry list of Spanish
predators—mine owners, haciendados, administrative officials. Up until the late
eighteenth century, however, the Jesuits, as other frontier residents, looked upon the
Apaches as little more than animals, undeserving o f sanctuary. As with Anza, though,
once they began living in close contact with the Apaches the padres began to change their
minds.'"
Initially sure that the Indians’ behavior derived from sin, men such as Fray Pfefferkom
came to realize that their actions actually were driven by their inabihty to find enough to
eat. Pfefferkom wrote, “They [the Apaches] Plant [sic] maize, beans, gourds, and other
things in different places, especially in valleys, but in such small quantities that they would
starve if they were not able to supplement their meager harvest with the products of

’ Schroeder, A pache Indians, 50-1; K essell, M ission o f Sorrow 173-4.
Henry F. Dobyns, LANCE, HO!: Containm ent o f the Western A paches b y the R oyal Spanish
G arrison A t Tucson (Lima, Peru; Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1964), 3-5.
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robbery and theft.”’' Living himself in southern Arizona, he now understood just how
difficult it was to survive in the desert. Had King Carlos III not expelled the Society of
Jesus fi'om the Americas in 1767, a combination o f Anza’s military pragmatism and
missionary compassion may have produced system that better balanced Spanish and Indian
interests, and thus reduced conflict.'^
Following the Jesuit expulsion, colonial bureaucrats asked for and received royal
consent to secularize the missions o f northern Mexico. This meant that Catholic Indians
would receive individual ownership of mission lands, which made it easier for
unscrupulous speculators to take native property and then force the Indians to work as
low-paid laborers. Just as the Crown authorized this, Franciscan missionaries, who had
taken over the Jesuit’s territory, were beginning to realize the true magnitude o f their
undertaking.’^
By 1797, Friar Bringas submitted a report that asked not only for a suspension of the
decision to secularize Sonora’s northern missions, but also permission to Open new
missions in the many areas that had never been adequately proselytized. The request never
received royal approval, but it highlighted the region’s continued unsettled, frontier
nature, which was due in large part to continued Apache agitation for access to
resources.

" Aschm ann, 4-5.
John L. K essell, Friars, Soldiers, an d Reformers: H ispanic A rizona an d the Sonoran M ission
Frontier, 1767-1856 (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1976), 59-60.
" Ibid, 182-190.
D iego M iguel Bringas, F riar Bringas R eports to the K ing, ed. David S. Matson and Bernard
Fontana (Tucson: University o f Arizona Pres, 1977), 44-53.
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Spanish administrators had not turned a deaf ear to men such as Friar Bringas; they
had simply come to view reports from Arizona not as policy suggestions but instead as
tools for uncovering and exploiting Apache weaknesses. In fact, it was this use of
intelligence that underlay a major shift in frontier policy at this time. A shift that moved
away from an offensive posture and toward one seeking to create among the Apaches a
state o f chronic economic dependence and cultural demoralization. The man who initiated
this pragmatic, yet morally dubious Indian policy, was a minor nobleman named Jose de
Galvez.'^
Galvez arrived in New Spain in 1765 under orders to reform and centralize Spain’s
civil and military bureaucracy. Exuding the Bourbon affinity for fastidiousness, Galvez
tightened lax tax collection, extended royal monopolies, and implemented a new plan for
eliminating waste in colonial expenditures. He was especially determined to bring order to
the turbulent north. To achieve this, he called for a thorough inspection that would include
recommendations for administrative restructuring. Not one to delegate hghtly, Galvez
sent the trusted Marquis de Rubf with instructions to visit key northern settlements, to
note any irregularities, and to finally synthesize the sum o f his observations into a coherent
plan for improved efficiency.’"
Rubf arrived in Tubac in December o f 1766. He was pleased with the settlement and
praised Captain Anza for creating such an efficient state o f affairs. He must not, however,
have truly understood just how much Tubac’s success w as the result o f Anza’s

K essell, Friars, 259-60.
Alfred Barnaby Thomas ed., Teodoro d e Croix A n d The Northern F rontier o f N ew Spain, 17761783, trans. Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1968), 62-67.
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management, because in his final report, Rubf recommended that the town’s civilian
residents be left to care for themselves, while the presidio moved north to the more
vulnerable settlement o f San Augustine de Tucson. This decision made good economic
sense as it deployed resources more efficiently, yet it was bad policy as it ultimately
removed a necessary, meditating institution fi’om a highly contested region.'^
Upon completion o f his two-year, fect-finding mission, Rubf concluded that the
Apache threat was surmountable if the Crown would authorize a systematic re
deployment o f presidios along a corridor stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of
California. Combined with a policy o f waging relentless war against the Apaches, Rubf
believed that his plan would not only boost the northern economy, but in the end would
save the Crown money through reduced expenditures. In 1772, the Monarchy acted by
issuing the Reglamento de 1772, which in many respects was a codified version o f Rubf’s
recommendations with modifications by Jose de Galvez.’*
Unaware o f what was about to happen, Juan de Anza, with the assistance of
Franciscan Padre Francisco Tomas Hermenegildo Garces Maestro, began to revive Kino’s
idea o f establishing an overland route connecting Sonora and New Mexico with California.
When royal officials first reviewed the plan they found no compelling reason to finance
their efforts. In 1772, however, the Russians began moving down the coast o f California,
causing Viceroy Bucareli to throw his support behind the idea o f strengthening the
colony’s military position with an efficient overland supply route. He decided, therefore.

Ignaz Pfefferkom, Sonora: A D escription o f the P rovince, trans. Theodore E. Treutlein (Tucson:
Uni versity o f A rizona Press, 1989), 271-2; McCarty, 31-4.
Moorhead, 116-117, 133.
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to reverse course and authorized Anza and Garces to take an exploratory journey. Leading
a group o f settlers, the Captain and the Padre crossed the lower Colorado River headed
for California, on May 2, 1772.’^
Anza returned triumphant in May o f 1774, yet his celebratory mood soon turned to
distress when he found Tubac in disarray and under siege by Apache raiders. A drought
begun in 1770 had by this time severely contracted available wild plant and animal life and
was beginning to affect domesticated crops and livestock as well. The need to feed their
families was therefore driving the Apaches to raid for whatever supplies they could
capture. Likewise, settlers were fiercely defending their scarce supplies. Afraid that
renewed conflict would dampen official support for his plan to transform Arizona into a
commercial hub, Anza wrote to the Viceroy to assure him that there would be few
problems for travelers in Arizona if they would merely follow a few simple rules.^"
The Captain first advised that settlers bound for California strictly follow the Santa
Cruz River to the junction with the Gila. Then, from there they should hug the Gila River
until it joined with the Colorado. These stipulations had less to do with the aridity o f the
region than with the protection Anza beheved the Piman Indians would provide against
Apache attacks. What he actually meant was that the river Indians would serve as a buffer
from Yavapai attacks as the GUa River was the lower boundary of the eastern Yavapai
bands, not the Apaches. Secondly, to ensure Piman cooperation and to establish friendly
relations with the Yumans, who were willing to ferry travelers across the swift moving

K essell, Friars, 93-100.
“ G arate, 87-93.
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Colorado, Anza warned that Spanish travelers must take pains not to alienate either group.
Among his list o f transgressions was taking food without permission or just compensation,
allowing livestock to destroy native fields, and any other arrogant behavior that would
provoke indignation.^'
Anza fed his rules into the slow turning gears of the Spanish government where they
passed from one bureaucrat to the next until they finally reached the Viceroy. At this
point, however, Anza’s message lost its urgency as it became tossed in a sea o f pressing
communiqués. Unable to advance further, Anza’s pragmatic plan for ameliorating conflict
on the Apache frontier stalled. Unaware, in 1776, the Captain followed orders and moved
his men to Tucson under the stipulations established in the Reglamento de 1772. To
assist, the Crown promised to excuse settlers who were willing to relocate from all taxes
and tithes, as well as provide them supplies if they provided their own weaponry and
horses and served in the ranks o f the citizen militia.^^
Anza apparently seized this opportunity to implement parts of his plan for dealing with
the Apaches. He offered the Apaches a clear choice between food and peace or continued
raiding and relentless warfare. As the Crown’s offer to compensate those who went to
Tucson had attracted more than one thousand soldiers, settlers, and Piman Indians, Anza
had gained, as presidio commander, the power to requisition generous amounts of
supplies. Thus, he could order enough food to support not only the citizen’s of Tucson,
but also all peace-seeking Indians. Throughout his tenure at Tucson, 300 b e e f cattle

Ibid., 101-155.
' Moorhead, 90-1; McCarty, 16-18, 88-92.
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arrived annually, providing plenty for all/^
In 1776, Jose de Galvez became Minister of the Indies and began implementing his
own plan for transforming New Spain’s northern frontier into an independent
administrative unit. Calling his creation the General Command o f the Interior Provinces,
Galvez selected Viceroy Croix’s nephew Teodoro as the first Commandant General.
Teodoro’s primary job was to defend the frontier against hostile Indians and foreign
encroachment. He began by first addressing the deficiencies he saw in Rubi’s presidio
corridor plan and evaluating other options for containing the Apaches. After settling on
solutions, Croix informed Captain Anza in 1777 that his talents were to be put to better
use in the more volatile region o f northern New Mexico.^'*
Apparently unaware o f Anza’s previous warnings that Spaniards not trespass on the
Pima and Yuma Indians, Croix authorized Padre Garces to establish two missions on the
west bank o f the Colorado River. These new settlements were to be different as they were
to be streamlined, meaning soldiers would live with the missionaries, instead o f in a nearby
presidio. Garces was reluctant, as he understood the sagacity o f Anza’s rules; he worried
that this plan would create just the type o f confiict between Spaniards and Indians that the
Crown was attempting to eliminate.^"
It did not take long for Garces’ misgivings to be proven correct. Once arrived,
mission soldiers began allotting themselves farm plots from Indian fields, and they allowed
their cattle to graze on Indian crops. To add insult to injury, when the soldiers ran low on

23
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provisions, they took supplies from the Indians without offering just compensation. The
final straw came in the summer of 1781 when a group of Yumans ferried a Spanish party
across the river and the settlers only paid them with a few cheap gifts. The Spaniards then
allowed their livestock to strip nearby mesquite trees bare—an essential Indian food
source. In mid-July the Indians had had enough and rebelled. They killed most o f the
Spanish men, including the two friars, and captured the women and children. Once Croix
heard o f this disaster, he dismissed any fiiture possibility o f establishing missions in
southern Arizona. He then attempted to shift the blame for the debacle onto Anza by
accusing the Captain o f misleading him into thinking that Arizona’s river tribes were
peaceful.^"
In 1785, Jose de Galvez’s nephew Bernardo became Viceroy and decided to use his
position to experiment with a new Indian policy. While serving in Spanish Louisiana,
Bernardo Galvez had admired French methods for winning Indian cooperation through
gift giving and diplomacy. Not only did he beheve that the French policy was more
successful at minimizing conflict, but that it was also much cheaper than relying solely on
mihtary force. Consequently, in 1786 Viceroy Galvez ordered Commandant General
Ugarte^’ to adopt a similar peace policy on the northern frontier. Once in operation,
presidio commanders were under orders to negotiate with individual Apache bands and to
ensure that Spaniards strictly adhered to all treaty stipulations. Commanders were also to
assume a p r io r i that the Indians would not uphold their end o f the agreements. Instead,

“ Ibid.
27
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they were to be ready to coax compliance by rewarding pliant Indians and viciously
punishing those who remained intractable/*
Indians willing to settle near a presidio received adequate rations, poor quality guns
for hunting, and protection from molestation from settlers. But, most importantly, they
gained access to an endless supply of liquor. This was the case as Bernardo de Galvez
hoped to control the Indians through their appetites. On the one hand this was a
pragmatic way to address the roots of Apache unrest, food scarcity and mistreatment by
settlers and soldiers, while on the other hand it was a reprehensible attempt to destroy
Apache society through addiction and internal conflict.^^
Regardless o f the motives, by 1790 the Apache threat to frontier settlers had
diminished greatly, as more and more Indian families settled near presidios. In Arizona,
the Western Aravapai Apaches permanently relocated near Tucson to gain access to
rations and other goods. By the time Americans began traversing the region in the 1830s,
the Spanish had begun calling these bands Mansos Apaches, which translated to Tame
Apaches.^" The effects o f this peace program only lasted for about twenty-five years,
however. It came to an end when Mexican Creoles broke from Spain and royal fimding
disappeared, leaving presidio commanders with no provisions for their Apache charges.
As soon as it became evident that the Spaniards were no longer able to fulfill their
obligations, Apache families deserted the peace camps and resumed other subsistence

^*Henry F. Dobyns, Spanish C olonial Tucson: A D em ographic H istory (Tucson: University o f
Arizona Press, 1976), 92-112; Moorhead, 104, 117, 119, 127, 131.
Dobyns, 97-108.
McCarty, 61-3.
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strategies, which included raiding/'
By enforcing existing taxes and implementing new government monopolies on key
commodities Spain’s Bourbon monarchs had succeeded in diverting money from colonial
hands into royal coffers. The Bourbons had also managed to curtail local prerogatives,
making it more difficult for colonial-born bureaucrats to improve their standard o f living
through patronage and graft. While causing disquiet, such policy changes did not,
however, automatically lead to rebeUion. Instead, for over one hundred years, Americanbom Spaniards continued to beheve that the benefits derived from belonging to a powerful
empire outweighed the costs o f what the Bourbons were deducting from their bank
accounts and egos.^^
The breaking point finaUy came when Creole resentment combined with the
uncertainty that emerged foUowing Napoleon’s seizure of Castile’s throne in 1808. Many
in the colonial ehte at first recoiled from advocates for independence as these rebels were
also clamoring for a social revolution. As events in Spain became even less stable,
however, many Creoles began to beheve that the only way to protect their way of life was
to start their own limited movement for independence.** Although, before they could take
charge, a populous rebelhon broke out under the guidance of a parish priest named Father
Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla.
Hidalgo was a revolutionary whose aim was to oversee a true social uprising in which

Moorehead, 37-42.
Leiby, 167.
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the poor and dispossessed would rise and struggle for their liberation. The ranks o f his
army reflected this as they were filled with Indians and Mestizos. As would be expected,
Padre Hidalgo’s goals and constituency fiightened Mexico’s Creoles who correctly
envisioned attacks on themselves as the ruling elite. They were unable to stop Padre
Hidalgo, however, who had the advantage o f numbers and momentum, until he provided
them an opening at the edge o f Mexico City. Hidalgo was low on provisions and afraid he
would lose control o f his organized mob once they entered the capital, so, in a fateful
decision, Hidalgo chose not to attack and instead retreated to seek fresh supplies. In
doing so, his lost forever his chance to upend the Mexican social structure.*'*
Given this break, Mexico’s leaders mounted an all-out effort to capture the priest and
teach his followers a lesson. When news o f the rebellion reached presidio commanders in
Sonora and southern Arizona, they dispatched all available soldiers to capture the priest.
Consequently, when Hidalgo’s retreating army arrived at Guadalajara, these northern
soldiers were waiting for them. Dependent on Mexico City for funding o f the Apache
peace program, frontier citizens saw no benefit to be gained by joining Hidalgo’s populist
movement.**
Only after conditions in Spain worsened appreciably, in their view, did Mexico’s
Creoles finally decide that it was time to break the colonial bonds. Led by Colonel
Agustm de Iturbide, these reluctant rebels won their independence and then set about
codifying the socioeconomic system that had benefited their caste throughout the colonial

Hugh M. Ham ili, The H idalgo Revolt: P relude to M exican Independence (Gainesville: University
o f Florida Press, 1966), 176-78.
** James E. Officer, H ispanic Arizona, 1536-1856 (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1987), 84-6.
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era. Once news o f the rebellion reached the northern frontier, debate raged over the
rightness o f opposing Spain. Ultimately, the regional leadership decided to throw their
support behind the conservative revolutionaries.*"
Life after Mexico’s ruling class achieved independence was chaotic as political power
shifted rapidly between two ideological camps, neither o f which represented the lower
castes. The effect o f this in Arizona was multifaceted; with the most telling consequence
being a precipitous drop in the amount of money available to frontier posts. Surrounded,
as many were, by Apaches who had grown used to provisions provided through the peace
program, the loss o f revenue threatened to cause a wave o f rebellions. To add to this
problem, m the case o f the Arizona settlements in particular, the government made matters
worse in 1828 when officials decided to expel all peninsulars,*^ depriving the outposts of
not only all o f their missionaries, but also the Friars’ independent sources o f money and
provisions.**
Once the Mexican government reneged on Spain’s treaty obligations to the Apaches,
the peace camps began to dissolve. With access to secured resources gone, it made little
sense for the Indians to stay and starve when they could leave and easily supply
themselves through raiding. This return to a state o f Apache hostilities traumatized nearby
settlers not only due to years o f relative quiet coming to an abrupt end, but also because
the scale o f raiding was even worse than it had been before. The reason for this was that
ranchers, miners, and small farmers had all advanced northward during the peace-poUcy

Archer, 136-37.
” Spaniards born in Spain.
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years in the belief that the frontier had been permanently pacified. Some had even
ventured into the heart the Apacheria and acquired large land grants, which they populated
with cattle and sheep. These plump beasts then became the Indians’ main target after they
returned to a nomadic way o f life.
Many contemporary observers and historians have consistently blamed the Apaches for
the theft o f livestock in this period. Under the circumstances, however, it would be more
correct to state that many Indian groups were raiding, yet Mexican citizens only
consistently blamed the Apaches.'*" One notable example of the continuing
misidentification o f guilty parties occurred when a number of southern Piman bands began
attacking Mexican settlements after losing their prime sources of water. Their misfortune
began when several well-connected, non-Indian families received land grants along the
Santa Cruz River and began diverting water for irrigation. Without a resident missionary
to plead their case, the Indians foimd themselves without protection and subsequently
without water.'**
In addition to feeling aggrieved over their lost water, the Pimans also echoed
complaints over Hispanic methods o f ranching that dated back to Onate’s settlement in
1598. Still practicing extensive livestock management, the Mexican landowners allowed

A ll the American groups that traveled across the southern route to reach California commented on
the ferocious, w ild bulls that ran feral in the abandoned haciendas in southern Arizona. See Sgt. Daniel
Tyler, A C oncise H istory o f the M ormon B attalion in the M exican Am erican War, 1846-7 (Chicago: The
Rio Grande Press, 1964), 95-6; John Russell Bartlett, P ersonal N arrative o f Explorations an d Incidents in
Texas, N ew M exico, California, Sonora, a n d Chihuahua: C on nected With The U nited S tates a n d M exican
Boundary Commission, D uring the Years 1850, ’51, ’52, A n d ’53 (Chicago: The Rio Grande Press,,
1965), 155; Schroeder, A pache Indians, 103-6.
K essell, M ission o f Sorrow, 119-123. James Officer also notes, 84-6, that M exican officials in
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their cattle and sheep to roam freely and trespass on mission and Indian fields. It was this
second grievance that pushed some southern Pimans to adopt Apache tactics; they began
stealing livestock and destroying check dams that kept water from reaching their fields.'**
By the late 1820s, much o f Mexico’s northern frontier looked as it did before
Bernardo de Galvez implemented his peace policy. Soldiers struggled daily with hungry
and angry Indians, while settlers lived in constant fear o f Indian raids. Not everything was
the same, though; there was one noticeable difference. Whereas, settlers had once kept
watch for French and British interlopers, now, they were on the look out for Americans.
Southern plantation owners were pushing into Texas and entrepreneurs from diverse parts
o f the United States were converging on the Santa Fe and Taos trade fairs. Many o f these
Norte Americanos also dabbled in the fur trade and had their interest piqued when they
heard o f good trapping along the Gila River. Technically, they could not go into Mexican
territory without a license, but as long as they knew whose palm to grease or whose sister
to marry, few were actually kept out.'**
The Indian reaction to the American presence in Arizona was varied. Some Indians
avoided the trappers fearing they were slavers, while others attempted to trade with the
Americans hoping they had better goods than the Mexicans. A third group o f Indians
even preemptively attacked the trapper to protect their resources and families from
American rapacity. Inter-ethnic relations in Arizona became increasingly tense when the
governor o f Chihuahua began offering bounties for Apache scalps. In his decree, the
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governor only asked for an intact forelock of black hair as proof for payment. Obviously,
this led to indiscriminate killings of innocent Indians and even Mexicans citizens. With the
going price at $100 for a male, $50 for a female, and even $25 for a child, murder on the
frontier became rampant and produced the opposite effeet that the policy was intended to
produce. Instead o f creating docile Indians, the lawlessness associated with the bounty
hunters provoked attacks against anyone the Indians felt was suspicious in an eye for an
eye style o f revenge. Thus, right on the eve of official contact between the residents of
Arizona and the U.S. government, a state o f near pandemonium gripped the region.'*'*

'*'* R alf Adam Smith, B oarderlander: The Life o f Jam es Kirker, I7 9 3 -I8 5 2 (Norman: University o f
Oklahoma, 1999), 49.
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CHAPTER4

MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE AMERICAN WEST
The first Americans to venture into Arizona were fiir trappers eager for access to the
Gila and Salt Rivers. According to Mexican law, it was illegal for Americans to trap
without authorization, but few bothered to apply. Thus, the vast majority o f Americans in
Arizona before the Mexican-American War were illegal aliens. In many ways, however,
the American fur trappers who ventured into Mexican Arizona had much in common with
the resident Hispanic population. Both viewed natural resources as commodities that
could be translated into personal wealth; both belonged to societies that utilized similar
technologies, such as guns and writing; and both adhered to millennialistic forms of
Christian monotheism that promoted conquest over heathens.'
On a deeper level, however, obvious distinctions existed between the two peoples.
While both recognized the same supreme being, religious practices diverged as Hispanic
Catholicism and American Protestantism were in many respects antithetical to one
another.* And while both participated in hierarchically organized political systems, the
Americans adhered to an aggressive form o f republicanism that had no real counterpart m

' McCarty, 8-9; K essell, Friars, 99; Eve Kornfeld, C reatin g an Am erican Culture, 1775-1800
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 120-7; Weber, 44-52.
^ This is necessarily so as Protestantism was a reaction against Catholic ritual and liturgical
conventions.
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the still semi-feudal, northern Mexican polity.*
These and other socio-cultural differences stemmed in part from England’s distinct
history and the traits England passed on to her North American colonists. But the
differences were even more the result o f Anglo-American development apart from, and
then in opposition to, their motherland. Over the millennia, England, as Spain, received
successive waves o f migrants and invaders who left their mark as they came and went.
Yet, unlike Spain, in the years preceding American colonization, England experienced no
uniting event such as the Reconquista/ but instead witnessed divisive conflicts between
Protestants and Catholics, as well as economic upheavals that pitted social classes against
each other.* This explains why, when the opportunity to migrate to North America arose,
various groups within English society jumped at the chance to escape from hardship.
When joined with lax immigration policies, this willingness to leave resulted in a
hodgepodge o f English colonies settled not by representatives o f a unified ideology or
monarchy, but instead by divergent factions possessed o f differing agendas."
The first English colonizing efforts, which took place in the 1580s, were not successfixl
due to a combination o f inadequate funding, deficient supplies, harsh coastal

* In Spanish society a person’s place was determined in large part by their genetic lineage. Because o f
this Spaniards went to great lengths to categorize people according to their parentage and set lim its on
rights and aspirations for each group. There were obvious exceptions to the rule, but for the m ost part a
person’s potential was predetermined at birth. For an in-depth examination o f Spanish social structures,
see Robert Howard Jackson’s Race, Caste, a n d Status: Indians in C olonial Spanish A m erica
(A lbuquerque: U niversity o f N ew M exico P ress, 1999).
This is what the Iberians called the war to drive the Moors from the Peninsula.
^ When Spanish gold and silver from the Americas flooded into Europe it caused spiraling inflation
that hurt not only the poor but also aristocrats w ho lived on fixed feudal incom es.
* For an in-depth exam ination o f the differences between Spanish, Dutch, French, and English
colonization policies and experiences, see D enys D eL ange’s B itter Feast: A m erindians A n d Europeans in
N ortheastern N orth A m erica, 1600-64 (Van Cover: UBC Press, 1993).
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conditions, and disease carrying insects. It was not until 1606, when investors in the
Virginia Company tried their hand at colonizing, that England achieved it first success. To
avoid the problems that plagued previous attempts, company officials legally bound all
participants to place the good o f the company ahead of personal enrichment. While this
coercive policy correctly identified one of the main causes of colonizing failure, company
officials failed to establish the means to enforce this rules once the ships arrived in the
Americas. As a result, company captains were no better at controlling their “employees,”
than were leaders o f previous ventures. What allowed the Virginia Company to succeed,
then, was not skilled planning or adept leadership, but the chance arrival and dictatorial
assumption o f power o f soldier of fortune John Smith. Through his ruthless enforcement
o f common sense rules. Smith successfully kept the company’s settlement, Jamestown,
from becoming just another failed enterprise.*
Despite their best efforts, no members of the Virginia Company ever found Indian
gold. They did, however, stumble upon something almost as good as gold: tobacco.
Spanish explorers had discovered the stinking weed in the Caribbean and had been
exporting it into Europe before the English arrived in the Americas. Thus, a nicotineaddicted market already existed, ready to purchase whatever Jamestown planters could
produce. The problem for planters, then, was not a shortage o f customers, but a shortage
o f laborers to grow and process the time-intensive plant. At first, growers tapped into a
dom estic supply o f workers by indenturing desperate English citizens w ho had been

pushed off their land during the enclosure movement o f the early 1600s. After exhausting

* David Hackett Fisher and James C. Kelly, B ound Away: Virginia a n d W estward M ovem ent (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 110-118.
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this pool, planters then turned to importing African slaves as their main source of labor.*
As other Southern colonies came into existence, they also adopted economic systems
that tended to replicate inequalities reminiscent of the English social system. At the top
were men able to monopolize resources and keep others on the bottom rung o f the social
ladder; at the bottom, were the men and women living miserable lives with little hope for
improvement. Hence, in England’s southern American colonies, a political culture
emerged that stressed themes of classical liberalism with an emphasis on the protection of
private property and the notion that only the “best” men should directly wield economic
and political power.^
In the North, radical and moderate Puritans founded the New England colonies to
create the Christian utopia they believed could not take root in their corrupted homeland.
Once established, other religious migrants followed and settled nearby. The Quakers, a
religious sect that actually practiced the Christian toleration they preached, made their
home in William Penn’s proprietary colony, Pennsylvania. Farther south. Lord Baltimore
established Maryland for Catholics fleeing England’s tumultuous political and religious
climate. Neither o f these later groups claimed the same sort o f chosen status as the
Puritans, yet both did view America as a refiige from persecution. Thus, in contrast to the
secular Southern colonies. Northern culture adhered more to a pious worldview, which
tended to emphasize themes o f classical republicanism, such as service for others, charity.

For an explanation o f the Chesapeake econom y and its race and class relations, see T.H. Breen and
Stephen Innes’ “M yne Owne Ground: ” Race & Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 16 4 0 -1676 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
9

’ Ibid.
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and the suppression o f individual desires in favor of the common good.*"
Over time Northern and Southern concepts o f individual achievement, protection of
property rights, and government promotion o f the public good blended with various
European currents o f thought into a unique American worldview. This new ideology first
appeared in coherent form in the discourse o f colonists expressing their outrage over
Parliament flexing its power to lay and collect taxes. It then became embedded in the
common vernacular during the War for Independence, and afterward, it found its way into
the new nation’s founding documents through the pens o f men such as James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson."
In the years foUowing the war, Madison and Jefferson gave fuU expression to this new
inteUectual tradition as they struggled to construct the political system the Americans
claimed was their birthright. Each man turned to the other as they ruminated over how
best to maintain individual liberty, while at the same time guarding against the rise o f a
grasping aristocracy or an unruly mob. Further, they pondered over ways to expand
poUtical participation without initiating some grand scheme for artificiaUy redistributing
private property. In the end, after many vigorous debates, both men arrived at the same
conclusion: the solution to their dilemma lay in the country’s ability to expand into its vast

Puritan minister John Winthrop expressed the northern ideal o f community good succinctly when
he wrote in his sermon “A Model! o f Christian Charity,” “There are two rules whereby wee are to walke
one towards another: Justice and M ercy.” For a broader examination o f northern intellectual culture,
please see Ernest Lee Tuverson’s R edeem er Nation: The Idea o f A m eric a ’s M illennial Role (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1980).
" In his book The Id eological O rigins o f the A m erican R evolution Bernard Bailyn traces the
concurrent streams o f intellectual discourse prevalent during the pre-war years and delineates how the
colonists expressed Europeans them es through their own provincial lens. Jefferson’s most eloquent
contribution to this ideology would have to be the D eclaration o f Independence, w hile M adison’s gift to
political thought, apart from the U.S. Constitution itself, was F ederalist No. 10.
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western holdings.**
Being a consummate theorist, Madison scoured philosophical treatises ranging from
ancient to contemporary scholars hoping to cobble together a comprehensive model from
which to construct a new government. Yet the more he searched, the more disheartened
he grew as one tome after another told the tale o f a failed republic that crumbled due to
human failings and errors. His despair turned to elation when he realized that it was
unchecked factional power that had led to the downfall o f many previous republics, and
that remedying this defect would remove the greatest obstacle to creating a truly
enlightened government. Consequently, Madison argued at the Constitutional Convention
that the United States could succeed only if its national government was carefully
regulated and balanced by equally powerfiil, coimtervailing forces. And amongst those
forces would be a strong yeoman class.'*
After sharing his insights, Madison then had to convince his critics who firmly believed
that uncorrupted republican government could only exist in geographically and culturally
limited polities. Citing conventional wisdom, they argued that a country as large and
diverse as the Untied States could not sustain representative democracy, as its populace
was too scattered and possessed o f too many interests.*'*

To view the com plete collection o f Jefferson and M adison’s correspondence, please see A Republic
o f Letters: The C orrespondence Between Jefferson a n d M adison, 1776-1826, ed. James Morton Smith
(N ew Haven: Courtpress, 1952).
James M adison, The D ebates in the F ederal Convention o f 1787, which fr a m e d the C onstitution o f
the U nited S tates o f A m erica (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1920).
Charles F. Hobson, “Republicanism, Commerce, and Private Rights: James M adison’s Path to the
Constitutional Convention,” in Liberty, E quality a n d Power: P rivate P roperty an d O ther Rights, ed. Ellen
Franke! Paul and Howard Dickerman (N ew York: State University o f N ew York Press, 1989), 85-7.
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Madison countered by turning their argument on its head. He asserted that in fact a
large country possessed o f a substantial population, with a good number of competing
interests, was actually the best setting for republican government. Only in such a nation,
he claimed, could representatives o f the people truly serve as stewards o f the public good.
This he said was due to the feet that the ability o f any one interest group to form a
majority and infringe upon the rights o f the minority would diminish in inverse proportion
to the number o f interest groups represented in the government. The caveat, he conceded,
was that the country’s population could not expand beyond its resource base by any
considerable degree. If this occurred, he admitted, a propertied majority would appear
and reduce the landless minority to a state o f utter dependence. And in doing so, they
would shatter the republic’s cornerstone.**
Due to this belief, Madison argued that the ability o f the United States to increase its
land base in tandem with its population was paramount. Fortunately, North America was
much larger than the small portion occupied at the time o f Independence. While it was
true that Indians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Englishmen all inhabited much o f the
continent, this was only a minor complication, as political leaders could remedy the
situation once the country’s constitutional government was functional.*"
Jefferson’s views tended to be more pragmatic than those of his theoretical friend.
This was due in part to the fact that he was the ambassador to France during the years

James Madison to Thomas Jefferson June 19, 1786, in R epublic o f Letters, 424. In his
correspondence with Jefferson, Madison developed the concepts that would later emerge as his most
famous essay. F ederalist No. 10, when he wrote: “Our lim ited population has probably a large share in
producing this effect [comfort o f the masses] as the political advantages which distinguish us. A certain
degree o f misery seem s inseparable from a high degree o f populousness.”
Ibid:
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preceding the bloody French Revolution. As a result, he witnessed in stark relief the
consequences o f sacrificing the majority’s wellbeing to subsidize a life o f leisure for the
elite.’’ Contrasts between starving families and opulent wealth worried him enormously as
he feared the same would happen in his own country if government policy did not include
the means for promoting an equality o f circumstance. He even went so far as to propose a
system o f progressive taxation to lessen the possibility o f property concentrating in the
hands o f the few.’*
In addition to his disdain for corrupt aristocrats, Jefferson also deplored the
degeneracy he believed accompanied the rise o f commercial manufacturing. As a result,
he hoped America’s abundance o f land would also postpone for many generations the
need to resort to non-agrarian production. In his Notes On The State o f Virginia,
Jefiferson addressed this topic when he wrote:
In Europe the lands are either cultivated, or locked up against the
cultivator. Manufacture must therefore be resorted to o f necessity not of
choice, to support the surplus o f their people. But we have an immensity o f
land courting the industry o f the husbandman. Is it best then that all our
citizens should be employed in its improvement, or that one half should be
called off fi’om that to exercise manufactures and handicrafts for the other?

The first signs o f Jefferson’s political pragmatism appeared in 1776 when he assisted in drafting
V irginia’s Constitution. W hile he agreed with the majority in attendance that only propertied, white
m ales should have the franchise, he also insisted on granting “every person o f frill age neither ow ning nor
having owned [50] acres o f land . . . an appropriation o f [50] a c r e s .. . ” The Avalon Project at Y ale Law
School, D raft C onstitution f o r Virginia, June 1776,
1996,<http://w w w .yale.edu/Iaw w eb/avalon/jeffcons.htm > (8 N ovem ber 2003).
'* Thomas Jefferson to James M adison, October 3, 1785, in The R epublic o f L etters, 390. In his
Second Inaugural Address Jefferson also wrote, “The rem aining revenue on the consumption o f foreign
articles is paid chiefly by those w ho can afford to add foreign luxuries to domestic comforts, being
collected on our seà-board & frontiers only, &, incorporated with the transactions o f our mercantile
citizens, it may be the pleasure & the pride o f an American to ask, “What farmer, what m echanic, what
laborer ever sees a tax-gatherer o f the Untied States?” The W ritings o f Thomas Jefferson, 2001,
< http://www.etext.org/Politics/Essays/Thomas.Jeffrrson/Inaug2.txt> ! 12 October 2003).
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Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a
chosen people . .

In light o f such views, it should come as no surprise, then, that it was Thomas
Jefferson, acting as President, who doubled the size o f the United States by boldly seizing
a fortuitous diplomatic opportunity. Upon inauguration, Jefferson had categorized himself
as a constitutional constructionist. A man who would not engage in the type o f loose
interpretation his political rival Alexander Hamilton had employed to create the National
Bank. Yet when Napoleon Bonaparte offered to sell the whole o f the Louisiana territory
for $15 million, Jefferson soon found that the only way he could acquire this land was to
loosely interpret the Constitution’s treaty making clause. Ultimately, it was Jefferson’s
vision o f an “empire for liberty” teaming with yeomen formers, sturdy in their habits and
secure in their independence, that allowed him to violate his own principles and purchase
the Louisiana Territory.’’’
To hide lingering misgivings over his expansion o f presidential authority, Jefferson
exuded an infectious optimism. He repeatedly assured the American public that the
country’s new dominion would guarantee the continuance of their blessed republic.” In

Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State o f V irginia, 1787,” in The Am erican Intellectual Tradition:
Vol. I, 1630-1865, ed. David A. Bollinger and Charles Capper (N ew York; Oxford University Press,
1993) 174-75.
In a letter to James Madison dated April 27, 1809, Jefferson wrote: “w e should have such an
empire for liberty as she [history] has never surveyed since the creation; and 1 am persuaded, that no
constitution w as ever before so w ell calculated as ours for extensive em pire and self-governm ent.”
R epublic o f Letters, 1586.
Jefferson was actually planning to propose a constitutional amendment specifically authorizing the
president to acquire new territory, but French diplomats informed him that Bonaparte would withdraw the
deal if Jefferson did not act quickly. Consequently, Jefferson informed M adison-who was his Secretary o f
State-that “Infer that the less w e say about constitutional difficulties respecting Louisiana the better . . . ”
See letters from Jefferson to Madison dated July 1803 and August 18, 1803 in R epublic o f Letters, 1269,
1278.
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his second inaugural address, and subsequent State of the Union speeches, he mixed lofty
ideals with a call for every American to exercise their right to claim a portion of the
enlarged public domain:
I know that the acquisition o f Louisiana has been disapproved by some from a
candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its union.
But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate
effectively? The larger our association the less will it be shaken by local passions; &
in any view is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled
by our own brethren & children than by strangers o f another family? With which
should we be most likely to live in harmony & friendly intercourse?”
Consequently, unlike Europe, where the expectation to benefit from government
power was limited to the aristocratic classes, under Thomas Jefferson, America became a
country where average citizens could expect their government to promote the public good
by also securing their access to private property. It was this sense of entitlement that
energized many aggressive American settlers as they struck out onto the frontier.”
To fulfill his promise o f making land available to those who would work it, Jefferson
had to devise a system for extinguishing Indian property rights. He was not starting from
scratch, however, as previous government officials, including himself, had already begun
to pave the way. In fact, one o f the first acts of the Continental Congress in 1775 was to
create three departments o f Indian affairs, and then to appoint men such as Benjamin
Franklin and Patrick Henry as Indian commissioners. Their job was to negotiate treaties

^ T hom as Jefferson’s Second Inaugural A ddress; Internet.
^^Unfortunately, included within this lot were land speculators and silent congressional partners who
took advantage o f insider information to buy land cheap and sell it for a profit. Jefferson worried that such
criminal activity would be detrimental to the country. He noted this in a letter to Madison dated April 23,
1787: “The inhabitants o f those places [settlem ents on the Illinois and W abash], claim protection against
the savages, and som e provision for both criminal and Civil justice. It appears also the land jobbers are
among them who are likely to multiply litigations among individuals, and by collusive purchases o f
spurious titles, defraud the United States. The R epublic o f Letters, 475.
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with Indian groups, so as to secure pledges o f neutrality during the War for
Independence.’"* Jefferson revealed his own views on how to deal with Native Americans
when he wrote to a Mr. Charles CaroU, “Our news from the westward [5 /c] is
disagreeable. Constant murders committing [ric] by the Indians, and their combination
threatens to be more and more extensive. I hope we shall give them a thorough drubbing
this summer, and then change our tomahawks into a golden chain o f friendship. The most
economical as well as most humane conduct towards them is to bribe them into peace, and
to retain them in peace by eternal bribes.”’^
This did not mean that Jefferson believed Native Americans were biologically inferior.
Unlike his views on Africans, whom he categorized as subhuman in his Notes On Virginia,
Jefferson judged Native Americans to be equal to Euro-Americans, yet deficient in
civilized manners. To view them otherwise would have confirmed European critics who
argued that the American environment produced peoples with degraded intellects. After
all, was Jefferson not now also a “native” American? Consequently, when it came time to
devise an Indian policy, Jefferson focused not only on exacting submission, but also on
extinguishing heathen manners through coercive assimilation.’^

C.L Henson, "From War To Self-determination: A History O f The Bureau O f Indian Affairs,"
Am erican Studies Today Online, 1996,< http://www.am ericansc.org.uk/Online/Indians.htm > ! ! !
September, 2003).
T he L etters o f T hom as Jefferson: 1743-1826, T o C h arles C arroll P h iladelphia, A pril 15, 1791,
Jefferson's Indian Policy, 2003,< http://courses.sm su.edu/ftm 922f/Docum ents/jeffindianpolicy.htm l>(8
October 2003).
Two books offer extensive coverage o f Jefferson’s policies and actions regarding Native Americans,
the first is Donald Jackson’s Thomas Jefferson & The Stony Mountains: E xploring the West From
M onticello (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1981); and the second is Bernard W. Sheehan’s S eeds o f
Extinction: Jeffersonian P hilanthropy a n d the Am erican Indian (Chapel Hill: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1973).
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Under Jefferson’s administration Indian agents were to slowly allow American
settlements to encroach upon hunting grounds until the Indians could no longer support
themselves. Then, once tmder duress, officials were to offer the Indians assistance in
becoming self-sufficient agriculturalists, while simultaneously convincing them to cede
land in return for farming implements and know-how. For those tribes who refused to
cooperate, Jefferson authorized government traders to sell them goods on credit until they
could no longer service their debt. Once this happened, agents were then to offer to
forgive the debt in return for land cessions. For any tribe that refused both approaches, or
decided to “take up the hatchet,” agents were authorized to drive them “across the
Mississippi.” In any case, Indians had to remove themselves from the path of advancing
whites.”
Jefferson’s coercive policies o f assimilation and removal held sway up to the late
1820s. Until then, his successors continued to offer Indians the choice o f living
unmolested in their pursuit o f sedentary life, or being forcibly relocated beyond the line of
white settlement. Things changed somewhat during Andrew Jackson’s administration
when he set the precedent o f removing even assimilated Indians beyond the Mississippi.
Consequently, from the early 1830s to the 1850s, Indian agents placed more emphasis on
restricting Indians to areas removed from white settlers, rather than negotiating terms for

President Jefferson to W illiam Henry Harrison, Governor o f the Indian Territory, 1803,
< http://www.course.sm su.edu/ftm922fiDocum ents/jeffindianpolicy.htm >(8 October 2003)..
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assimilation.’*
New problems arose following the American victory over Mexico in 1848. With the
country’s acquisition o f Mexico’s Northern provinces, the United States now controlled
the territory it had been using to exile recalcitrant Indians. As American citizens believed
themselves entitled to take any land paid for in American tax revenue and blood, the
Executive Branch had to abandon simple Indian removal and create some other form o f
exclusion. Had the Gold Rush not happened when it did, Washington officials may have
reincarnated Jefferson’s system o f peace through bribes. This did not occur, however, as
it was not long after California became American territory, that a worker at Sutter’s Mill
discovered gold and set off a mad rush o f prospectors directly across “Indian Territory.”
When Americans first began migrating westward, they crossed paths with not only
previously removed tribes, but also Plains and Southwestern Indians. These native groups
had spent many generations honing their skills o f resistance against Spaniards and
Frenchmen and were unwilling to simply bow to American pressure. Government officials
and citizens alike were aware o f these Indians fi’o m reports such as those o f Lewis and
Clark, but were unsure as how to treat them. Many early travelers erred on the side of

In his Fifth Annual M essage to Congress on December 3, 1883, Andrew Jackson summarized his
view s o f Indian affairs: “M y original convictions upon this subject have been confirmed by the course o f
events for several years, and experience is every day adding to their strength. That those tribes cannot
exist surrounded by our settlements and in continued contact with our citizens is certain. They have
neither the intelligence, the industry, the moral habits, nor the desire o f improvement which are essential
to any favorable change in their condition. Established in the midst o f another and a superior race, and
without appreciating the causes o f their inferiority or seeking to control them, they must necessarily yield
to the force o f circumstance and ere long disappear..” President Jackson Speeches,
<htt://www.synaptic.be.ca.ejournal/Jackson.htm>(10 September 2003).
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caution and did their best to avoid them.’^
Circumstances became volatile when the trickle o f prospectors, merchants, and sundry
other Americans heading for California turned into a river. Not only did the increased
number o f people consume more resources, but so too did their large number o f cows,
mules, and horses. Thus, while emigrants cut precious trees for fuel and helped
themselves to game animals, their livestock destroyed the grasses Indian horses relied on
and fouled scarce watering holes.’” Real inter-ethnic violence did not start in full,
however, until the Americans crossed the line and repeated the Spanish mistake of
punishing Indians who “took” supplies or drove emigrants away from resources.”
For a time, migrating Americans defended themselves, but it was not long before they
grew tired o f providing for their own security and demanded that government troops
protect them from aggrieved Indians. When government officials obliged, military leaders
and Indian agents found themselves in a weakened position. Now they could not simply
threaten to remove a tribe, as there was virtually no place left that was not already
claimed. Many o f the Plains and Southwestern Indians also possessed o f a sense o f
property rights and were determined to not turn over their land to the Americans without
a fight.”

’^For a thorough examination o f American migration west please see John D. Unruh’s The P lains
Across: The O verlan d Em igrant an d the Trans-M ississippi West, 1840-1860 (Urbana: University o f
Illinois, 1982).
See Elliot West, The C on tested Plains: Indians, G oldseekers, & The Rush to C alifornia (Lawrence,
Kan.: University o f Kansas Press, 1998).
See Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis a n d Reinvention
(Norman: University o f Okalahoma Press, 1999).
See Robert M. U tley’s The Indian Frontier o f the Am erican West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque:
University O f N ew M exico Press, 1983), as it address this type o f conflict.
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Due to growing unrest, by the mid-1850s, the Interior Department took Ameriean
Indian policy in a new direction with a reservation system. To quell potential conflicts and
remove Indians from areas whites wanted, the government began consolidating native
groups on restricted pieces o f land where they could receive coneentrated, assimilation
training. The problem with this was that militarily strong Indian groups refused to stay on
their reservations. Government officials responded by authorizing troops to force
compliance, which led to a state o f low-level warfare. Commissioners from the executive
branch still went through the motions o f negotiating treaties with Indians, yet by I860 the
only choices Indians had were to relinquish self-determination or wage an all out war
against the white man.”
Representatives o f the American government made official contact with Arizona’s
Indians in 1846 when the Army o f the West traveled through on its way to California.
This meeting o f soldiers and residents ostensibly took place in the shadow o f war, yet no
fighting took place. In feet, early contact was so uneventful, that many American soldiers
praised the various Indian groups for being well disposed to peaceful relations. Conditions
would not stay this way for long, but at least for a time it seemed that Arizona would
become a middle ground where different cultures could co-exist.

” Indian agents often expected one or the other o f Indian groups. For exam ple, here is a quote from
an Indian agent assigned to the Apaches before even m eeting his charges: “From all I have seen and know
o f the Apaches, they are treacherous, warlike and cruel, and need severe chastisement before they can be
made to know the policy o f observing good faith with white people.” L etters R eceived b y the Office o f
Indian Affairs, 1824-1888, N ew M exico Superintendency, 1849-1880, Roll 546 (W ashington: The
National Archives and Record Service, 1956).
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CHAPTER 5

THE AMERICANS OFFICIALLY ARRIVE
The first officially sanctioned American exploration o f Arizona began in 1846 when
soldiers and scientists' passed through during the Mexican-American War. American
political and military leaders were not interested in Arizona per se, as they, like the
Spaniards before them, viewed the region mostly as an extension o f New Mexico as well
as a dangerous barrier blocking access to California. But President Polk wanted to secure
New Mexico’s trade economy, while Congressional members sought information about
possible southern routes to the Pacific. These two motivations not only set the agenda for
the Americans’ first visit to Arizona, but also shaped American relations with Arizona’s
Hispanic settlers and Native Americans for the last half of the nineteenth century.’
To secure New Mexico and survey a southern route to California, Secretary o f War
William L. Marcy ordered General Stephen Watts Kearney to organize at least fifteen
hundred volunteers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and to march them to Santa Fe as soon
as possible. In the early summer of 1846, Keamy fiilfiUed his orders by taking command

' A s today with the Army Corp o f Engineers, in the 1840s the military included a branch know as the
Corp o f Topographical Engineers. See letter from Secretary o f War W. L. Marcy to the President o f the
Senate Geo M . D allas in Emory, 19.
^ George Rutledge Gibson, Journal o f A S oldier U nder K earn y an d Doniphan, 1846-1847, ed. Ralph
P. Bieber (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974) 23-6.
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o f seventeen hundred troops and heading southwest, toward New Mexieo.’
While Keamy did not have specific reconnais^ce orders, the daily need to secure
adequate water supphes caused the General and his subordinates to carefully note their
surroundings. On July 4, 1846, Private George Rutledge Gibson wrote about their search
for water in his journal: “The day was excessively hot, and all the eompany suffered
extremely from thirst, to relieve which they pushed forward at a rapid gait, expecting any
moment to find water. In this, however, they were disappointed and had to march twenty
miles under a burning sun before they came to any.”^ In fact, the closer they came to New
Mexico the more likely it was that they would travel more than a full day between
adequate watering sites.
At times soldiers would discover water, only to be disappointed when a pecking order
for access emerged. Sergeant Daniel Tyler expressed his frustration when he wrote, “..
.after about twelve miles’ [sic] travel [we] came to a hole or crevice in a rock . . . [with]
water enough to give each man a half pint. As the Colonel and staff rode up to it, the
former remarked ‘The men can do without water better than the animals.’ . . . His mule
and his staff mules drained the spring.”’
A member o f the Mormon Battalion, Tyler and his coreligionists had joined the
fighting to prove their patriotism for a country that had rejected them.” Little did they
know that their unit would become famous for surviving a grueling trek down the Rio

" Ib id , 17.
“ Ibid., 133-4.
’ Tyler, 208.
* The Mormons had by this tim e been driven from two states by angry mobs and where in conflict
with the governm ent over their practice o f polygamy. To smooth tensions Brigham Young encouraged
som e o f his followers to participate in the war.
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Grande River into Chihuahua, and a harrowing march westward across the harshest parts
o f southern Arizona. Captain James Alien was td be their commander, but died at Fort
Leavenworth. As a result, on October 2, General Keamy selected Captain Philip St.
George Cooke, who was in St. Louis at the time, as their new leader. As the battalion
was already en route to New Mexico when Cooke assumed command, Keamy decided he
would leave the Mormons in Santa Fe to wait for him.’
After facing no resistance from New Mexicans, who were tom between their cultural
ties to Mexico and their resentment over t)eing neglected by federal authorities, Keamy
left the Mormons in Santa Fe and headed west.* Among his troops was another young
man whose life work was also about to become tied to Arizona. This was Lieutenant
WiUiam H. Emory, a member the military’s Corp o f Topographical Engineers. Lt. Emory
was under orders from Washington to first assist in extinguishing all armed resistance in
the Southwest, and then, as a scientist, to gather geographic data on New Mexico and
California.”
When Keamy and his men reached the headwaters o f the Gila River they found the
terrain was too mgged for their heavily loaded wagons. The General finally decided to
abandon the buckboards and transfer his supplies to the backs o f the company’s mules.
Before leaving, he hired local guides to wait for Cooke and to assist the Mormons in

’ Philip St. George Cooke, “C ooke’s Journal o f the March o f the Mormon Battalion, 1846-1847,” in
Exploring Southwestern Trails, 1846-54 ed. Ralph P Bieber and Averam B. Bender, vol. 7 (Philadelphia:
Porcupine Press, 1974), 254-5.
* For a contemporary view o f the ambivalent feelings N ew M exicans felt on the eve o f the M exicanAmerican War see Arms, Indians, an d the M ism anagem ent o f N ew M exico: D onaciano Vigil. 1846, ed.
David J. Weber (El Paso, Texas Western Press, 1986).
’ Emory, 10-1.
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refitting their mules. When all the repacking was complete, Kearny’s battalion moved into
Arizona’s eastern mountains. It did not take Lt. Emory long to discover why the
prehistoric Anasazi and Mogollon Indians had abandoned the region and why the Western
Apaches could not give up raiding and adopt a sedentary life.'”
On October 9, he wrote, “Game in [this part of] New Mexico is almost extinct, if it
ever existed to any extent.” Then, on October 29, he noted, “The dust was knee deep in
the rear o f our trail; the soil appeared good, but, for whole acres, not a sign o f vegetation
was to be seen.” And lastly, on November 5, he observed, “Nature has done her utmost
to favor a condition o f things which has enabled a savage and uncivilized tribe, armed with
the bow and lance, to hold as tributary powers three fertile and once flourishing states.
Chihuahua, Sonora, and Durango ..
Cooke and his Mormon troops left Santa Fe on October 19, ten days behind Keamy.
It was not until they came upon the discarded wagons and hired guides that they leamed
o f the new mule-train plan. Unconvinced that this was the best course of action, Cooke
decided not to follow General Keamy and to instead map-out a southem route that would
circumnavigate around Arizona’s eastem mountains.”
As the days passed, conditions on Cooke’s route worsened. The land was rough and
uneven, and water was dangerously scarce. It was not long before Cooke began to doubt
the wisdom o f his headstrong decision; yet he confided his misgivings to no one but his
journal. The farther the battalion went, the more he worried about where he would

“’ Emory, 113-4.
Ibid., 9 0 ;1 1 3 ;1 2 3 .
” Cooke, 95.
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purchase meat on the hoof to feed his men; and where he would find healthy replacements
for his exhausted draft animals. This last problem was to become particularly vexing for
later Americans heading across Arizona, as horses and even mules had difficulty coping
with the region’s desert topography and arid climate.”
To keep his fears from becoming reality, at each stop, Cooke ordered his quarter
master to search for anyone willing to trade healthy stock for their “broken down” mules
and depleted cattle. O f this, on October 25, 1846, he wrote, “I sent the quartermaster and
interpreter to the owner . . . [but] they [5/c] treated his oflfer with contempt. It was great
good luck to obtain those [mules] yesterday from a merchant. . . The bargain for
exchange, two for one, was made before he saw mine””
Both Keamy and Cooke set a significant precedent when they began to strike deals
with Indians who offered to trade or sell animals and other items. On October 20, General
Keamy even sent a runner to the well-known Apache headman Mangas Coloradas to let
his band know that the Americans would like to trade. O f this encounter Lt. Emory
observed, “The whole camp was now busily engaged in attempting to trade. The Indians
had mules, ropes, whips, and mezcal [sic].”” Cooke met with the equally well-known
Navajo chief Manuelito on November 29 and in a roundabout manner asked him to trade.
Cooke wrote that he told Manuehto: “we [are] friends and . . . my great chief [Keamy]
ha[s] gone on to California with a few men to meet a great many more who came by the

" Ibid., 71-3.
Ibid., 76-7.
Emory, 100.
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sea; that [Keamy] would take the country from the Mexicans; that I would join him; that
my mules were tired and I wished trade with his people for others.””
Neither Keamy nor Cooke ever bothered to ask where or how the Indians acquired
their animals and other supplies even though both had to have known that such goods
were stolen.” Emory betrays his knowledge when he describes the trading event in great
detail, even down to what each Indian was wearing; “One had a jacket made of a Henry
Clay flag, which aroused unpleasant sensations, for the acquisition, no doubt, cost one of
our countrymen his life.” In light of this, it is no wonder that during the early years of
contact Plains and Southwestem Indians continued to view raiding as a more profitable
economic practice than other more “legal” subsistence strategies.'*
Apart from powerful headmen such as Manuelito and Mangas Coloradas, most Indians
kept their distance from the Americans. Soldiers from Private George Gibson all the way
up to General Stephen Watts Keamy attributed this fear to bounty hunters such as James
Johnson who had once lured a large group o f Indians to his camp and then killed most o f
them with cannon blast so as to claim a reward for their scalps.'’ The Americans did not,
however, seem to know o f the circumstances that prevailed during the years o f Bemardo
de Galvez’s peace policy, as none correctly identified it as the cause of the Indians’
dependence on, and therefore insatiable desire for, Hquor. In regard to this, boundary

Cooke, 122-3; Cooke refers to M anuelito as an Apache, but he was Navajo.
” Ibid., 78. Just one month before m eeting Manuelita, Cooke passed by a M exican ranch that had
lost over 6,000 head o f sheep to Navajo raiders.
Emory, 101; John C. Cermony, “The Apache Race,” in E yew itness to the Indian Wars, ed. John
C ozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Book, 2001), 10.
In every journal or report related to encounters with the Apaches there is som ewhere a very similar
accounting o f Johnson’s actions; making it highly likely that the men all read the sam e story in local
newspapers.
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commissioner John Russell Bartlett wrote of a typical encounter, “They [the Indians]
asked for whiskey, which I positively refused, denying that I had any. Although this was
the simple truth, they did not believe it, not being able to imagine how a party of
Americans could be without that indispensable article.”’”
O f the few lesser-known headmen who met with the Americans, all professed
friendship and proposed that the two people join as allies in defeating their common
Mexican enemy. At no time, however, did any o f them state that they would submit to
American authority, nor did they behave in a manner that would indicate that they
expected to be treated as anything but equals. Unfortunately, most Americans ignored
this; instead, they heard the Apaches’ message without really listening to what was being
said. Consequently, men such as Keamy and Cooke falsely led the Indians to believe that
they agreed with their views, and they gave officials in Washington the wrong impression
o f the Indians’ disposition.’' The men made it appear that Arizona’s Indians as a whole
where willing to quietly accept subordination to the Great White Father in Washington
when this was not actually the case.
O f all the Indians the Americans met on their way to California, it was the
“industrious” Pimans who they favored the most. While the soldiers looked down on the
Pimans for their childlike fascination with dyed cloth and their preference for silver over
gold coins, their vast, well-kept fields and settled villages so readily matched the

“ Bartlett, 302.
When addressing the Indians Kearny and Cooke affected a child-like speaking pattern and liberally
infused their rhetoric with phrases such as “Great Father in Washington” and “Red Children.”
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Jeffersonian ideal, that the Americans could not help but embrace them.” The fact that
the Apaches did not intimidate the Pimans also impressed the Americans as the soldiers
viewed the Mexicans as cowards, unnecessarily paralyzed with Apache fear.” O f this
Cooke wrote, “. . . the Apaches do not often trouble [the Pimans], being afraid.” And,
“They have a reputation o f escaping molestation fi-om Apache [sic], on [account] o f [their]
resistance.”’"* In almost every way, then, the Pimans were the model o f what the
Americans wanted in their Indians.
Keamy and then Cooke stayed briefly in the Piman villages to allow their men and
animals to recuperate. It is a good thing that they did because upon leaving, each faced
two more harrowing challenges before crossing into California. The first was the march to
the junction o f the Gila and Colorado Rivers. The bend in the Gila River forced the
soldiers to either waste precious time and energy hugging its banks, or to march straight
for over a day without access to potable fluids. A second obstacle appeared when the men
reached the Colorado. The River’s rapid and unpredictable nature made it a challenge for

Neither o f these behaviors was irrational as bright dyes were hard to com e by in the desert and the
M exican econom y, especially in the north, was based on the silver standard.
They are probably also including the Southeastern Ya vapai who lived just north o f the Pim a and
had been their enem y since the tim e o f the Hohokam; the m ost poetic description o f M exican prostration
cam e in 1849 through the pen o f John W oodhouse Audubon when he wrote o f a M exican town: “it has the
apathetic lassitude o f everything M exican.” See John W oodhouse Audubon, A udubon's Western Journal,
1849-1850, (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1984), 84. May 3 0 ,1 8 4 9 , prospector A. B. Clark and
his party stopped in Tucson and he wrote: “The soldiers made a contemptible appearance, lounging about
their quarters. Their pay is the promise o f three bushels o f wheat; and a small sum o f money per m o n th ..
. They however receive more than their services are worth.” A .B . Clarke, Travels in M exico an d
California, ed. A nne M. Perry (C ollege Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1988), 68.
Cooke, 168-9; Emory, 133-6. In 1871 Peace Comm issioner Vincent Colyer met with a group o f
“Tonto Apaches,” which were either an intermixed band o f Yavapai and Apaches or a band o f Yavapai,
w ho told him that they would not com e to Fort M cD owell unless the Americans would promise to keep
the Pimans away from their camp sites. See Vincent Colyer, P eace With the A paches o f N ew M exico a n d
Arizona, R eport o f Vincent C olyer (N ew York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 23.
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even the most physically fit to cross.”
Both Keamy and Cooke made it to California with their ranks intact and the MexicanAmerican War ended in March o f 1848 when the Senate ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. At that moment, most o f what had once been Spain’s northern buffer against
foreign encroachment became the property o f Mexico’s overbearing northern neighbor.’”
Once the war was over, reconnaissance reports such as Lt. Emory’s made their way back
to military headquarters and inquisitive congressional committees. Such information
would have taken possibly a year or more to filter through official channels and into
newsprint had nothing o f major importance happened to force the information into the
public arena.
This important event occurred when President Polk confirmed the discovery o f gold in
California in his December 1848 State o f the Union Address. Predictably, soon after,
there was a sudden urge among thousands o f men to go west; and each traveler was now
very interested in knowing which was the shortest and safest route to the Pacific. Some
forty-niners opted to travel over northern trails that passed through Wyoming, Utah, and
Nevada, while others decided to try the southem course pioneered by Cooke. This lower
route became especially attractive after the gmesome details o f the Donner Party, who
resorted to cannibalism after becoming stranded in the Sierra Nevada Mountains during

Sgt. Tyler, 240-1; E m ory, 157-63. In 1849 John A udubon w rote o f th e jo u rn ey to the Colorado;
“Sixteen days o f travel from th e P im os [sic] villages an d such travel, as please God, I tru st w e m ay none
o f us ever see a g a in .. . . Lack o f w ater an d g rass w e have alm ost com e to regard as inevitable; tru ly we
look, and are, a forlorn spectacle, and w e feel, I am sure, w orse th an we look.”
In Arizona, only the area north o f the Gila River transferred to the U.S. in the Treaty o f Guadalupe
Hidalgo; the region that currently m akes up southern Arizona became U.S. territory with the Gadsden
Purchase in 1853. See The Avalon Project, “The Gadsden Purchase Treaty, December 30, 1853,” 1998,
< http://w w w .yale.edu/law w eb/avalon/diplom acy/m exico/m xl853.htm >(25 September 2003).
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the winter o f 1846, reached the eastern newspapers.”
At first there was just a trickle o f emigrants passing through Arizona, but by the early
1850s the trickle had turned into a steady stream o f prospectors, cattle herders, and
merchants. As the number o f migrants increased, so too did the potential for conflict.
Violence during the early years o f contact, however, was just as likely to be committed by
non-Indians perpetrating murders, thefts, and bloody brawls as it was by Indians. Among
the Indians, violence was more likely to occur between groups than with Americans as
internal feuds and offenses often required a physical response. Regardless o f who was
committing the majority o f the violence, Arizona soon became a place in need o f a
mediating authority.’*
That mediator arrived in 1851 when the War Department sent Major Samuel P.
Heintzelman to establish Fort Yuma at the junction o f the Gila and Colorado Rivers. The
tiny outpost was not very impressive, consisting o f little more than a few shabby tents and

Louisiana Strentzel, “Letter o f Louisiana Strentzel to her Family,” in C o vered Wagon Women:
D iaries an d L etters fro m the Western Trail, 1840-1890, vol. 1, 1840-1849, ed. Kenneth L. Holmes
(Glendale, Calf.: Arthur H. Clark, 1983), 250-67. In her letters hom e Louisiana Strentzel reports that she
finds The Gila Trail much as Cooke had with the only exception being that there were many more people
and animals. She writes, “. . .At his place w e met a company o f M exicans returning from the gold mines.
They gave awful accounts o f the road before us, that they way was strewn with dead anim als, and that
w agons and property o f every kind were left on the road all the way through the desert.” Yet even after all
the hardships she writes, “W e have just heard from the emigrants w ho cam e the other route [northern
route] and from what w e can learn they suffered a great deal more than those who cam e the Southern
route.”
Major Samuel P. Heintzelm an, A Transcription o f M ajor Sam uel P. H eintzelm an ’s Journal, I
January 18 5 1 -3 1 D ecem b erl8 5 4 : Concerning the Establishm ent o f a P ost a t the Junction o f the C olorado
a n d G ila Rivers, trans. Creola Blackwell (Yuma, AZ.: Yum a County Historical Society, 1989). Major
H eintzelm an’s journal serves as an excellent gauge for the increasing amount o f violence in Arizona over
time; the change in American attitude toward even the Pima Indinas is evident from the follow ing quote
taken from Hepah, California! The Journal o f C ave Johnson Cuots: From M onterey, N uevo Leon,
M exico to Los Angeles, California D uring the Years 1848-1849, ed. Henry F. Dobyns (Tucson: Arizona
Pioneers’ Historical Society, 1961), 68. “The Unfortunate redman! Unsuspicious and unsuspecting o f the
cunning and politic white flatterer, little thought o f their days being numbered! O f the day when the
white man would see the last red warrior drowning in the Pacific, and rejoice as his rifle ball took the last
breath o f life from him !”
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a holding pen for animals. Unimposing as it was, the fort did at least now provide
American officials with an institutional base from which to exert control over both people
and resources. Heintzelman was none too happy when he arrived at one of the country’s
hottest spots and often openly wished he could be assigned anywhere else. Throughout
his stay he consistently complained that he had been “exiled” from the civilized world.”
As a good career soldier, however, he ftilfrlled his orders and did his best to bring
American justice to the Arizona frontier.
The first order o f business for Major Heintzelman and his men was to address the
violence that was keeping Americans from crossing peacefiilly into California.” In his
assignment letter from the Adjunct General’s Office, the Major was directed to: “ ..
.protect the emmigrants [sic\, to punish the Indians for any outrages they have committed
upon persons passing through their country, [and] to establish and maintain friendly
relations with and to prevent any combination on the part of different tribes for hostile
purposes.””
Heintzelman soon discovered, however, that while the military was correct in
recognizing that the situation on the Colorado River needed to be ameliorated, the
leadership was incorrect in assuming that the only parties in need o f chastisement were the
Indians. In fact, he was surprised to find that many Indians felt just as threatened by
emigrants, who were expropriating their resources, as emigrants felt about Indians who

” In his last journal entry Heintzelman wrote, “This ends the last year o f m y exile I hope [sic]”, 174.
” It is interesting to note that no one ever asks why the Indians were attacking travelers until people
on the ground started to report that the Indians had good reasons for why they oppose American
encroachment on their territory.
Ibid.
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were lashing out at American abuses.”
When Heintzelman realized this he jettisoned the idea that all Indians needed to be
“controlled” and instead adopted a more evenhanded approach. An example o f this
occurred on January 31, 1853, when he refused to punish a group of Indians based solely
on unsubstantiated accusations: “Those Mexicans accuse the Indians o f stealing some o f
their animals. They have no evidence o f it, only [that] they have lost the animals. I don’t
think the indians [sic] would venture to do this.”” At times the Major even found himself
serving as a de facto peace chief by mediating between warring bands o f Maricopas,
Cocopahs, and Yumans. On December 9, 1852, he wrote, “ . . . I was explaining to the
two Co-co-pas [sic] chiefs the relation in which they stood & that I would not permit them
to war against the Yumans [n]or the latter to against them.”’"*
By 1853, many Mexican miners were coming back from California as discriminatory
laws had kept them from mining. Among these men were some who planned to still strike
it rich by driving Sonoran sheep, cattle, and mules back to sell in California’s inflated
markets. Slowly, as the amount o f livestock crossing Arizona increased, so too did the
reports o f stolen animals. Not all cases involved Indians, but, as bands o f Pai speaking
natives living in western Arizona were in perpetual short supply of food and had few other

John Audubon, A u du bon ’s Journal, on October 5, 1849, Audubon com m ents that the Maricopas
were on their way to “assist the Yumas against the Am ericans,” yet conflict was apparently averted with
the “prompt shooting o f a party o f Texans who had shot one or two Yumas [sic] Indians for not making
the right landing.” This is the same kind o f m istake made by the Spaniards when they attempted to
establish a m ission among the Yum as in 1781; on Jan. 27, 1853, Major Heintzelm an wrote o f the problem
Indians were having with emigrants beginning to settle on their land: “Lt. O ’Connell is burning over the
country between C ook’s W ells, the A lgodones & Fr. Defiance. Jose [probably a Yavapai man] appeared
to think it was som eone w ho intended to settle there. He is afraid our [sic] cattle w ill destroy their
gardens when they plant, 125.
Heintzelm an,125.
^ U b id , 113.
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methods for acquiring domesticated animals, it should have come to no surprise that some
were pilfering fattened sheep and cattle.”
After adopting raiding as a means to meet their nutritional needs, some Indians then
began to trade or sell a portion o f their “surplus livestock” to emigrants whose animals
had broken down. In doing this, these native entrepreneurs gained access to coveted
American trade goods either directly or through purchase with money they received for
stolen animals.’^ Heintzelman did Iiis best to curtail what he saw as an illicit practice, yet
he was hindered by an inability to addresses the underlying environmental factors driving
Arizona’s hungry Indians to take American animals.
Along with the animal herders, miners and men exiled fi’om California for being
habitual criminals also began arriving in Arizona in the 1850s. The miners were searching
for the next bonanza where a man could strike it rich with just a pick and a pan, while the
reprobates were eager to resume their illicit ways in any available town. For the
prospectors Arizona seemed the perfect spot as the territory’s violent reputation had kept
the area relatively clear o f miners, while the criminals would go anywhere they could find

Complaints to Heintzelman over stolen herds increase throughout 1853. An interesting and
wonderfully candid recounting o f interaction between Americans with cattle and hungry Indians com e
from the memoirs o f Hank Smith, “M ining and Indian Fighting in Arizona and N ew M exico, 18581861,” P anhandle-Plains H istorical Review, vol. 1, no. 1, ed. Hattie M. Anderson (Am arillo, TX: Russell
& Cockrell, 1928) 81. Smith wrote, “W e signaled them [the Indians] to com e to camp, which they did.
They said they were hungry and wanted a beef, that there were twenty more Indians with them on the
mountains that they were on their way to Sonora on a raiding expedition and they would pay back the beef
w e would let them have . . . We finally concluded to give them the beef, provided they let the herd alone,
which they promised.”
Hank Smith also provides insight into trading relations between Americans and Indians: “We
found the W hite M ountains all r ig h t. . . about 150 W hite Mountain Apaches rode up to our camp and
wanted us to com e to their camp . . . for the purpose o f trading som e horses, mules, and calico, o f which
w e always carried in good supply o f the purpose [o f trading with the Indians.] Smith, “M ining,” 106.
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men laden with pockets o f gold and silver.”
At first, the prospectors kept to the Colorado River and its peripheral streams. With
the Colorado Ferry Company and Fort Yuma established nearby, staying close offered
them assured access to both food and military protection.’* Eventually, fi’om within this
group grew a more organized effort to exploit Arizona’s mineral wealth. Some men had
realized that real wealth was not to be found at the bottom of a rusted pan, but instead in
the judicious cultivation o f political connections. These speculators looked to merge the
knowledge and power o f military men with the money o f eastem investors to create an
industrial mining complex.
Despite his early protests against profiting from his position. Major Heintzelman
became the first military commanders to profit from insider investments in mining and
transportation concessions in Arizona.” On February 20, 1851, he had fumed: “I have
never hinted to him the least desire to own any part [of the proposed steamboat venture.].

^’John Gregory Bourke, 119. For a detailed account o f American discrimination against Hispanics in
California please see Leonard Pitt’s The D ecline o f the Californios: A S ocial H istory o f the SpanishSpeaking Californian, 1846-1890 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1966). California’s territorial
legislature passed the Foreign M iners’ Tax in 1850, which mandated that anyone not a U .S. citizen had to
pay $20 per month to retain the right to prospect, “The people o f Greenwood were about like those in any
m ining camp o f the old days. They were largely m ining men and adventurers from the old m ining camps
in California and Nevada, though som e were from Texas and N ew M exico. Som e were Americans,
Germans, Irish, French, and M exicans. A ll in all, the men were more or less desperate in character.”
Maguire, 54.
By 1863, this section o f Arizona had m any men who had “gone down to the new D iggin s found on
the tributaries o f the Gila and others are leaving daily.” L etters o f the Office o f Indian Affairs, E xtract
fro m letter o f Gov. F. H ooper to M ajor Heintzelman, San F rancisco, S eptem ber 24, 1863. Bureau o f
Indian Affairs, 1821-1880, N ew M exico Superintendency, 1849-80, Roll 2 (W ashington, National
Archives and Records, 1956), Microform.
” In a letter dated December 27, 1856, Captain R.S. Ewell wrote to his sister from Fort Buchanan
that he wanted to “make som e speculations here” in regard to his plan to invest in the Patagonia M ine
near the fort. “Documents o f Arizona History: An A rizona Letter o f R.S. Ewell, ” in The Journal o f
A rizona H istory, vol. 2, no. 7, (Summer) ed. Percy G. Hamlin (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1966)
23-5.
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.. I have not sunk so low yet as to sell my character for a few paltry dollars. 1 can
advocate the interests o f the post without having at the same time a private interest.” Yet,
the next year he was drawing dividends from his investment in that very steamboat
operation. By November, 25, 1853 he had dropped all pretenses: “I gave Lt. McLean the
gold Grinnel gave me, to send to Gen. Estel o f S. Francisco, to try & have something done
in the way o f farther [sic] exploration & in making up a company. We want to profit some
by it if we can.”"*’
After leaving Fort Yuma, in 1856, Heintzelman joined with speculator Charles Poston
to create the Sonora Mining and Exploring Company. Poston established the venture’s
headquarters at the abandoned presidio o f Tubac, while Heintzelman went back east to
raise money. The main thrust of their business plan was to reopen abandoned mines
previously worked by Spanish and Mexican miners.^'
At first there was only a few Americans, such as Heintzelman and Poston, who striving
to monopolize Arizona’s resources. It did not take long, however, before the U.S.
government joined in the quest. Congress did so when it authorized two railroad surveys
through the region. Eager to connect California’s booming markets to east coast centers
o f finance and manufacturing, lawmakers were stuck in a debate as to where to put a
trans-eontinental rail line. Each time a representative attempted to authorize an
exploratory expedition that would favor his own state, opposition invariably formed. To
m ove forward, compromisers finally passed a bUl on March 3, 1853 to create multiple

survey teams, so that the ultimate decision o f where to locate the rail line would result

Heintzelman, 11, 168.
Charles D. Poston, B uilding a State in A pache Land ( Tempe, AZ: A ztec Press, 1894), 62-4, 72.

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from scientific data and not due to majorities running roughshod over minority interests/’
With a Congressional mandate. Secretary o f War Jefferson Davis authorized now
Major Wilham H. Emory to assemble surveying teams for possible southem routes along
the 32"*' and 35* parallels. And the Texas Western Railroad Company financed a third
team. The task for each group was to “provide exact data on elevations and grades of
mountain passes, meteorological and astronomical observations, and reports on the
availabihty o f water and timber as well as the nature o f mineral resources, rocks, and soil.”
For Americans in Arizona, this was just the type o f information they needed to begin
laying claim to the best pieces o f land."*’
These survey reports, which literally directed men to promising mineral sites, began to
publicly circulate in the late 1850s. The following excerpt comes from the Gray Report:
“The mountains in the neighborhood are filled with minerals, and the precious metals are
said to abound.” And “. . . [we] found the argentifeours galena ore and gold.”"*"*
Unfortunately, in addition to being conduits for information, the survey teams were also
responsible for stirring up ill feelings among Arizona’s Indians. During the Whipple
expedition a man came down with smallpox at about the same time that the disease was
killing hundreds o f Indians at the nearby Hopi and Zuni Pueblos. The Indians believed
that man was to blame, as chronicler John P. Sherburne wrote, “Nothing could induce
them [Indians] to come into Camp [sic]. They would take nothing to eat, drink, or smoke.

John P. Sherburne, Through Indian Country to California: John P. S h erbu rn e’s D ia ry o f the
Whipple Expedition, 1853-1854, ed. Mary M cDougall Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)
5-9.
Ibid., 1-2
L. R. Bailey, ed.. Survey o f a Route on the 32'^ P a ra llel o f the Texas Western R ailroad, 1854, (Los
Angels: Westernlore Press, 1963), 78-9.
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so great was their fear o f catching the smallpox.”^’
Members o f survey teams also found amusement in harassing Indians. To assure
themselves o f keeping to the correct path, the men with Whipple captured an Indian man
and forced him serve as their guide. When two Mexican runners arrived to take them to
meet another team, they finally decided to let the humihated man go: “We had a message
from Lieut. W. this morning advising us to move and, hearing that he had met Indians [to
serve as guides], we concluded to let our captive go, so after amusing ourselves for some
time by making him show the road, we unlocked the chains, loaded him with old clothes,
blankets, etc., and sent him oflf.”"*’ As a result, by the time miners and ranchers began
pouring over Arizona’s landscape, many o f the region’s Indians already held a very low
opinion o f Americans.
Despite high expectations, none o f the mining ventures begun before the Civil War
turned into a bonanza. Placer finds stopped producing either when miners had taken all
the easily gathered minerals or when water supplies dried up, thereby eliminating panning
and sluicing as extraction methods."” Underground mining had its own problems related
to access and ore refinement. Most underground claims required backbreaking work to
expose buried veins as well as machinery for separating slag from ore. To meet their labor
needs, mine owners often hired Mexican “peons” who would work cheaply without too

Sherburne, Indian Country, 136.
‘'U b id , 171-2.
47

<

“Tucson Correspondence,” Tucson, Feb. 11, 1860, St. Louis M issouri Republican, reprinted in
Thompson Turner’s L atest fro m Arizona: The H esperian Letters, ed. Constance Wynn Altshuler (Tucson;
Arizona Pioneers’ Flistorical Society, 1969), 141; “A ll the placer m ining hitherto attempted in Arizona,
whether on the Gila, the Santa Cruz, or Bear Creek, has proved unprofitable to the miners on account o f
the scarcity o f water.” See also Maguire, 64-5.
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much complaint/* After extracting the ore, owners could then either resort to the timeconsuming, yet inexpensive patio refining process/^ or they could import expensive
machinery to do the job. Technology was obviously the better choice if one had the
money. Yet, as a cross-country railroad did not yet go through Arizona, bulky items had
to come up the Colorado River on a steamboat and then move overland by mule train, or
they had to come across country fi’om the nearest eastern rail depot. Both options were
time intensive and quite expensive.^®
A few miners and their investors were willing to risk the expense, but before any
machines arrived in Arizona, the war between the Union and the Confederacy broke out.
Southern sympathizers in Tucson and adjacent towns in New Mexico voted to support the
Confederate cause, yet nothing o f consequence came o f this until Texans invaded New
Mexico on July 24, 1861. Confederate Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Baylor was able to
capture Mesilla, New Mexico, forcing Union commanders to order all loyal soldiers

Ibid., 20: Tubac, N ov. 24, 1859, “The Sonoran Exploring and M ining Company have an engine en
route for the works, which w ill arrive early next year, and enable the company to reduce their rich ore in
quantities to render it very profitable to shareholders;” Poston, State, 73, “A s soon as it was known in
M exico that an American company had arrived in Tubac, M exicans Irom Sonora and the adjacent states
cam e in great numbers to w o r k .. A few straggling Americans cam e along now and t h e n .. .[but] they
were generally worthless, dissipated, dangerous, low white trash.”
In most cases, the patio process, which was developed in M exico, consisted o f a mule harnessed to
a grinding w heel that crushed large chunks o f rock into finer sand. The sand was then m ixed with
quicksilver and then dumped into vats o f water. The quicksilver amalgamated with precious ores, which
could then be separated fi'om the slag.
The few men who succeeded in getting m achinery into the region after the Civil War often
abandoned m ining them selves and went into the business o f m illing as they could charge exorbitant
prices. “The prices charged by the cormorants running the m ill were so exorbitant that on e-h alf the ore
was left on the dump because it would not pay to crush it.” See Maguire, 48.
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west o f the Rio Grande to abandon their posts and move to forts along the front line. ^'
This troop withdrawal upset loyal citizens in Southern Arizona, as they were now to
be without a defensive buffer from Indian attacks. On June 15, 1861, Samuel Robinson,
who was an accountant with the Santa Rita Mining Company, wrote in his journal, “Fort
Breckenridge is literally surrounded by Apaches and many o f the troops at the Fort talk of
leaving, so that the immediate future o f Arizona is not very bright.” And on July 2, 1861,
“The infantry expects to get off by the 15'*' in st.. .It is said the cause of the troops being
removed to the Rio Grande is that they expect an attack from the Texans.”^^
Arizonans were particularly worried at this time as a recent incident between the
military and some Indians had caused a sudden increase in Apache attacks. A rift had first
opened between the Americans and the Apaches m 1848 when military leaders attempted
to fulfill a pledge made in the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo to keep Apache raiders out of
Sonora and Chihuahua. Apache headmen could not understand why the Americans would
want to protect an enemy that their military had just defeated. They also wanted to know
why the Americans believed the U.S. government had a right to stop Apache warriors
from avenging depredations perpetrated upon them by Mexican citizens.
Having lived for generations with Spaniards who monopolized scarce resources and
often indiscriminately punished Indians, the Apaches had learned to meet mjustice with

Maguire, 1-3; John P. W ilson, When the Texans Came: M issing Records fro m the C ivil War in the
Southwest, 1861-2 (Albuquerque: University o f N ew M exico Press, 2001), 25-6; Santa Fe June 22, 1861,
J .L C ollins Superintendent o f Indian A ffairs to William P. D ole Com m issioner o f Indian Affairs, Letters
o f the Superintendency o f Indian Affairs, N ew M exico, Reel 5575 (W ashington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1923), Microform.
” Sam uel Robinson, 1825-1907: Papers, 1861: MS 1088 (Arizona Historical Society: Tucson, AZ);
On July 10, 1861 Indian A gent C. Lennan wrote, “The withdrawal o f the U .S. troops has removed every
check upon the Indians o f Arizona and the larger portion o f this part o f the Territory o f N ew M exico is
now entirely at the mercy o f the m ost relentless o f savages-the several tribes o f A paches.”
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injustice. When the Amerieans began to act in what they perceived to be a manner
reminiscent o f the Spanish, Gila, Chirieahua, and Western Apache bands resisted by
treating the Americans as they did their Hispanic enemies: an eye for an eye. Apache
headmen believed to do otherwise would be tantamount to subordinating themselves to
American power and eventually giving up their way o f life.^^
Relations between Americans and Apaches worsened considerably on January 27,
1861, when a band o f Apaches stole livestock from a ranch near the Chirieahua Mountains
and kidnapped a Mexican boy. In response, on February 4, the commander o f Fort
Buchanan, Lt. Bascom, met with Apache headman Cochise to demand that he return the
cattle and the captive. Cochise brought femily members with him and claimed that a band
o f White Mountain Apaches had the boy and that he would try to retrieve him. Bascom
was not convinced and seized the group as hostages to bargain for the boy’s return.
Coehise escaped and demanded his relatives’ release. Baseom refused. In retaliation,
Cochise attacked a Butterfield st£^e and captured an employee who he offered in
exchange for his relatives. Bascom still refused. Two days later, Cochise burned a wagon
train, which killed nine Mexicans, and he took three Americans prisoner.^"*

” With m an-on-the-ground clarity, Dr. M ichael Steck, Indian agent assigned to the Apaches during
the 1850s, wrote in a report that “The Apaches living upon the headwaters o f the Gila are in a most
destitute condition, they have lived principally from tim e immemorial, upon cattle, mules, & horses stolen
either from this territory, or from the northern states o f M exico, Sonora & C hihu ahu a.. . at certain
seasons they are in a starving condition, but such is the fact that the natural resources o f the country
cannot supply them with fo o d .. . They are then reduced to the absolute necessity o f choosing between
stealing and starvin g.. .Place a w hite man in the sam e position and I doubt whether he would consult the
ownership or right to property more than these Indians.” National Archives M icrofilm Publications,
R ecords o f the N ew M exico Superintendency o f Indian Affairs, 1849-80, No. T21, Roll 1 (W ashington
D C.: National Archives and Records, 1956), M icrofilm.
Turner, 271; Dan L. Thrapp, The Conquest o f A pacheria (Norman University o f Oklahoma Press,
1967), 18-9.
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Finally Cochise made a direct attack, but Bascom repulsed the attempt. Fed up,
Cochise killed all o f his hostages. The Lieutenant then hung six o f the Apache men he was
holding, including Cochise’s brother and two o f his sister’s sons. As the Chirieahua were
a matrilineal people, hanging Cochise’s nephews was tantamount to hanging his sons.
Consequently, according to some reports, Cochise sought blood revenge by killing close
to one hundred and fifty Americans in the ensuing weeks.^^
Less than two months later, in April o f 1861, Congress moved the Overland mail route
fi-om its southern course to a central route so as to reduce travel time to San Francisco
and to punish the south for seceding. When the Apaches watched the mail company
remove its men and animals from their territory, they apparently assumed it was due to
fear provoked by their efforts. After this, Apache raids increased even further.^* And
finally, a few months later, U.S. soldiers stationed at Arizona forts, packed up, burned
their remaining supplies, and marched east to turn back the Confederate invasion o f New
Mexico. Not surprisingly, it was not long before Apache headmen began boasting that
they had defeated the Americans and driven their soldiers from the territory.^^
While fear o f the Apaches was high among American and Mexican residents, it is
misleading to assume that this was the only worry in Tucson and Tubac. With the soldiers
gone, the kind o f frontier violence that had plagued the region during the early years o f the
gold rush returned with non-Indians involved in as many “depredations” as the Indians.

” Ibid.
’"Turner, 212-3.
Upon being appointed Superintendent o f Indian Affairs o f the territory o f Arizona, Charles Poston
wrote a detailed report o f the Indian in his jurisdiction, o f the Gila Apaches he wrote, "... when our
unfortunate civil war caused the withdrawal o f the U.S. troops from the country they proudly boasted o f
having chased the Americans from their domain never more to return.”
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Contemporary diaries and newspapers illustrate this, as they are filled not only with raiding
Apaches, but also an assortment o f American and Mexican thieves, murders, and assorted
other criminals/* In fact, local resident Samuel Robinson wrote to assure his family that
he was not living in constant fear o f Indian raids: “It is true that we are always prepared
for them, but we do not really fear them.”^^
Reality did not, however, stop Americans fi'om blaming the Indians whenever
something or someone came up missing. The following report fi'om Fort Mojave
demonstrates the generally irrational behavior o f Americans toward Indians during this
period: “Se-rum [,] head chief o f the Hulapais who has been paying a friendly visit to this
Post[,] was brutally Assaulted [5/c] this evening by a drunken man in the Street o f Mojave
C ity.. . The probabilities are that this aggressive act will lead to another war with the
Hulapais..

The next incident, also occurred near Fort Mojave, and demonstrates the

tendency o f settlers to see Indians culprits behind every crime, regardless o f the evidence.
Some t wo weeks ago an Indian (Mojave) by name Toke-watha came to me and
informed me that [Mr.] Goodrich was cutting his grass and refused to pay him for it,
I sent for Goodrich and he and Toke-watha came up together about two days
afterward when I ascertained that Toke-watha lived about four miles from where
Goodrich was cutting, supposing that the Indian was simply trying to obtain some
money I told him they would have to refer the matter to the Justice o f the Peace at
Hardyvüle as it was not on the Military Reserve. Toke-watha had threatened three
or four times to shoot Goodrich previous to this occurrence. Owing to the above
facts I suspect that Toke-watha murdered Goodrich, he was killed by an axe, or

’*In his memoirs, Charles Poston wrote o f this period, “The V igilance Comm ittee o f San Francisco
sent a considerable number o f unsavory immigrants to Arizona, who with the refugees from M exico,
Texas and Arkansas, render m ule property rather insecure in the early days.” Poston, 100. And in an
editorial written from Tucson on October 17, 1859: “What with Indians, revengeful M exicans and Border
Ruffians, if I m istake not, the history o f Arizona, for the next six months w ill be written in blood.” L atest,
15.
” Robinson, MS 1088.
""Irene J. Brennan, F ort M ohave L etters o f the Com m anding Officers, 18 5 9 -1890 (Manhattan, KS:
M A /AH Publishing, 1980) 50; Aug. 20, 1869.
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other sharp instrument when asleep . . . A great many [citizens] are desirous of
going down the valley in a body and taking the Indian [Toke-watha] by force, which
would probably bring on a general skirmish. . . I would respectfully state that if 1 do
not receive the Indian today a mob will probably try to take him themselves..
This example also illustrates the fact that there were some parallels between the
behavior o f frontier settlers in relation to Indians and southerners toward emancipated
blacks following the Civil War.*^ Other such similarities would also begin to emerge
between how the North defeated the South and then sought to reconstruct the region at
the end o f the Civil War, and how the federal government defeated Arizona’s Indians and
then attempted to forcibly acculturate them.^^

Ibid., 81; Sept. 4, 1872.
Racially tinged com m ents such as that which follow s were not uncommon in journals, newspaper
articles, and military reports, “W e read everywhere o f the stoicism and gravity o f the Indian, but my
Apaches were merry as darkies, laughing, singing (but such singing) for hours at a time. The soldiers
delighted in them— gave them tobacco and extra sugar and coffee, made pets o f them, as it were and had
nearly all o f them rechristened.” Charles K ing, “On Campaign in A rizona,” M ilwakuee Sentinel, March
28, 1880, in E yew itness to the Indian Wars, 165; similarly, “Here the m eals were prepared, and they were
brought hence by “our man” on a tray, into the “large house,” where the board was spread. . . ” Frank K.
Upham, “Incidents o f Regular Army L ife in Tim e o f Peace,” The O verlan d M onthly 5, 2"‘‘ ser. (April
1885): 426-29, in E yew itness to the Indian Wars, 87.
“ The anim al-like view som e Americans had o f Indians com es out clearly in U.S. Army surgeon L.
Y . Loring’s report on the Coyotero Apaches, “When they are housed and have beds t sleep in in place o f
groveling in the earth like dumb brutes, when they have been taught to wear clothes and to keep
them selves clean, when they have acquired industrious habits and the rudiments o f civilized life, then will
they be in a better condition to comprehend and accept the mysteries o f the Christian religion.”
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CHAPTER 6

AMERICAN VICTORY: HEGEMONY ACHIEVED
The events that led Arizona’s regular troops to pack up, bum their supplies, and head
east in the summer o f 1861 also caused settlers to shift their focus from provincial
concerns to national problems. As a result o f this reorientation, citizens began to
increasingly base their actions on factors not always evident to their Mexican and Indian
neighbors. Without knowing this, it became much more difficult for these groups to
respond to Americans in ways that did not jeopardize their own wellbeing. In fact, by
1886, miscalculations on the part o f many Indians put them squarely at odds with the
American settlers and ultimately cost them control over not only important resources, but
also their lives.
In the years immediately following 1846, American emigrants and Arizona’s Indians
came into sustained contact. During this time, however, they were able to co-exist
without too much bloodshed, as neither group was willing to fight for control over the
region. This did not mean that Native Americans merely stood by as Americans
trespassed on their land and usurped their resources, as many took umbrage with travelers
who refused to respect their territorial claims. What it did mean was that neither side was
yet ready to go to war. Evidence o f this state o f afifeirs comes from Indian agent John
Greene in his 1852 report on the Gila Apaches: “The whole o f this Country [sic] would
soon be settled if the Indians would allow it but they are unwilling to part with their land
116
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without Êiir compensation.”' Moreover, he wrote that settlers had repeatedly attempted
to move into a verdant valley, but had “as often bëen driven away by the Indians who say
they shall (emphasis in the original) not have them unless the Government pays for their
country.”^
Indian agents such as John Greene also repeatedly warned federal officials that
violence would erupt if the Indians, the Apaehes in particular, were not given the same
consideration as citizens. They bluntly informed American officials that if they did not live
up to promises made to the Indians, American settlers would pay a heavy price. In a
report dated January 19, 1855, Indian Agent Michael Steck wrote, “1 hear complaints
among them [the Apaches] o f the bad faith of the Government towards them, they say
they were promised assistance, but that they have waited two years and have not yet
received it, and any one at all acquainted with the peculiar characteristic o f Indian
character, will at once see the evil that would result from another years’ delay..
Unfortunately, federal officials were too busy or too little attuned to frontier life to take
the agent’s warning seriously.
On the level o f the average American traveling through Arizona, most had some
understanding o f the Indian way o f life as well as the historic nature o f the ongoing battle
between the southwestern Indians and Mexicans. This is evident in their journals and

‘ United States Bureau o f Indian Affairs, "The Official Correspondence o f James S. Calhoun w hile
Indian Agent at Santa Fe and Superintendent o f Indian Affairs In N ew Mexico," June 30, 1852
(W ashington D C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, m icrofilm). Reel 557 No. 5675.
^ United States Bureau o f Indian Affairs, L etters R eceived By the Office O f Indian Affairs, 1821-88,
N ew M exico Superintendency, 1849-80, Roll 2 (W ashington D C.: National Archives and Record Service,
1956).
^ Ibid.
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letters when they condemn the Indians for their un-Christian ways. Yet most Americans
were very willing to overlook these supposed character flaws as long as the Indians
facilitated their ability to reach California by providing fresh draft animals, potable water,
and supplies wholesome food.
Underlying tensions first came to the surfece in 1850 when Indian agents attempted to
enforce a clause in the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo obligating Americans to curtail
Apache raids into Mexico. The agents quickly ran into determined resistance from
Apache headmen such as Mangas Coloradas who demanded to know: “. . . are we to
stand with our arms folded while our women & children are being murdered in cold
blood? The Sonorans beat out the brains o f fifteen o f them with clubs. Are we to be the
victims o f such treachery—are we not to be revenged? Are we not to have the privilege
o f protecting ourselves?”^ As the War Department was unwilling to commit the resources
needed to stop the raids, ^ e n ts ended up turning a blind eye to most cross-border activity
and only half-heartedly reprimanded the Indians when Mexican authorities complained.^
Tempers again flared when the number o f emigrants passing through Arizona
increased in the mid-1850s. One factor in this was the strain emigrants put on the
environment, as the desert could only sustain so many extra mouths. The bovine
merchandise stripped the ecosystem o f the plants most Indians relied on as famine food,
raising the specter o f starvation for more than just the nomadic groups. Boxed into a
subsistence com er, som e Indians decided to take matters in their ow n hands by helping

Ibid., August 13, 1851.
’ This is the main reason why the Gadsden Purchase Treaty, ratified in 1853, specifically released the
United States from any further obligation to stop cross-border raiding by the Apaches.
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themselves to the resource the Americans relied on: the cattle. It was this low-level
poaching and retaliation along with other forms of “frontier” lawlessness that had caused
Washington officials to establish Fort Yuma.
Despite Washington’s intentions, military men, such as Major Heintzelman, only had
enough power to keep local renegades on both sides from disrupting the flow of travel
across the Colorado River. They did not, however, have the resources needed to secure
the territory farther away from their posts. As long as American political leaders were
unwilling to commit the money and manpower needed to undertake such an endeavor,
military men could not effect a real redistribution o f power or resources.
Conflicts between Americans and Indians escalated further with the arrival of
prospectors who came to pan for gold in the Colorado and its tributaries. As the number
o f miners increased, so too did the burden o f the soldiers to keep the Indians and
Americans from abusing one another. The men stationed at Fort Yuma struggled to
maintain peace on their own until 1859, when increasing American complaints pushed
national authorities to establish Fort Mohave up the river. At first, relations between
miners and resident Pai-speaking Indians was peaceful, but as Fort Mohave’s commander
understood, “Soon circumstances may cause the Indians to hesitate or object to making
Treaties [5 /c]. Already the Indians are aware that the Mountains [i'zc] contain valuable
ores, but when they leam more as to its value and mode of separating it from the earth,
they will part with the mountain with more reluctance.”

When the Indians did begin to resist, it was not because they wanted to keep minerals
for themselves, instead, it was due to the same environmental deficiencies plaguing other
areas o f sustained contact. Under orders to suppress violent encoimters. Fort Mohave’s
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various commanders adhered to the same sort of pragmatism that Major Heintzelman
found so effective. The following report is indicative o f officers at Fort Mojave:
This year however there has been no overflow [of the river], the Mesquite crop has
been a failure, the wheat crop was light and the flour made fi'om [it] is exhausted..
It is evident that something must be done, and that speedily. They [Indians] will
soon reach the starving Point [5/c] and it is certain that depredations will then be
Committed [5 /c] on the settlers, and others traveling in the valley. This would lead
to war, many Indians would probably be killed. They would be forced to submit,
or else driven off to the Mountains [5 /c] to join the hostile bands. If they
submitted, as many would do, for this People [^/c] is not warlike, the Government
would have to feed them. Is it not better to assist them now?”*
The first fort commissioned east o f the Colorado, apart fi'om Fort Defiance, in the far
northeast, was Fort Buchanan. It opened in 1857 and was located twenty-five miles east
of Tubac, which was then the headquarters o f Charles Poston’s Sonoran Exploration and
Mining Company. It was also just to southeast of Tucson, where a handfiil of American
merchants were now established as local powerbrokers. With this new post, Washington
continued a general pattern o f stationing soldiers where miners and merchants needed
security, yet at the same time not providing fort commanders with the manpower needed
to seriously threaten Indian autonomy.’
For Mexican and Indian residents in Tubac and Tucson the arrival o f American miners,
merchants, and soldiers was not troubling as circumstances merely reverted to the way

" Brennan, 53-4.
’ In a letter to his sister Private George H. Cranston wrote from Fort Grant in June o f 1867 that “It is
useless to follow them [the Indians] with a small party o f men because nine times out o f tem you will
either fall into an ambuscade and [be] killed or taken prisoner.” And on September 23, 1868, he wrote to
her from Camp Crittenden, south o f Tucson, “W e have been at this post now for nearly 7 months, and
dureing [sic] that tim e there has been a great amount o f scouting done. The Indians are more troublesome
this summer than ever before. They have killed several o f the settlers and drove o ff their stock, and
driveing [sic] the settlers into the fort, what were left o f th e m .. The Indians never do run from no troops
in their own Country [sic]. They only laugh at our ap[pe]arance.” Bruce J. D ines, ed., “A N ew York
Private in Arizona Territory: The Letters o f George H. Cranston, 1867-1870,” The Journal o f A rizona
H istory 75, no. 4, (Fall, 1994), 135.
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they had been under Spanish and Mexiean rule. For Mexiean workers, American
employers were not that much different from Mexican haciendados and mine owners.
Both paid the same low wages for similarly harsh and degrading work. For the Pimans,
the Americans offered protection from Apache and Yavapai raids and created a market for
their surplus agricultural produce.
Relations between groups living in Arizona took a decided turn for the worst in 1861.
In that year Lieutenant Bascom executed Cochise’s relatives; the Congress moved the
overland mail route; and the regular troops retreat eastward. Taken together, these events
caused the Chirieahua Apaches to reclassify Americans from periodic annoyance to
committed enemy. Not only did these events cause the Apaches to view the Americans
differently, but they also made the Indians believe they could dominate over the remaining
settlers. When the Superintendent o f Indian Affairs in Arizona, none other than Mr.
Charles Poston, relayed this information to Washington he wrote, “These lordly
mountaineers tauntingly say ‘The Americans are their husbandmen and the Mexicans are
their herders. Why should they labor? When they want they will gather in abundance’.”*

* Charles Poston, Report to the O ffice o f Indian Affairs, April 22, 1863, United States Bureau o f
Indian Affairs, L etters R e ce ive d by the Office o f Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, A rizona Superintendency,
1863-1880, Roil 3 (W ashington D C.: N ational Archives and Records Services, 1956); in a similar vein,
in 1868 O verlan d M onthly reporter John Cremony spent tim e am ong the Apaches o f Arizona and relates
this exchange that followed Cremony show ing an Apache headman pictures and m odels o f American
technology: “Y ou desire our children to leam from books and say that, because you have done so, you are
able to build all those big houses, and sail over the sea, and talk to each other at any distance and do many
wonderfiil things; now, let m e tell you what I think. You begin when you are little to work hard, and
work until you are men in order to begin fresh work you say that you work hard in order to learn how to
work w ell. After you get to be m en, then you say, the labor o f life commences; then, too, you build big
houses, big ships, big towns, and everything in proportion. Then, after you have got them all, you die and
leave everything behind. Now, w e call that slavery. You are slaves from the tim e you tiegin to talk until
you die; but w e are as free as the air. W e never work, but the M exicans and others work for us.” In
Eyew itness to the Indian Wars, 18 65-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,
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As the Chirieahua Apaches and Americans drew their battle lines, the Piman peoples
decided to bind themselves closer to the Amerieans. In doing this they hoped to
strengthen their proteetion from Apache and Yavapai raiders and gain the ability to appeal
to white settlers as allies. While making perfeet sense at the time, this deeision, however,
bode ill for the friture as the Pimans did not foresee that the defeat o f the Apaches and
Yavapais would mean an increase in the number o f settlers, many o f whom would
expropriate Piman land and water.
Americans such as Superintendent Poston also blundered when they supported arming
the Pimans. He seems to have not taken into consideration possible long-term
eonsequences o f this aetion.^ It apparently never crossed his mind that armed Pimans
eould turn their weapons on Americans. Instead, he and others like him falsely assumed
that the more “eivilized” Pimans had always befriended intruders o f European deseent, so
they therefore could always be inqjlicitly trusted. This, however, was not historically
accurate as various Piman groups had resorted to armed attacks against Spaniards,
Mexicans, and American frir traders when circumstances led them to believe their
resources were being threatened.'*

^ The O ’Odom o f the G ila and Santa Cruz both received reservations in the late 1860s; according to
merchant Don Maguire, “[Am os] Carroll and the Pimans carried on a sort o f contraband trade; that is he
sold them w ine and w hiskey and playing cards and other m eans o f gam bling, contrary to the w ishes o f the
nearby Indian agent. The agent told m e that Carroll purchased horses, mules, and donkeys furnished to
the Indians by the government, paying them not more than one-third their value and reselling them to
travelers or Mexican traders at high prices.” In Maguire, 75.
Letter to Comm issioner o f Indian Affairs P. D ole from Indian Agent Charles Poston, August 19,
1864; These Indians have always been friendly to the whites, and have served as a bulwark against the
Apaches, the great scourge o f our Territory.. .it is considered as a matter o f vial importance to conciliate
them , and retain their good w ill.” Officer, 99; see also The p erso n a l N arrative o f Jam es O. Pattie, ed.
W illiam Goetz man (Albuquerque: University o f N ew M exico Press, 1962) for a detailed account o f Pima
and Maricopa Indians attacking American for traders.

122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

When Confederate and Union forces began battling each other, Apache headmen
appear to have surmised that American political power was fracturing, just as it had in
northern Mexico following Mexican independence. They probably also assumed that they
could pit opposing factions against one another just as they had done with Hispanic
residents o f Sonora and Chihuahua. This line o f reasoning is probable as it most cogently
explains Apache aggressiveness and bravado during the Civil War. Why else would they
begin to behave as if they had nothing to fear?
While, this assessment o f American politics certainly made sense from the Apache
perspective, in a broader context, it was disastrous. The Apaches could not understand
that the events shaping American behavior were occurring hundreds o f miles away and
that these events were in fact strengthening American resolve to crush any and all
rebellions. What this meant for the Apaches was that they would pay dearly once the
Americans decided to commit the resources necessary to defeat them."
American resolve to pacify the west arrived on the Great Plain almost a decade before
it arrived in Arizona. Eager to apply the total war strategies that had defeated the South
to the West, Generals Philip H. Sheridan and William T. Sherman swept the Plains with a
vengeance. Their greatest problem was not that a scorched earth, no holds barred strategy
was ineffective against the Indians, but that it was too successful. When news arrived in

" Between 1866 and 1868 regular army forces again manned the posts in Arizona and many o f these
soldiers were veterans o f the Civil War. They learned lessons o f warfare from this experience, and then
applied to the frontier context. First Lieutenant C am illo C. C. Carr related this in his diary, “When
possible w e carried salt pork and hard bread, which were made to last without reference to the number o f
days or rations. That trick w e learned w ell in the Army o f the Potomac.” See Cozzens, 32; “Letter o f
January 23, 1866 to Com m issioner C ooley from Special A gent,” in Letters Received from the O ffice O f
Indian Affairs: “when the troops were withdrawn in 1861, the whites settlers were all driven o ff by the
w ild A p a c h e s.. .Since the return o f the troops, during the last year the settlers have com e back, unless a
reservation is soon selected, the poor Indians [Aravapai Apaches] w ill have no chance.”
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the East o f military massacres o f Indian women and children, reformers involved with
uplifting ft-eed slaves were aghast. Their protests'resulted in a reconfiguration of the army
back to its pre-Civil War strength and the removal o f Civil War military commanders from
the Plains. Consequently, in Arizona the voluntary California Column, which had
occupied the territory after the Texans invaded New Mexico, mustered out in 1864.
Some o f the soldiers returned to California, while others stayed to prospect, and a few
organized vigilante groups to bring “justice” to Indian raiders."’ Territorial governor John
Goodman replaced the Californians with a volunteer regiment consisting mostly of
Mexican and Piman men, yet they only served one year before the governor received
orders from Washington to disband his militia.’’
Between 1862 and 1871, the army established nine military forts and camps in three
strategic zones in Arizona: in the northeast near the Navajo, in the southeast near the
Chirieahua Apaches, and in central Arizona in Yavapai country. As before the Civil War,
these new posts were only minimally staffed with soldiers and supplies." Commanders

Some men stayed to return to promising mineral deposits they had previously located w hile on
reeonnaissance m issions under Carlton; see Ted Cogut and Bill Conger, H istory o f A rizo n a ’s CliftonM orenci M ining D istrict-A P ersonal A pproach (Thatcher, AZ: M ining History, 1999).
Edward Palmer, “A Great Slaughter o f A paches,” Prescott, A rizona Miner, February 28, 1866, in
Eyew itness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,

2001
In a letter to the editor o f the N ew York H era ld Sylvester Mowry bitterly complained that the lack
o f supply and foresight by military leaders in W ashington was leading to the unnecessary deaths in
Arizona: “This all-powerful and beneficent governm ent sends a young man like my dear friend
Cushing— poor, dear fellow , a man the army could not afford to lose— w ith tw enty m en to fight the
bravest, w ildest Indian ch ie f on the continent, Cochise, with 150 warriors entrenched in a mountain
range, every foot o f which is as familiar to the Apache as your own doorstep is to you. It is not sim ply the
killing o f an officer. It is an officer’s duty and expectation every tim e he goes out to be killed, for in
Arizona the troops always fight at a disadvantage in numbers and position.” Quoted in Eyew itness to the
Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 69: “in
December o f 1868, Indian Agent Post complained that “The military force now in Arizona is inadequate
to the protection o f the M ining Settlements [sic] and public highways So [sic] that the progress o f the
Country [sic] and development o f the precious metals are very much retarded.”
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did their best, but their men spent most of their time fiitilely chasing Indian warriors who
stealthily raided and then disappeared into their mountain fortresses. Without training in
guerilla tactics, or more recruits to lay siege to Indian hideouts, there was not much more
the soldiers could do." In feet, there was such a lack of coordination among the outposts
that in at least one instance, an Apache headman tried to lure soldiers from one fort into
participating in a raid against soldiers at another fort. According to first lieutenant
Camillio C. C. Carr,
Another result was that in a day or two after our return to Fort McDowell,
Delshay, the chief o f the Coyoteros, to which tribe the Indians we had killed
belonged, came to the post to make peace, bringing with him several hundred of his
people. He made the most liberal promises as to future good behavior, and as an
unquestionable guarantee o f his good feith offered to bring all his warriors, about
three hundred, and join the troops o f our garrison for the purpose of attacking and
capturing Canqj Grant. This offer was declined with thanks, but it showed that the
Apaches had no idea that the troops o f different posts belonged to the same army,
but were regarded as independent bodies hostile to each other and simply holding
places in the country for their own profit and advantage."
Unbeknownst to Arizona’s Indians, in Washington D C., a battle between advocates of
relentless war as a means for defeating recalcitrant Indians and proponents o f a negotiated
peace came to a head when Ulysses S. Grant, victorious Union general, became president
in 1869. Upon his inauguration, a group o f influential reformers requested that he create a
peace commission for rooting out the corruption and brutality plaguing the military and

” When possible, scouting parties did what Major John Green ordered his men to do when they came
upon an A pache cam p, “W hilst on th e m arch, th e captive squaw inform ed m e th a t th ere w as a cornfield
about three m iles from the trail, on one o f the sm all tributaries o f the San Carlos. 1 sent Corporal M iles
and twelve men o f the Thirty-second Infantry with the scouts to destroy it. On his return he reported he
had found and destroyed about four acres o f com .” And , “B elieving that m any o f these Indians, if not all,
had been guilty o f marauding, I instructed Captain Berry, if possible, to exterminate the w hole village but
gave no positive ord er.. . ” John Green , “Interesting Scout among W hite Mountain Apaches Som e o f
Whom Sue for Peace and a Reservation,” in Cozzens, 42-4.
16,

Carr, 3 1.
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Indian Bureau. They argued that fraud and a complete disregard for the Indians’
wellbeing were causing the ongoing Indian wars, and that the extirpation o f these moral
failings would bring peace to the West. And with peace would come the ability to bring
the same benevolent policies that were uplifting freed slaves to the Indians. Grant agreed,
yet in doing so did not completely abandon his commitment to proving the effectiveness of
the total war strategy.”
During the Grant administration, then, competing Indian policies o f peace and war ran
on parallel tracks until they collided in Arizona in 1871. On April 30 o f that year, a
vigilante mob from Tucson, consisting mostly o f Mexican and Papago men, but led by a
handful o f Americans, arrived at Camp Grant in the early morning ho urs and bashed in the
skulls o f a group o f sleeping Aravapai Apache women, children, and old men."
According to supportive newspaper editorials, these men carried out this heinous act
because the camp’s commander. Lieutenant Royal Whitman, was allowing a duplicitous
band o f Apaches to live at the camp and receive rations while they were simultaneously
conducting nocturnal raids against local citizens.” In a deposition. Camp surgeon Dr.
C.B. Biesly recounted in stark terms the result o f this act o f vengeance.
On my arrival 1 foimd that 1 should have but little use for wagon or medicines. The
work had been too thoroughly done. The camp had been fired, and the dead

" See: Robert H. Keller, Jr., “Shrewd, Able, and Dangerous Men: Presbyterian and Dutch Reformed
Indian A gents in the Southwest, 1870-1882,” in The Journal o f A rizona H istory 26, no. 3, (Autumn,
1985,) 243-257.
'* According to testim ony taken by Peace Comm issioner Vincent Colyer, the Papagos took 28 Apache
children from Camp Grant and “that the majority o f them have been carried ordered into Sonora by the
Papagoes [sic] and sold to the M exicans.” Colyer, 15.
19

O f Arizona’s newspapers, Colyer, 19, wrote, “But I am told that these papers only reflect the
opinions o f the traders, army contractors, bar-rooms, and gam bling-saloon proprietors o f those tw o towns,
who prosper during the war, but that the hardy frontiersmen, the miner, poor laboring men o f the border,
pray for peace and I believe it.”
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bodies o f some twenty-one women and children were lying scattered over the
ground; those who had been wounded in the first instance had their brains beaten
out with stones. Two o f the best-looking o f the squaws were lying in such a
position, and from the appearance o f the genital organs, and of their wounds, there
can be no doubt that they were first ravished, and then shot dead. Nearly all of the
dead were mutilated. One infant, o f some ten months, was shot twice, and one leg
nearly hacked off.’*
By feeding the Indians, Lt. Whitman had not violated established policy; in fact, he
was carrying out approved strategies o f the peace plan, which included feeding Indians
who promised to renounce raiding and settled down. This, however, did not sit too well
with Tucson’s leading men, and it was they who organized the citizen’s militia that had
marched on Camp Grant. After an investigation, the Grant administration demanded that
the men involved be prosecuted, but as a leading Aravapai headman Eskiminzin said, “I do
not expect ever to see any o f them punished, for they will never punish a white man for
killing an Indian. . . ” He was right.”
In the middle o f the Camp Grant scandal a man who represented the war policies of
the Grant administration arrived in Arizona. His name was General George Crook.
Crook had been temporarily stationed in San Francisco after successfully fighting Indians
on the Plains and in the Northwest and was looking forward to a respite. It was not long,
though, before his superiors began asking if he would consider going to Arizona. He
refused until he felt he could no longer do so without jeopardizing his career.”

Ibid.. 17.
” Quoted in Andrew H. Cargill, “The Camp Grant Massacre,” A rizona H isto rica l R eview 7, no. 3
(July 1936): 73-79, Eyew itness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (M echanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2001, 63-6.
” George Crook, G en eral G eorge Crook: H is A utobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman:
University o f Oklahoma Press, 1960), 160-3.
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After touring southern Arizona, Crook wasted no time in devising a pragmatic plan for
defeating and relocating all hostile Indians. First, he would give his adversaries an
ultimatum; they could choose either to remove to a reservation where they could live in
peace or they could remain hostile and be hunted down and killed. To enforce this threat
he decided to assemble a fighting force that could move swiftly and match the Indian’s
guerilla tactics. He understood and respected Indian fighting strategies, remarking that the
Indians were adept at launching “A number o f simultaneous attacks . . . at points widely
separated, thus confusing both troops and settlers, spreading a vague sense of fear over all
the territory . . . ”
To create his fighting force. Crook first followed in General Kearny’s 1846 footsteps
by jettisoning his supply wagons and adopting the mule train. Then he hired Mexican and
Indian scouts who understood Apache warfare and knew the location o f Apache and
Yavapai hideouts.” Crook and many others called these scouts “Apaches,” but those with
a better femiliarity with the region’s cultural geography noted that these Indians were
“Tonto Apaches,” meaning Yavapais, or “Apache -Mojaves” and “Apache-Yumas,”

From descriptions o f the higher elevation Apache hideouts it is possible that they were using the
sam e defensive sites that native groups used during the violent 14"" century. The follow ing quote is
representatives, “We had then an opportunity to exam ine the locality, so much dreaded by the Pimans,
used as one o f the strongholds o f the Apache-M ojaves [sic] and Tontos. Situated upon the crest o f a very
elevated range, it was difficult o f access to large parties from all sides except that upon which w e had
com e and even here the character o f the sold was such that a footstep, unless made in the m ost cautious
manner, would be heard for m iles.” John G. Bourke, “The Salt River Cave Fight,” John G. Bourke Diary
1; 68-92, United States Military Academy Library, in Eyew itness to the Indian Wars, 18 65-1890, ed. Peter
Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 149.
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meaning Mojaves and Yumas/'*
Once on the trail. Crook admonished his men that none should wantonly destroy life
and property, yet he also granted them leeway to use whatever means necessary to force
the enemy to surrender. Just as he was beginning to implement his plan, however, officials
from the Grant administration ordered the General to temporarily halt. By this time, news
o f the Camp Grant massacre and the perpetrators’ rigged trial had reached the Board of
Indian Commissioners. Incensed, they recommended that peace advocate Vincent Colyer
go to Arizona and undertake an investigation. President Grant finally agreed to send
Colyer in September o f 1871.”
So, just as Arizona’s Indians were about to see a more determined and organized side
o f the American military, the President intervened, and in doing so confirmed their belief
that the Americans were divided. Crook referred to Colyer as a member o f the “Indian
Ring,” meaning he was nothing more than a naïve and meddlesome outsiders.’* But as the
General wrote in his autobiography, “I had no faith in his enterprise, but I was afraid if I

John Gregory Bourke, On The B order with C rook (Chicago: The Rio Grande Press, 1962), 98, 101,
150; John F. Finerty, “On Campaign after Cibicue Creek,” Chicago Times, September 18 to October 21,
1881, in Eyew itness to the Indian Wars, 18 65-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (M echanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 2001, 238. Various commanders at Fort Mojave had already been enlisting the Hualapais as
scouts against the Mojave and Yavapai Indians. “Letter to Comm issioner Mowry from Acting Indian
Agent for the A rizona Indians, Tucson, December 25, 1859, 58-9,” L etter o f the Office o f Indian Affairs,
Superintendency o f Indian Affairs, N ew M exico, 1821-80, Roll 2 (W ashington D C.: Government
Printing Office, 1956) :“The name Apache includes a branch o f the Yuma family called the Tonto
Apaches, who speak an version [?] o f the Yuman language.”
C olyer, 6-7.
Later, members o f the Society o f Arizona Pioneers had much worse to say o f the Peace
Commissioners: “The President and Congress o f the United States, have apparently, ever been guided in
their treatment o f hostile Indians, by religious sentim entalists and romantic fem ale em otionalists, who
have derived their know ledge o f Indian character from a perusal o f the novels o f Fenimore Cooper and
other hypochondriac fiction ists, and w ho believe that the bible, done up in a wrapper o f kindness and
sweetmeats, is the only instrument which should be used in the subjugation o f the ‘savage, but noble red
man o f the forest.” S ociety o f A rizona P ioneers M em orial, 1885 ( Tucson: Arizona Historical Society).
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continued my operations and he was to fail, I would be charged with interference.”
Consequently, Crook dutifully suppressed his incredulity long enough to serve as
Commissioner Colyer’s escort.
Crook correctly predicted that Co Iyer’s visit would not significantly change
circumstances in Arizona, yet he wrongly assumed that Colyer’s failure would be due to
his naivety. The real cause was instead the unwillingness of Congress and the military
leadership to follow through on his recommendations. In his detailed report, Colyer
correctly explained why Arizona had “suffered” for so long from Indian depredations.
According to Colyer, the Indians were starving because settlers had usurped their
subsistence resources. On top o f this, Americans often cheated and physically abused the
Indians, which then created an endless cycle o f retribution and revenge. He wrote, “I ask
them, ‘Why are you so poor?’ and the answer invariably is, ‘How can we be otherwise?
We had not much originally, and now we can get nothing; we do not steal; we cannot go
to the mescal country, as we are liable to be met and killed by scouting parties.’ I know
myself this to be the case, hence they have either to starve or steal, or we must feed them
until they can raise enough for themselves.”” Thus, his remedies included creating
reservations with sufficient subsistence resources in each Indian group’s home territory;
ensuring that peacefiil Indians received adequate rations until they could support
themselves; and restraining settlers fi'om abusing the Indians. In the end, Colyer placed
blame for the ongoing conflict squarely on the shoulders o f the Americans. In his report

V incent Colyer, 12.
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he concluded that,
When the Americans first came among them bringing better traditions . . . and
treating them as a people whose rights to the soil not having yet been extinguished
by treaty .. . were entitled to some respect, and so treated them kindly, the Apaches
received them as fiiends. But [when the Americans] began to treat the Apaches as
incumbrances to be exterminated.. . They reaped the bloody finits of that policy in
a war which has cost us thousands o f lives and millions o f dollars.”’*
Some military officials, such as Captain J. J. Van Horn, agreed with Colyer’s
assessment: “I am o f the opinion that if the whites would deal fairly with the Indians and
when they have any transaction with them and were as well disposed to keep peace as the
Indians are, there would be but very little Cause for Complaint [ric].”’* Many other
officials, however, dismissed the commissioner’s interpretations as being overly
sympathetic to the Indians. This view was especially prevalent among white settlers. On
July 30, 1871, Judge B. Hudson o f Grant County, New Mexico, sent the Superintendent
of Indian Affairs in Arizona a series o f resolutions signed by local citizens as well as a
personal message that read in part: “What we want to know is, whether our stock can be
recovered or not fi'om Indians on your reservation . . . or are we forever at the mercy o f
these thieving murderous Apaches . . .if so, the sooner we know the better, because the
citizens o f this county are determined to put a stop to it, and if they carry out their
program the Camp Grant massacre will be thrown entirely in the shade, and Alamosa will

^*Vincent Colyer even quotes agent Steck in his introduction to his official report: “In 1857 M. Steck,
the Apache Indian agent for N ew M exico, which then included Arizona, wrote, ‘In my last annual report I
urged the necessity o f liberally supplying the Indians o f my agency with food. Another year’s experience
and close observation has still more forcibly impressed m e with the conviction that this is the only means
o f effectually controlling the Apache tribe.” In Colyer, 4-5; see also Thomas Alexander, The F ederal
Frontier: Interior D epartm ent P o licy in Idaho, Utah, a n d Arizona, 18 6 3 -1896 (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
University M icrofilm s, 1974).
Brennan, 103.
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stand next to Sand Creek

(Emphasis in the original.)

Many members o f Congress shared Judge Hudson’s sentiment, but most did not want
to look as if they were rejecting Colyer’s plan outright. Reformers still held enough
political power to make reelection troublesome, so a coalition formed to allow the
implementation o f any o f Colyer’s suggestions that did not interfere with Crooks’ plans.
Consequently, once Colyer left Arizona, Crook received the green light to resume his
efforts, but before he could get under way, he once again received orders to stop.
Refusing to be dallied with, influential reformers had convinced the Grant administration
that military interference underlay Congress’ refusal to accept Colyer’s whole plan. As
such, they demanded another investigation to be done by someone who could stop any
further military insubordination. Their man tfiis time was peace advocate Major-General
Otis Oliver Howard.”
Howard was an ideal candidate not only because o f his military credentials, but also
due to his exemplary record as a reformer. Before coming to Arizona, Howard had just
recently been Commissioner o f the Bureau o f Freedman and Refiigees. For his part,
General Crook was not any more impressed by General Howard than he had been o f
Commissioner Colyer. In his autobiography Crook wrote o f Howard, “I was very much
amused at the General’s opinion o f himself. He told me that he thought the Creator had
placed him on earth to be the Moses to the Negros [sic]. Having accomplished that

A s quoted in Colyer, 74-5.
” Major-General O. O. Howard, M y Life a n d E xperiences Am ong O ur H ostile Indians: A R ecord o f
P ersonal O bservations, Adventures, a n d Cam paigns Am ong the Indians o f the G reat West With Some
Account o f th eir Life, Habits, Traits, Religion, Cerem onies, Dress, Savage Instincts, A n d Custom s in
P eace a n d War (Hartford, Conn.: A .D . Worthington & Company, 1907)122-3.
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mission, he felt satisfied his next mission was with the Indians.” As credulous as Crook
was, he nevertheless suspended his operations and stoically served as Howard’s guide.
As had Vincent Colyer, General Howard met with a number of aggrieved Indian
bands, acknowledged their suffering, and promised that he would attempt to fairly
reconcile Indian and American interests. His mission seemed doomed, however, as
Cochise’s band o f Chirieahua Apaches continued raiding throughout his stay. Try as he
might, he could not find anyone willing to take him to the headman’s mountain fortress.
Finally, while meeting with the Mimbres Apaches on the Rio Grande, fate intervened and
brought him an Indian guide named Tom Jeffords.
As Jeffords was a confidant o f Cochise, Howard believed “it a good providence which
now threw him in my way.”” Jeffords agreed to take Howard to Cochise and after an
extended stay with the Chiricahuas, the General consented to establish a reservation in the
southern Dragoon Mountains with Jeffords as the agent.” Cochise then promised that his
people would no longer be at war with the Americans. The Chirieahua’s kept that pledge
until their beloved leader died.’'*
After General Howard departed Arizona, General Crook resumed his grand plan for
winning the peace through war. By this time, though, many Indian groups now doubted

32

Ibid., 187.
The Tucson C itizen (Tucson), O ctober 12, 1872.

C ochise did not, however, prom ise to keep his men from raiding into M exico as he believed that
the Americans and M exicans were two separate political entities. O f this Crook’s aide-de-camp John G.
Bourke wrote, “In reference to the M exicans, he [Cochise] said he considered them as being on one side in
this matter, w hile the Americans were on another. The former had not asked him for peace as the later
had done. He did not deny that his boys were in the habit o f raiding on M exico, but this he could not
prevent as it w as no more than was done from all the reservations.” Cozzens, 152; Howard made the
treaty with C ochise on October 13, 1872.
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the Americans’ word. General Crook had threatened war if they did not submit; yet
Colyer and Howard had agreed to resolve the problems between the Indians and settlers in
the Indians’ favor. And, least they forget, there was also the very clear message sent to
the last group who had agreed to settle near Camp Grant and accept American
benevolence. Consequently, while some bands decided to take Colyer, Howard, or
Crook’s messages seriously and settled down on reservations, others chose to continue
raiding, believing that the Americans were too divided to be able to follow through on any
one plan.”
Once Crook swung into action, he ended up fulfilling not only his own promises, but
also many o f those o f Colyer and Howard. By the middle of 1874 he had successfully
forced the surrender o f virtually all the renegade bands operating north o f the Gila and Salt
Rivers, just as he said he would. Then, he placed each group on a reservation set aside
within their homeland, just as Colyer and Howard had promised.’* Had everything
continued on a natural course. Crook would have then swung through southern Arizona,
and at least for a time, Arizona’s “Indian problem” would have been resolved.” This,
however, was not the case as Crook’s initial victories opened the way for the Indian
Bureau to try to reassert its authority. O f this Crook >\Tote, “As soon as the Indians
became settled on the different reservations, gave up the warpath, and became harmless.

” An editorial dated October 26, 1872, the newspaper The Tucson C itizen complained that “there
must be unity and consistency in the course the Government toward the numerous and treacherous tribes
w ho are classed under the name in Arizona.” See Dan Thrapp for a detailed description o f Crook’s battles
with different Indian groups.
Colyer, 11, 18; The Tucson Citizen, (Tucson), October 26, 1872.
” The Tucson Citizen, (Tucson), September 6, 1871, Colyer reported that the Apaches at the W hite
Mountain Camp “furnished on hundred and ninety tons o f h a y . . . They [also) supplied the garrison with
al the wood they used. . .”
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the Indian agents, who had sought cover before, now came out as brave as sheep, and
took charge o f the agencies, and commenced theif game of plundering.”^*
In fact, by the end o f 1874, Indian policy in Arizona was once again in a state of
disarray due to conflicts among warring American factions. The first faction consisted of
General Crook and the military leaders and civilian reformers who now supported him.
The second faction was the Indian Bureau and its San Carlos agent John P. Clum. Bureau
officials resented any usurpation o f their patronage powers and saw Crook as an obstacle
to reestablishing a toehold in the Southwest. And the last faction was the Democratic
Party, members o f which had recently regained a majority in the House o f Representatives,
who planned to cut the monetary lifeblood to all Republican reform programs. This
politically motivated stinginess was not a new weapon as Agent John Gregory Bourke
attested to in 1872: “Just as soon as a few o f the more progressive people begin to
accumulate a trifle o f private property, to raise sheep, to cultivate patches o f soil and raise
scantly [sic] crops, the agent sends in the usual glowing report o f the occurrence, and to
the mind o f the average man and woman in the East it looks as if all the tribes were on the
highway to prosperity, and the first thing that Congress does is to curtail the
appropriations.”*^ But this time the cuts in funding were so deep that it soon became
virtually impossible to provide for even Indians’ basic needs.
In the impending battle. Agent Clum made the first move. To ingratiate himself with

Crook, 184. John Gregory Bourke told o f how one agent was shorting the Hualapais supplies to
sell the surplus to local miners: “Nearly the whole amount o f the salt and flour supply had been sold to the
miners in the Cerbat range, and the poor Hualpais, w ho had been such valiant and efficient allies, had
been swindled out o f everything but their breath, and but a sm all part o f that was left,” 163.
Bourke, 223.
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the local “best citizens,” and cultivate a patronage base, Clum began consolidating the
Yavapai and Apache bands onto the San Carlos reservation. This move benefited Tucson
merchants, as they were now the closest suppliers for Indian provisions. Consolidation
also made it easier for Clum to keep watch over the Indians as the reservation lay on the
broad lowlands near the Gila River.'*®
For the Indians, this reorganization was not welcomed. With agent Clum and the
Tucson merchant vested in supply contracts for San Carlos, more money went to pay for
contractors’ services than was devoted to purchasing Arming implements. As a result, the
Indians received little that would help them become self-sufficient farmers. The second
problem lay in San Carlos’ environmental setting. The flat lowlands, which covered most
o f the reservation, did not have a sufficient carrying capacity for the number o f Indians
confined within its boundaries. On top o f this, it was horribly hot in the summer and
desolate in the winters. Crowded conditions also only facilitated the spread o f disease,
and reservation living put lifelong adversaries into close contact, which resulted in
numerous assaults and even some murders'**
General Howard had created San Carlos by moving the old Camp Grant north onto
the Gila River so that it abutted the southern perimeter o f the White Mountain
Reservation. Clum saw the adjacent land as an opportunity to consolidate the Indians in
his jurisdiction, saving him time and aggravation. He first marched the Yavapai fi-om the
Fort Verde Reservation to live at San Carlos with the Aravapai Apaches. In the next year

John Dibbern, “The Reputations o f Indian Agents: A Reappraisal o f John P. Clum and Joseph C.
Tiffany,” Journal o f the Southwest, Vol. 39, N o. 2 (Summer, 1997), 204-5; Alexander, 29-30.
Bourker, 224.
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he then ordered the relocation of the White Mountain Apaches. By 1876, Cochise had
died and his band had split into factions, one of which decided to resume raiding into
northern Mexico. As Indian agent Tom Jeffords was unable to mend the fracture, Clum
obtained permission to also move the Chiricahuas north to his agency. He finished his
consolidation in 1877 by bringing Apache bands living along the Rio Grande to San
Carlos.'**
With each move. General Crook watched, impotent to stop the impending disaster.
He understood that the consolidation at San Carlos had placed various unrelated kin
groups together who now lacked the option o f moving away when disagreements broke
out. He also knew that trouble was sure to erupt once the summer heat arrived as the
Indians would request, but be denied, permission to go into the cool mountains, as was
their custom.'** Crook’s fears turned into reality when Indian men began to chaff under
Clum’s regimented system o f control, and families openly complained about starvation and
disease. With each passing month, “fiscal conservatism” and civil corruption pushed the
reservation dangerously close to catastrophe as supplies shortages and overcrowding
resulted in high levels o f malnutrition and epidemic disease. According to an editorial
published in the Globe newspaper the Arizona Silver Belt on February 7, 1879,
Flour is still not as abundant, by any means, at the San Carlos Indian Agency as it
ought to be! The contractor is derelict as usual and if the weather continues rainy he
will find it impossible to get supplies forward in time to prevent starvation from

Frederick G. Hughes, “The M ilitary and C ochise,” A rizona Star, (Tucson,) January 27 and 31,
1886; Cozzens, 136; C.L. Sonnichsen, “Tom Jeffords and the Editors,” The Journal o f A rizona History,
vol. 29, no. 2, (Summer, 1998), 118.
Bourke, On the Border, “The Apache-M ojave and the Apache-Yuma belonged to one sock, and the
Apache or Tinneh to another. They speak different languages, and although their habits o f life are almost
identical there is sufficient divergence to admit o f the entrance o f the usual jealousies and bickerings
bound to arise when two strange, illiterate tribes are brought in enforced contact,” 217.
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ensuing amongst the wards o f the Government. The consequences of
mismanagement in this matter o f Indian affaires are fearfiil to contemplate. I f the

Indians are starved they will ‘break out’ and himdreds o f white men will be
slaughtered.'*'*
In May o f 1878 The Weekly Miner, a Prescott newspaper, reported that seventeen
Indians fled the San Carlos Reservation due to the fact that “small pox was spreading at
the Agency and they had left to escape its ravages.”^* All Crook could do was lament the
shortsightedness o f such a policy, “Their removal was one of those cruel things that greed
has so often inflicted on the Indian. When the Indian appeals to arms, his only redress, the
whole country [will cry] out against the Indian.”^®
Despite simmering tensions, for a short time, an uneasy peace settled over Arizona.
This lull emboldened miners, farmers, and ranchers to swarm over the once dangerous
eastern sections o f the territory. Mormon settlers migrated down the Little Colorado
River, encircled San Carlos, and began irrigating farms with water fi-om the Salt and Gila
Rivers. The result was water shortages on the reservation as well as downriver for the
Pima and Maricopa.'** In fact, the Mormons drew off so much river water that the Pimans
began raiding white settlements to acquire enough food to keep their families from
starving. They were obviously dismayed to discover that they were no longer trusted

A rizona S ilver Belt, (Globe), February 7, 1879; see also, A rizona S ilver Belt, (Globe), February 28,
1878: “We hear very general complaints o f Indians robbing m iners’ cabins in the district. The truth is the
poor wretches are starving, and a kind hearted victim does not like to punish them as they deserve. We
learn that except lean b eef they now get very little in the way o f food at the San Carlos Indian Reservation,
and are sent out to do the best they can in keeping bodies and souls together. W e hope that som e m eans
w ill be adopted to give the Indians their rights.”
The W eekly

(Prescott), May 31, 1878

^ Crook, 184; Dibbern, 203-5; Alexander, 124.
A Pima ch ief told General Howard that one the Mormon farmers began drawing water from the
Gila and Salt Rivers “the poor Pimans and Maricopas lose their water and their crops.” Quoted in
Cozzens, 117.
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allies now that the Apaches were pacified, and had instead become mere impediments to
progress. Settlers quickly forgot their praise for these industrious Indians and instead now
routinely argued that their once loyal Piman allies should be removed to some other
location. Some Americans even make the ease for sending the Pimans to Indian Territory
in Oklahoma.'**
An editorial in the Prescott newspaper The Daily Miner, January 30, 1879, read in
part: “The Pima Indians should be taken fi-om their present location on the Salt River, and
placed by themselves, where they will not come in contact with white people. The lands
they are settled upon are owned by bona fide citizens, who located them, and are kept
fi-om peacefiil occupation by old Chin-chi-a-cum, one of the meanest old wretches on the
face o f the earth.”^® By the end o f the year, voices such as this, clamoring for displacing
the Pimans, grew exponentially.
In response to such hostility, the Pimans did not immediately fights back, but instead
revived an older form o f defense. An editorial in December o f 1879 made it clear that the
Pimans were responding with a strategy similar to one pioneered by their Hohokam
ancestors: increasing their fighting force through alliance building. “For several years a
large number o f citizens living at the Tempe Settlement, which by the way, is the best
portion o f the Salt River, had been annoyed, plundered and harassed by the Pima Indians,
who live opposite on the north side o f the River. From a small number, these Indians had
increased by recruits from the Gila [River], until n ow they have 1,000 souls.”^®

' Pim ans living along the Gila River told Comm issioner Colyer that “They were always led to
suppose that the white men wanted them to kill the Apaches . . . ” Colyer, 75.
The D a ily M iner,{ Prescott), January 30, 1879.
The A rizona Miner, (Prescott), December 18, 1879.
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In a letter to Commissioner Colyer, Special Indian Agent to the Pimans J. H. Stout
reported that.
The time for preparing their land is now at hand, but having no water they can
do nothing . . . On Sunday Morning last, Chin-kun . . . came to me and said that for
many years he and his people had ‘lived from what they planted,’ but now they had
no water; white men up the river had taken it from them, & etc. After spending a
few moments in telling me o f his wrongs, he made known the object o f his visit,
which was to obtain leave to take the warriors o f his village . . . and by force o f arms
drive the whites from the river.”*'
Military advisor General McDowell also noted the Piman’s destitution and petitioned
the federal government to assist its former allies: “They are now suffering, and are likely
to suffer, from no act o f their own but by reason o f settlements o f whites on the Gila river
above their farms, and the diversion o f the water which they have heretofore been
depending upon to irrigate their ground, for the land will produce no grain without
irrigation.”**
On the San Carlos Reservation, upriver, in addition to the serious lack o f water, the
Indian also faced encroaching prospectors who stirred up trouble as they searched for
mineral wealth. The miners were especially eager to access reservation land, as soldiers
serving under General Crook had included the hunt for minerals into their daily, scouting
missions. According to soldier John Gregory Bourke, “We were among the very first to
come upon the rich ledges o f copper which have since furnished the mainstay to the
prosperity o f the town o f Clifton, on the border o f New Mexico, and we knocked off
pieces o f pure metal, and brought them back to Tucson to show to the people there . . .”**

"C olyer, 21.
” The A rizona Miner, (Prescott), November 22, 1878.
” Bourke, 98-9.
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Lured by such reports, miners three times located ore deposits within the reservation’s
boundaries and three times were able to convince territorial officials and businessmen—
including agent Clum—to lobby the President to contract the reservation’s boundaries.
Not only did this shrink the amount o f land available to support the Indians, but it also put
Americans on the doorsteps o f bands who were already seething with anger over
government duplicity.*'*
Due to building pressure, tension flared into conflict at San Carlos after 1875, causing
both the Chiricahua and Güa Apaches to flee the reservation. It was especially galling to
the Chiricahuas to be treated as defeated prisoners as they saw themselves as conquerors.
Both groups o f Apaches had apparently reasoned that the Americans were still internally
divided, which Clum’s actions seemed to confirm, and therefore would be unable to mount
an eflective efibrt to force them back to the reservation. They were incorrect in this
general appraisal, however, as army soldiers did come to return them to San Carlos. At
the same time, they were correct in assuming that division within the American ranks had
weakened the military, because once they were back on the reservation, the soldiers were
stretched too thin to keep the Apaches fi-om fleeing again.**
According to Captain Charles B. Gatewood, Apaches such as Victorio left the
reservation due to “restlessness, caused by robbery and mismanagement by their agents
(the same old story the West over) and innate desire to slay, pillage, steal, and create

Ibid., 434: “It w as openly asserted that the Apaches were to be driven from the reservation marked
out for them by V incent Colyer and General O. O. Howard, upon which they had been living for more
than eleven years. N o one ever heard the Apache story, and no one seemed to care whether they had a
story or not;” by 1878, an editorial celebrated the resulting pacification o f the Indians in the Tucson
newspaper The C itizen , August 30, 1878, called for a program under which Americans could now “utilize
the labor o f these Indians to our great benefit.”
" The C itizen, (Tucson), June 17, 1876.
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havoc generally, summed up in the word 'revenge.

(Emphasis added.) By 1882

conditions on the reservation had gotten so bad that Cochise’s former band fled once more
and declared war on the Americans.**
Fearful Arizonans called for General Crook to return and once again manage their
Indian problem. Bolder citizens dismissed using the military and argued that if the troops
could not settle the Indian problem permanently then “the so-called army be withdrawn
from the Territory and settlers be permitted to defend themselves.”** In a column that
appeared in the Arizona Weekly Star, in Tucson, Charles Poston took an opposing view
and placed blame not on the military, but instead on the Indian Bureau: “The only honest

Charles B. Gatewood, “Campaigning against Victorio in 1879,” in Eyew itness to the Indian Wars,
1865-1890, ed. Peter C ozzens (M echanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 231; Victorio also told E C.
Kemble, an inspector for the Bureau o f Indian Affairs, “A good many years ago, before my hair was gray,
and when the Americans first began to com e into this country, w e were sitting in a room like this eating
your bread and drinking coffee. W e had had som e trouble with your people, but w e thought it was all
ended when they asked us to com e to a feast. We left our guns and bows and were ready to smoke with
your people. In a moment, and w hile w e were eating, the house w as surrounded with soldiers, w ho put
their guns through the windows and shot down all but five o f our party. I was one w ho esca p ed .. .Since
then I cannot lie down beside the road and not be afraid.” E. C. Kemble, “Victorio and His Y oung M en,”
N ew York Time, November 28, 1880; Cozzens, 207.
According to relevant sources-newspapers, governor’s reports, journals-the people o f Arizona were
having as much if not more difficulty with non-Indian robbers and outlaws as they were with the Apaches.
Salesman Don Maguire wrote in his journal, “I was very anxious to reach Prescott, which was yet sixty
m iles away. I was doubly anxious, as w e were in bandit-infested country and also in a region were there
were yet straggling Apaches w atching that they m ight waylay and murder solitary travelers.” Maguire,
58; also, according to the Tucson newspaper The Citizen, December 11, 1875, Arizona settlers had filed
claim s with the federal governm ent for damages caused by “Indians” totaling over $5,000,000.
" The tone o f a Tucson editorial published on April 22, 1876, indicates an acceptance o f Crooks
tactics for “pacifying” the Apaches. Instead o f resorting to a call for extermination, which was usually the
case before the Camp Grant Massacre, this directive calls for the military to bring all its forces to bear on
renegades, including the use o f Apache scouts, but the avoidance o f harming peaceful Indians; in a
memorial, the Society o f Arizona Pioneers appealed to President Grover Cleveland “for relief from the
curse o f the Apache Indian depredations that [had] been allowed to rest upon them so long by previous
administrations.” Tucson, Arizona, June 25, 1885, Arizona Historical Society; an article even appeared
in the San Francisco newspapers claim ing that “troops are required in the neighborhood o f San Carlos
reservation to protect the Indians from a threatened attack by the lawless w hite elem ent,” telegraph from
Governor Zulick o f A rizona to the S ecretary o f the Interior, D ecem ber 30, 1885, Interior D epartm ent
Territorial P apers Arizona, 1868-1913, roll \ , E xecutive P roceedings a n d O fficial Correspondence: July
1, 1887-D ecem ber 31, 7903 (W ashington D .C ., National Archives, 1963).
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remedy [to the problems caused by corrupt Indian agents] is to turn the Indian business
over to the War Department. There is some honor in the military service—not much in
the civil.”*®
General Crook did return to Arizona in 1882 to once again put the territory’s house in
order. After arriving, Crook negotiated an agreement with Mexico to allow his men to
cross the international border. Then, reviving his strategy o f offering the Indians a clear
choice between war and peace, he underscored his ultimatum with relentless pursuit.
Understanding the importance o f backing his threats with actions, he even pursued the
Chiricahuas through the Sierra Madre Mountains twice, once in 1883 and again in 1886.
After negotiating a peaceful return the second time with Chiricahua leader Geronimo, the
deal fell apart before Crook could deliver his band back to San Carlos. Hoping that
government officials would have patience and continue to support his efforts. Crook
offered to resign, assuming they would decline. Instead, military leaders accepted and
replaced him with his rival General Miles Nelson.*®
Nelson ultimately received credit for ending the Chiricahua standoff, yet he did so only
by adopting Crook’s methods. First, he hired Apache scouts to locate the renegade band;
then. Miles engaged Geronimo in negotiations just as Crook would have. Where he
departed from Crook’s plan was in not offering the Chiricahuas a diplomatic avenue for
resolving the standoff. Instead, Miles informed Geronimo that he had already arranged for
the deportation o f all Chiricahuas to Florida and that he would only accept G eronim o’s

A rizona W eekly Star, (Tucson), May 20, 1880.
** Joe A. Stout, Jr., "Soldiering and Suffering in The Geronimo Campaign: Rem iniscences o f
Lawrence R. Jerome," Journal o f the West 11, no. 1 (January 1972): 156.
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surrender if he agreed to willingly follow his kin. Crook was heartbroken to learn o f this
as he had promised Geronimo that he would not be exiled. With his only other alternative
being continued flight, Geronimo finally agreed to Mile’s terms and led his band back
across the U.S. border.*’ Then, on September 4, 1886, soldiers loaded the Chiricahuas
onto railroad boxcars, and with one motion o f the conductor’s hand, the U.S. military
shipped Arizona’s Indian problem away to a prison camp in Florida.**
The departing railcars marked two important turning points in Arizona history. First,
the territory moved fi-om an era of negotiated compromise in which the worldviews of
Americans and Indians co-existed, to a new era in which Americans alone set the standard
for social relations and resource consumption. And second, the fi-eedom minority groups,
such as Mexican and Chinese settlers, derived fi-om Indian violence, that limited EuroAmerican emigration to the territory, quickly disappeared. Consequently, no longer
deterred by Indian raids, large numbers o f Euro-American settlers began arriving who
would now relegate minority groups to more typical, subordinate positions.
The North Americans becoming the hegemonic power in Arizona was clearly not the
first time a cultural group had succeeded in seizing the region’s resources for their own
desires. But this last cycle o f conquest did mark the first time that a society had so
completely taken control and the first time that the area has been almost completely
integrated into a larger socio-political system. It seems clear fi-om historical precedent.

Arizona settlers supported this plan as is evident in the June, 1886, memorial complied by the
Tucson Arizona Society o f Pioneer in which they wrote: “The Society o f Arizona Pioneers again propose
to appeal to the National Government, to obtain the only effective remedy for all tim e to com e, namely:
the speedy and absolute removal o f the Apache Indians from our Territory.” M em orial, 1886 (Tucson:
Arizona Historical Society) MS.
Stout, 168-9.
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though, that the Americans will mostly likely follow in the footsteps o f their predecessors
and will eventually fail in their efforts to tame the Southwest. Just as the Hohokam, the
Spanish, and Apaches were unable to extent their power over both nature and other
cultural groups for long, the Americans will also one day learn that technology and
political power alone cannot save them from the next devastating drought or the arrival of
newcomers from distant lands who have their own ideas about how Arizona and her
resources should be managed.**

Shaw and Ciolek-Torrello, 7, write: “Historical land-use practices (e.g., rapid withdrawal o f
groundwater, grazing , wood cutting, and land clearing for urban expansion), possibly in combination
with natural clim atic change, have caused environments in southern Arizona to become seriously
degraded. Prior to the 1850s, southern Arizona drainages were characterized by greater surface water,
cienegas, and dense stands o f riparian v eg eta tio n .. . Over the last century, dense riparian com m unities
along most large drainages in the Tucson Basin have largely been elim inated.”
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